

Despite the fact that the populations of China and India make up over one quarter of the population of the Earth, and that “60% of humanity lives in the Pacific Basin,”¹ and that both countries have a history that in some cases predates that of Greece and the ancient Near-East there is not a voluminous body of work on the rhetoric of Asia. The *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* in its almost twenty years of publication has devoted one article to Asian rhetoric² and has published one bibliography devoted to the subject of Asian Rhetoric.³ Most of the references to be found in this bibliography are to speeches and the current writings of figures such as Mao Tse-Tung and other recent figures that have played a prominent part in the Asian political scene.

The major research that has been done in the area of Asian rhetoric seems to be primarily the work of Robert T. Oliver, a former professor of speech at Pennsylvania State University and who wrote extensively on the subject of Asian rhetoric and A. S. Cua of Catholic University who written on argumentation and Confucian rhetoric.

What I wish to focus on in this paper is the way in which ethical qualities are conveyed and which ethical qualities are particularly valued in Asian rhetoric and how this contrasts with the aretaic qualities that the speaker wishes to convey in the Aristotelian model of rhetoric. This enterprise, however, is somewhat handicapped by the fact there do not appear to be any paradigmatic examples of Asian rhetoric that are compact enough to be subjected to a thorough analysis, nor are there, in the popular literature of China, any that are of an early enough date to be models of Asian rhetoric and still fall within the purview of the historical era that we are dealing with. The *Bhagavad Gita* is an extended rhetorical piece which forms part of a larger epic, the *Mahabharata* and the larger unit of which it is a part has sometimes been compared to the *Iliad* both in terms of length (the *Mahabharata* is longer) and in terms of its centrality to Indian culture, however, because of the *Gita's* extensive length it is not suitable for a detailed analysis and there seems to be no other primary example from India that could serve as a paradigm for that country's rhetorical use of *ethos*.

The situation with respect to devising a paradigmatic oration for the rhetoric of China is even worse in that the central works of the Confucian tradition are not

¹ J. Vernon Jensen, “Teaching East Asian Rhetoric”, *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, (XVII, 2, 1987) 136

² The article by Jensen referred to above.

³ J. Vernon Jensen, “Bibliography of East Asian Rhetoric”, *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, (XVII, 2, 1987) 213–231.

primarily concerned with rhetoric but with ritual, poetry, and ethical customs. Popular works that provide paradigms might include the six classic novels (*San Kuo Yen Yi* (*Romance of the Three Kingdoms*); *Shui Hu Chuan* (*The Story of the Water Margin*); *Hsi Yu Chi* (*Pilgrimage to the Western Regions*); *Chin P'ing Mei* (*Golden Vase of Plum Flowers*); *Ju-lin Wai Shih* (*Unofficial History of Officialdom*); and *Hung Lou Meng* (*Dream of the Red Chamber*)), however, these all come during the post-Classical period and the earliest, the *San Kuo Yen Ki* dates from 1494.⁴

Due to the lack of suitable models therefore I must rely on secondary sources in presenting any kind of information about *ethos* in Asian rhetoric. A primary resource then will be the work of Robert Oliver who as a teacher of speech and one who worked extensively in Asia is familiar with patterns of Oriental thought. Dr. Cua, who teaches philosophy at Catholic University, has been kind enough to loan me a copy of his paper "The Possibility of a Confucian theory of Rhetoric" which will appear in a forthcoming volume edited by Kathleen Jamieson entitled *Rhetoric: East and West*.

ETHOS IN CLASSIC TIMES

The classical *πιστεῖς* or proofs were considered to be those of *ἠθος*, *πάθος*, and *λογος*, appeals in which the rhetorician presented himself as a person of good character, or in which he appealed to the emotions of his audience, or in which he appealed to the principles of reason. In the Western tradition, however, it has usually been felt that the strongest appeal is that of *ethos*, the ethical appeal, and that rhetoric derives its force from the character of the speaker.⁵ In the Greco-Roman tradition this ethical appeal has been based on the character of the speaker, that he has shown himself to be a person of good sense, good character, and good will or *φρονεσις*, *αρετε* and *ευνοια*.⁶

Aristotle links his discussion of *ethos* with a discussion of the virtues as a means of generating goodwill and friendship.

These qualities [good sense, good character, and good will] are all that are necessary, so that the speaker who appears to possess all three will necessarily convince his hearers. The means whereby he may appear

⁴ The names of the six classic novels and their translations are taken from Ch'u Chai and Winberg Chia, ed. and trans., *A Treasury of Chinese Literature: A New Prose Anthology Including Fiction and Drama*, (New York, Appleton-Century, 1965) which also includes excerpts of translated passages of each of the novels.

⁵ George A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times*, (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 33, 101, *et passim*.

⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *The "Art" of Rhetoric*, John Henry Freese trans., (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1926), 171 *et passim*.

sensible and good must be inferred from the classification of the virtue; for to make himself appear such he would employ the same means as he would in the case of others.⁷

It is only after this discussion that Aristotle proceeds to discuss the emotions, which he defines as “all those affections which cause men to change their opinion in regard to their judgements, and are accompanied by pleasure and pain.”⁸ Ethos is a way of affecting the emotions but it is not itself one of the emotions.

Quintilian, however, classes ethos as one or more of the emotions⁹ specifically those that are calm and gentle and which persuade and “induce a feeling of goodwill”¹⁰ These emotions, moreover, are continuous while those of pathos are momentary. The ethos that Quintilian describes or desiderates in the orator

is commended to our approval by goodness more than aught else and is not merely calm and mild, but in most cases ingratiating and courteous and such as to excite pleasure and affection in our hearers, while the chief merit in its expression lies in making it seem that all that we say derives directly from the nature of the facts and persons concerned and in the revelation of the character of the orator in such a way that all may recognize it.¹¹

This contrasts sharply with Aristotle’s view that ethos is not one of the emotions but one of the causes of the emotions. The emotions that are generated by ethos for Aristotle are those of friendship and goodwill or affection towards the speaker based on his demonstration of the aretaic qualities of φρονεσις, αρετε, and ευνοια. For Quintilian the ethical appeal has become rooted in an appeal to the emotions but specifically those gentle ones that are linked to feelings of benevolence.

The change from Aristotle’s conception of ethos to that of Quintilian represents a loss to the theory of rhetoric inasmuch as it has passed from being something that is sharply defined and differentiated into something that is vaguer and which has been assimilated into one of the emotions. The primary meaning of ethos, however, remains that of Aristotle and ethos is used throughout this paper as Aristotle used it, as a system or network of virtues that excite favorable feelings in the audience.

⁷ Aristotle, p. 171.

⁸ Aristotle, p. 173.

⁹ Quintilian, *The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian*, H. E. Butler trans., (Harvard University Press, 1921), II, 421.

¹⁰ Quintilian, II, 423.

¹¹ Quintilian, II, 423–5.

THE RHETORIC OF INDIA

As Jensen points out in his article¹² the terms “Asianism” and “Asian rhetoric” have been used in a pejorative sense for centuries to indicate a “florid, bombastic style, exaggerated rhythmic effect, excessive figurative embellishments, and the valuing of form over substance.”¹³ Of course, it should also be noted that Asia, during the classical period, referred to the area that is sometimes called Asia Minor or the Near East.

Robert T. Oliver in a *Culture and Communication: The Problem of Penetrating National and Cultural Boundaries*¹⁴ addresses the problem of establishing the ethos of Indian rhetoric. In a chapter entitled “The Rhetoric of Hindu-Buddhist Idea Systems” he examines the nature of Indian rhetoric and observes that writing was considered to be at best an approximation of what the speaker meant originally:

In India, also, even down to the nineteenth century, writing was considered too imprecise a means of conveying meaning to have any great communicative importance. Until the seventeenth century, books were inscribed on leaves and sheets of bark, which were hung like washing on lines and were called “treasure houses of the Goddess of Speech.” What was truly meant was what was said at the time of composition. Then a rough approximation of this meaning was transmuted into visible symbols and “stored”; but what the true meaning might be could only be conjectured in terms of the personalities, the problems, and the intentions of the composers of the message. Reading became a search for precision—aided but also handicapped by the admittedly imprecise medium of written words.¹⁵

What is especially noteworthy here is the similarity to the Plato’s comments on writing in the *Phaedrus*.¹⁶ Our main concern, however, is not with the Indian view of speech as opposed to writing but of the kind of ethical appeal, in short the aretaic qualities, which is used as a form of proof in Indian rhetoric.

Oliver poses four questions, the last of which is “...what kind of discourse is effective? What are the responsibilities of speakers? What are the proper uses of

¹² Jensen, 138.

¹³ Jensen, 138.

¹⁴ Robert T. Oliver, *Culture and Communication: The Problem of Penetrating National and Cultural Boundaries*, (Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, 1962)

¹⁵ Oliver, *Culture*, p. 141

¹⁶ Plato’s argument is that the written word is not an aid to memory but a substitute for it and that because it is the speech of a living person it is incapable of defending itself against attack. (Plato, *Phaedrus and the Seventh and Eighth Letters*, Walter Hamilton trans., (Baltimore: Penguin, 1973) 95-99.

speech?”¹⁷ The answers that he gives are based on his conception of Buddhist rhetoric. Briefly put the answer is that while we may appeal to the selfishness of people “we should not appeal *for* selfishness but *from* it.” The ethical appeal is not based on personal advantage but is rather a warning against it.

A better summary of the Indian view of ethos may be obtained from Oliver’s book *Communication and Culture in Ancient India and China* in which he states that

A person was not valued for his idiosyncratic characteristics but for his compatibility with his group. *Ethos* in ancient India did not arise from special merits of the individual but from his quality of representation of his family, his community, and his caste.¹⁸

This conception of conformity or representation of family, community and caste is, of course, most marked in the rhetoric of Hinduism. What seems most noticeable, however, from even a superficial reading of the Hindu religious classics, such as the *Gita* or the *Upanishads* is the way in which the ethical appeal of Krishna or of the guru derives not just from his relationship to the caste but from his special relationship to the divine. In this respect there seem to be parallels to what Kennedy sees as the source of the authority of Judeo-Christian rhetoric. This is an aspect that Oliver does not deal with in either of his books and would seem to be a fruitful area for investigation.¹⁹

In contrast to the Hindu rhetorician, who is bound by exigencies of caste, community, and family, Oliver sees the Buddhist rhetorician as confronting a different set of problems. As noted above²⁰ the problem for the Buddhist rhetorician was one of dealing with an appeal that was not *to* the selfishness of men but one that was *from* that selfishness. Oliver’s comment on this point is that “Speakers will attain their greatest effectiveness when they show their listeners that they ought not to seek satisfaction of their desires but should instead seek to transcend desire itself.”²¹ This attempt to transcend desire contrasts sharply with Aristotle’s discussion of the emotions. The second book of the *Rhetoric* is an attempt to show how the

¹⁷ Oliver, *Culture*, 146

¹⁸ Robert T. Oliver, *Communication and Culture in Ancient India and China*, (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1971), 21.

¹⁹ Kennedy, 121-25, *et passim*.

An example of this special relationship between the speaker and the divine in the *Gita* would be Krishna’s revelation of his identity with Vishnu in book 10. This would seem to parallel those episodes in the Gospels in which Jesus reveals himself to his disciples. This parallel, however, is only a suggestion that awaits further research by an investigator skilled in Indian languages and philosophy.

²⁰ Cf. p. 4 above.

²¹ Oliver, *Communication*, 79.

emotions can be manipulated in order to create a favorable disposition towards the speaker whether by arousing an emotion, such as anger, or by attempting to calm it and restrain it. Since the emotions are rooted in desire, for instance anger, which is

a longing, accompanied by pain, for a real or apparent revenge for a real or apparent slight, affecting a man himself or one of his friends, when such a slight is undeserved.²²

The speaker is advised by Aristotle to:

put the hearers into the frame of mind of those who are inclined to anger, and to show that his opponents are responsible for things which rouse men to anger and are people of the kind with whom men are angry.²³

This is obviously an attempt not to pass beyond desire but to manipulate and use desire for one's own purposes. The Western attempt to appeal to the passions would then be a violation of those principles of calmness and detachment that were implied by Oliver's statement that the Buddhist rhetoric should attempt to transcend desire.

Speech, in the Buddhist conception, according to Oliver, has three functions, it is to be "true, real (in terms of the attendant circumstances), and useful..."²⁴ This is, as Oliver says, the beginning of a theory of rhetoric and what remains, as far as the use of ethos goes, is to enumerate the aretaic qualities of the speaker. Oliver quotes the Buddha's description of the monk as an effective preacher:

Abandoning falsehood, he speaks the truth, is truthful, faithful, trustworthy, and breaks not his word to his people.

Abandoning slander, he does not tell what he has heard in one place to cause dissension elsewhere. He heals divisions and encourages friendships, delighting in concord and speaking what produces it.

Abandoning harsh language, his speech is blameless, pleasant to the ear, reaching the heart, urbane, and attractive to the multitude.

Abandoning frivolous language, he speaks duly and in accordance with the doctrine and discipline, and his speech is such as to be remembered, elegant, clear and to the point.²⁵

The qualities that are particularly valued in the Buddhist monk as speaker then are not those qualities which are aggressive and manipulative but those qualities which tend towards conciliation. Thus he is supposed to be truthful and to encourage concord rather than seeking what a Westerner would regard as a victory. The monk is also described as being urbane and sober, qualities which would seem

²² Aristotle, 173.

²³ Aristotle, 185.

²⁴ Oliver, *Communication*, 80.

²⁵ Oliver, *Communication*, 80–81.

to correspond to the notion of *φρονεσις* in Western rhetoric. In fact the overall qualities of good sense, good character, and good will would seem to be as desirable in Buddhist rhetoric as they are in Western rhetoric, the most salient difference, however, is that whereas the goal of the Western rhetorician is persuasion, i.e., a change of opinion and a consequent action based upon this opinion, the goal of the Buddhist rhetorician is, by implication, conciliation and mediation. The qualities that enable this conciliation are the monk's truthfulness, faithfulness, trustworthiness, urbanity and sobriety.

The rhetoric of India, in both its Hindu and its Buddhist forms, is not without an ethical basis then. The nature of the ethical appeal, however, is rooted in conceptions of the good, of the aretaic qualities that are especially prized and valued, from those qualities that are prized and valued in the West. Thus for the Hindu rhetorician, as described by Oliver, the primary qualities to be sought are those by which he may fully represent the traditions of family, community, and caste, while for the Buddhist rhetorician the qualities that are valued may be described as those of truthfulness, compassion, and conciliation.

ETHOS IN CHINA

Chinese rhetoric cannot be discussed as a unified whole deriving from a common tradition, which is one legitimate way of describing the Western practice of rhetoric insofar as it can be said to derive from Aristotle and the classical orators of Greece and Rome. The problem in discussing ethos in any concept of Chinese rhetoric is that there are at least three major strands of religious and ethical precepts and practice that are intertwined with Chinese life and thought. These strands are the Confucianist system of ethics, and the Buddhist and Taoist religious and magical practices. These strands intertwine and commingle so that a person can be a practitioner of all three beliefs at one and the same time.²⁶ Within each of these major strands or traditions there are also conflicting interpretations and divergences as well as schools of thought that exist outside of the major ethical and religious traditions. Since there is more work available on the Confucian tradition it seems best to focus on that and provide a brief summary of what can be asserted about ethos and the aretaic notions that inform Confucian rhetoric.

Oliver asserts that the values of Chinese culture of this period were those which were particularly appropriate for crowded urban conditions and that this made for a society that valued tolerance and harmony. As he says:

They could not abide unnecessary conflict for it was too disruptive. They developed a high regard for tolerance. Their political ideal was less justice and equality than harmony. To them, justice was so complicated that the very effort to define it often led to disputes and conflict; and they thought that equality manifestly was not observable among human beings.

A society that values harmony and tolerance cannot be expected to value the same things that a society which believes that debates can be won and that people can be persuaded to change their opinions values. The notion of what constitutes a good man will correspondingly differ from one society or culture to the next.²⁷ If we

²⁶ For example, the author of the *Hsi Yu Chi*, which records the journey of a monk from China to India to fetch back the scriptures of Mahayana Buddhism, has his principal character, a stone monkey, learn Taoist alchemy and lead a rebellion against the heavenly deities which include Kuan Yin and Gautama Buddha.

The *Hsi Yu Chi* has been translated by Arthur Waley in an abridged one volume edition entitled *Monkey* (New York. Grove Press. 19xx) and is also available in a four volume, unabridged edition translated by Anthony Yu and entitled *The Journey to the West* (Chicago. University of Chicago Press. 198x).

²⁷ Dr. A. S. Cua in his paper “The Possibility of a Confucian Theory of Rhetoric” refers to Professor Oliver’s statement that “the kinds of ideas that interest or move people and the reasons why they accept or reject are not universals, they are particular attributes of specific cultures” as cultural relativism. It would seem, however, that while peoples and cultures differ in assigning certain specific

accept the notion that each culture or society values something that it considers to be particularly conducive to persuasion then the problem is one of ascertaining what those values are and how those values are implemented in rhetoric.

Oliver gives a summary of those virtues that are recognized by Confucius as being especially persuasive as rectitude, sincerity, and consideration and respectfulness.²⁸ Dr. Cua, however, in his book *Ethical Argumentation* refers to the “basic Confucian aretaic notions, or notions of virtue, as *li*, *i* (righteousness, rightness), and *jen* (benevolence).”²⁹ These are the virtues which Dr. Cua sees as comprising the background out of which the ethos of a Confucian rhetoric arises.

Our discussion of the nature of Confucian argument and its use of the ethical appeal will be based primarily on the work of Dr. Cua and his discussion of Hsün Tsu and the practice of rectifying terms.

For Hsün Tsu “the telos of argumentation...is an ethical vision of human excellence.”³⁰ The nature of that ethical vision and how the aretaic notions of *li*, *i*, and *jen* relate to that vision is the topic of the remainder of this paper.

Li or propriety is perceived by Hsün Tsu as having “interdependent moral, aesthetic, and religious dimensions.”³¹ Argumentation is a process that involves not two opponents that are engaged in a contest to determine a victor but a co-operative enterprise between concerned and responsible parties³² that are attempting to arrive at some conclusion. As a co-operative enterprise it must obey a co-operative principle. Since it is co-operative in nature contentiousness is out of place and

betrays the lack of concern with a matter of common interest. Were contentiousness an appropriate attitude, argumentation would be more like a debate or an adversary proceeding rather than a serious undertaking among concerned and responsible participants.... Although argumentation

qualities pre-eminence they do agree in recognizing that there are concepts such as truth, beauty, goodness and so on whatever their individual portrayal of these qualities may be.

Cf. A. S. Cua “The Possibility of a Confucian Theory of Rhetoric” p.1.

For an interesting discussion of what he terms the *tao* as an underlying moral principle that exists despite all differences of perception see C. S. Lewis, *The Abolition of Man: or Reflections on Education with Special Reference to the Teaching of English in the Upper Forms of Schools*, (Macmillan, New York, 1947). Lewis, of course, was not primarily a philosopher or an anthropologist nor a profound student of oriental religion but his discussion is interesting in that he sees a common ground underlying ethical values, however, different the cultural enunciation of those values may be.

²⁸ Oliver, *Communication*, 138.

²⁹ A. S. Cua, *Ethical Argumentation*, (University of Hawaii Press, n.p., 1985), 6.

³⁰ Cua, *Ethical*, 3.

³¹ Cua, *Ethical*, 5.

³² Cua, *Ethical*, 6.

is a form of persuasive discourse, it is neither a contest nor a mere exhibition of dialectical skills.³³

Since the argument is a cooperative enterprise, in which contentiousness has no place, it follows that although disputable issues will arise

they must be taken in light of the governing ethical objective (*tao*). In this setting, the participants, instead of being obstinate in maintaining their proposals, must look for alternatives that are more likely to achieve consensus.³⁴

The nature of the ethical appeal then is changed from an appeal that seeks to demonstrate moral and ethical superiority at the expense of the opponent to an appeal that seeks a common ground and consensus based on recognition of the opponent's own worth even while one manifests disagreements with him. One must, in other words "be circumspect in one's words so that other's self-respect will not be injured...."³⁵ This forms one of the attributes of the superior man, the *chün-tzu*, and is important in recognizing that the appeal of this kind of rhetorical ethos is centered on reconciliation or accommodation.

The most important of these virtues that make up the aretaic notions of Confucian rhetoric is *li*, which is propriety.³⁶ Propriety in this sense has a moral and an æsthetic dimension.³⁷ *Li* are, for Hsün Tsu,

basically rules of civility. They may be regarded as argumentative protocols, functionally equivalent to, say, those in *Robert's Rules of Order*—procedures to be observed to ensure orderly conduct.³⁸

This concern for propriety is matched by concern for others but "at the heart of *jen*-conduct is a desire to prevent injury to others."³⁹ This concern for others extends not only to the actual participants in the argument but to those non-participants who will be affected by the proposal.⁴⁰ This follows from the fact

³³ Cua, *Ethical*, 8.

³⁴ Cua, *Ethical*, 9.

³⁵ Cua, *Ethical*, 10.

³⁶ Oliver quotes Confucius by way of defining *li* "The duties are those between sovereign and minister, between father and son, between husband and wife, between elder brother and younger, and those belonging to the intercourse of friends." (Oliver, *Communication*, p 142.) This series of five kinds of relationships was obviously intended to be all inclusive, it did, however, exclude relations between strangers.

³⁷ Cua, *Ethical*, 10.

³⁸ Cua, *Ethical*, 10.

³⁹ Cua, *Ethical*, 12.

⁴⁰ Cua, *Ethical*, 12.

that argument is engaged in not for its own sake but “for the sake of inculcating beliefs that have an influence on action.”⁴¹

The nature of a rhetoric that has as its chief virtues propriety, righteousness, and benevolence and which sees these virtues as being the primary aretaic virtues will necessarily be different than a rhetoric which sees different virtues as being its primary aretaic notions. Obviously the Confucian virtues can, in some sense, be said to be subsumed into the Aristotelian ideas of φρονεσις, αρετε, and ευνοια. The man who exhibits *jen*, or benevolence, obviously manifests goodwill or ευνοια towards his fellow men; the man who exhibits *i*, or righteousness, obviously manifests good character or αρετε; likewise the man who exhibits *li*, or propriety, may be considered to exhibit not so much good sense, or φρονεσις, except insofar as the *li* arise out of a social setting to which they are a response and their violation is an act of rashness, as, again, good character or αρετε.

The nature of the ethical appeal in Confucian rhetoric then, is not one that differs in an extreme way from the nature of the ethical appeal in Classical rhetoric. Although there is no obvious correspondence between the notions of φρονεσις and *li* or any of the other virtues in the Confucian triad the whole notion of the ideal speaker may be summed up in the idea of the superior man, the *chün-tsu*. The superior man would correspond to the Classical ideal expressed in Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian that the orator must be a man of good moral character and that it is from this moral quality that his speech derives its effectiveness. Just as the ideal speaker in the West exhibits or embodies certain characteristics which make us believe in his moral goodness so also the ideal speaker in the Confucian tradition embodies certain characteristics, namely, those of *li*, *i*, and *jen* which lend him credibility. The nature, or *tao*, of the superior man is that which arises from his embodiment of the virtues named above. Dr. Cua quotes Hsün-Tzu in this regard:

The superior man is not called a worthy because he can do all that men of ability can do. The superior man is not called wise because he knows all that the wise men know. The superior man is not called a dialectician because he can dispute concerning all that the dialecticians dispute about. The superior man is not called an investigator because he can investigate everything investigators investigate into. He has his standard [tao]....⁴²

The superior man then is one who lives in accord with the *tao*, the way or standard of the superior man. One who is not contentious but is rather agreeable

⁴¹ Cua, *Ethical*, 12–13.

⁴² Cua, *Possibility*, 8.

and conciliatory. He is clear minded and engages in “discourse with dignity, seriousness, and sincerity.”⁴³ He also exhibits magnanimity:

He practices the art of accommodation (*chien-shu*)...Respect for both the worthy and the unworthy exemplifies such a practice, in accord with the rules of civility (*li*). Observance of these rules is a matter of decency.⁴⁴

Impartiality (*kung*) is another virtue that the superior man exhibits in his dealings with others:

Kung is opposed to partiality (*p'ien*) in two different ways. As an expression of fairmindedness, a *chiün-tzu* will discount his own person interest or preference (*szu-yü*) in favor of what he deems to be right and reasonable from an impersonal standpoint...This attitude also involves patience or receptivity (*hsüeh-hsin*) before arriving at a reasoned judgment.⁴⁵

The superior man, the *chiün-tzu* exhibits these qualities of impartiality, benevolence, and so forth just as the good man, in the Western tradition, exhibits the qualities of good sense, good character, and good will ($\phi\rho\nu\nu\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma, \alpha\rho\epsilon\tau\epsilon, \epsilon\nu\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$). These qualities are those which are found to be particularly attractive in the Confucian tradition of rhetoric as exemplified by Hsün-Tzu and as such they fall under the rubric of “style of performance”⁴⁶ for the participants in the argument and as such they are representations of the self. As Dr. Cua remarks:

There are no rules for self-representation in ethical discourse. Following Aristotle, Dante reminds us that the exercise of the virtues is not ruled-governed.[sic]⁴⁷

Other areas of concern, which we have not touched on but which Dr. Cua, for example, discusses at length in his book *Ethical Argumentation*, are those that relate to the competence of the performer and the content of the speech itself. It is to a source such as this that the interested reader should turn for a more thorough discussion of Confucian rhetorical practices than has been possible here.

SUMMARY

Given that there are no paradigmatic speeches to which we can turn for analysis, as we could turn to speeches of the embassy to Achilles in the *Iliad*, which

⁴³ Cua, *Possibility*, 9.

⁴⁴ Cua, *Possibility*, 10.

⁴⁵ Cua, *Possibility*, 11.

⁴⁶ Cua, *Possibility*, 11.

⁴⁷ Cua, *Possibility*, 12.

provides with an idea of what a pre-Socratic Western rhetoric might have been like, to get some idea of the nature of Indian and Chinese rhetoric we were forced to turn to secondary sources to get some idea of the ethical concerns of these foreign rhetorics.

As might be expected from cultures that have highly evolved religious and ethical beliefs there is an ethical element present in their rhetorics. It is, also as might be expected, different from the ethical concerns that dominate Western rhetoric. In the case of India the primary concern, within the Hindu-Buddhist framework sketched by Oliver, is the representation of tradition. The speaker expresses himself as an embodiment of the traditions of caste and family and it is from this representation of self as the embodiment of tradition that gives his speech act such ethical force as it possesses. In the Confucian tradition the speaker derives his ethical appeal from his presentation of himself as a person who embodies certain virtues, virtues that have a rough correspondence to the Aristotelian virtues that were to be embodied by the orator. These virtues are those of ritual propriety, righteousness, and benevolence. These virtues also entailed certain corollaries, such as impartiality and patience. These virtues, as embodied in the speaker, belong to the superior man, the *chün-tzu*, who is near to the status of a sage. Since these virtues belong to a superior man they are particularly attractive and therefore make up the ethical appeal of the *chün-tzu*.

The aims of rhetoric, as might be expected from cultures that value these virtues more highly than the West does, are also different. The primary difference, which is especially noticeable in our discussion of Confucian rhetoric, is that the aim is not that of persuasion but that of conciliation. In a rhetoric that aims at persuasion, persuasion being understood as that which causes a person to change his opinion or to form an opinion where he had previously not held one and to manifest this through some action, such as voting in a legislature or on a jury, there exists the tendency to overcome the opponent through the use of devices such as humor, irony, or to play upon the emotions in a variety of ways. In both Buddhist rhetoric, as described by Oliver, and in Confucian rhetoric, this last tendency, to play upon the emotions, is regarded as something to be resisted.⁴⁸

The rhetoric of the Far East manifests an emphasis upon certain virtues, which may have analogues in Western or Classical rhetoric but for which there is not necessarily a direct parallel. It further manifests a regard for the feelings of the

⁴⁸ Cf. p. 5 above.

opponents that is not evident in Western rhetoric. Further it aims not at victory or conversion as much as it aims at conciliation. The virtues that make up the ethical appeal are those virtues that one would expect in a rhetoric that aims at conciliation. Propriety, *li*, because it derives from a set of traditional rules emphasizes that the speaker has a due regard for the social relations that exist between him and his audience, whether it is that of the ruler or of the people or some other relationship. Righteousness, *i*, establishes the moral tone or quality of the speaker. Benevolence, *jen*, because it contains within itself the characteristics of regard for the feelings of others, receptivity, and impartiality manifests itself as the speaker's indifference to his own feelings and his concerns for the rights of others. Within this framework of aretaic notions it would be difficult, if not impossible, to construct a rhetoric that has as its aim anything but conciliation.

It is possible, of course, to reconstruct to some degree, the nature of the rhetorics of other cultural or belief systems, such as those for Taoism, Mohism, and others that contrast in a greater or lesser degree with the systems outlined here. Robert Oliver has a number of articles on aspects of Confucianism and Taoism and other people such as Chad Hansen have written about the nature of linguistics and its influence on Chinese thought,⁴⁹ however, the basic outline for the rhetorics of the two largest belief systems, Hindu-Buddhist, as Oliver refers to it, and Confucian seem to be as outlined here.

Obviously more work needs to be done in order to form a definitive analysis of Indian and Chinese rhetoric and since there has been no work in the early history of either culture that occupies a place comparable to that of Aristotle's rhetoric in the West, i.e., one that has exerted a formative influence on the rhetoric of either Indian or Chinese culture it is unlikely that anything more than a piece by piece analysis can or will be done.

⁴⁹ For Oliver see "The Rhetorical Implications of Taoism", (*Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 47: 27-35 (1961)) and "The Rhetorical Tradition in China: Confucius and Mencius" (*Today's Speech* 17: 3-8, 1961). For Chad Hansen see *Language and Logic in Ancient China* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1982).

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