


## Chapter One

### Shaw, Will, Evolution, and the Major Theorists

#### The *Status Quo Ante* Darwinian Evolution



he history of the response to Darwinism is not only a history of the modifications of biological theory but also a history of the modifications in teleology and psychology. The modification of teleological beliefs and theories is in some way ways more important than the biological changes. The apparent success of Darwin's argument meant that on a personal level the psychology of Darwin's readers suffered a shock in which the sense of purpose that each had was subject to dissolution. This dissolution, in the case of Butler and Shaw, left a void which had to be filled, and which Darwin's theory could not satisfy. The crisis of Darwinism, for Butler and Shaw, was a religious one, and the void left in their personal worlds by the apparent victory of Darwinism had to be filled by a new faith. That faith they found in their personal evolutionary beliefs. These new beliefs that Shaw and Butler held can best be understood in relation to the previous *Weltanschauung*.

Loren Eiseley, in *Darwin's Century*, and John C. Greene, in *The Death of Adam*, have sketched in detail the history of the development of evolutionary thought, and it is not necessary to go into extensive detail in covering what has already been done by two able writers.<sup>1</sup> Despite anticipations of evolutionary theory in ancient Greek philosophers the dominant view of species in the late Renaissance was that of special creation. This position was stated by John Ray in his *The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation* when he said of God's works that they were "created by God at first, and by Him conserved to this Day in the same State and Condition in which they were first made."<sup>2</sup>

This statement implies several things: first, a literal acceptance of the Creation as described in Genesis and second, and even more important than the first, the belief that all species that ever existed were preserved by God and still existed. This proposition, that all species that ever were still exist in the present day, was open to refutation as soon as a species became extinct or as soon as the remains of a species that no longer existed could be identified.<sup>3</sup> It was only necessary, then, to find one species that no longer existed to cast doubt upon the whole structure. Discoveries of species that could not be found living on

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<sup>1</sup> Loren Eiseley, *Darwin's Century: Evolution and the Men who Discovered It*, (New York: Anchor Books, 1961). John C. Greene, *The Death of Adam: Evolution and its Impact on Western Thought*, (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1959).

<sup>2</sup> Eiseley refers to the early Greek writers and to Arabic "alchemical thinking" but does not pursue the question of their relation to evolution (4). Ray's work was written in 1701 and is quoted from Greene, 5. Eiseley notes that Ray speculated "timidly" on whether certain shells represented extinct species (64).

<sup>3</sup> As a universal affirmative, or "A" type proposition, only one negative, or "O" type proposition has to be true to disprove it. (If the proposition is "All men are mortal," one need only cite the example of the Babylonian Noah, Utnapishtim, who is immortal, to refute it entirely.)

the earth began as early as 1695 when a traveler gave an account of some woolly mammoth bones that were found in Siberia. Sir Hans Sloane in 1728 described these bones, and in 1737 Breyne gave an account of the same bones accompanied by illustrations.<sup>4</sup> This is only one instance, and perhaps not the principal one, of the kind of fossil discoveries that called Ray's statement into question.

James Hutton is credited with inaugurating the geological revolution that prepared the way for the development of evolutionary theory. Hutton's theory of uniformitarianism contradicts the catastrophic theories that sought to preserve the doctrine of special creation. Catastrophism supposes that there are mass extinctions of animals. These can be observed in the fossil strata. There are also fossil indications that new species were created to succeed the old ones. Eiseley follows Charles C. Gillispie in describing this as an attempt to reconcile the creation of new species with the Biblical account of creation.<sup>5</sup> Aside from its theological poverty this position is, as Thomas Huxley pointed out in an 1860 essay entitled "The Origin of the Species," just "as hopelessly inconsistent with the Hebrew view as any other hypothesis."<sup>6</sup> The uniformitarian hypothesis, however, can account for the stratification observed when cutting deep into earth by postulating that the same processes take place in both ancient and modern seas.<sup>7</sup> In order to account for the deposition of the sediments, however, Hutton and his followers needed to postulate that the earth was older than the 6,000 years given by Bishop Usher's calculations.

The uniformitarian hypothesis eliminated the need for periodic extinctions and creations to account for the emergence of new species. It did not account for the mechanism of emergence, but the application of the idea of uniformity to species formation meant that it should be possible, in theory, to account for extinctions and speciation by means of the same principles that operate in the present. Eiseley discusses in some detail the biologists, such as Cuvier and Buffon, whose work prepared the way for evolutionary theory. He also discusses, briefly, Darwin's grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, and his relation to Lamarck.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Greene, 91, 92, 126-7.

<sup>5</sup> Eiseley, 67. Charles Coulston Gillispie, *Genesis and Geology: A Study in the Relation of Scientific Thought, Natural Theology, and Social Opinion in Great Britain, 1790-1850*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 46. Gillispie points out, in the passage referred to by Eiseley, that the Neptunists did not demand vast amounts of time to account for species formation: "Within reason one could suppose the rock strata to have been deposited as long ago or as recently as one pleased." Further, the order of fossils was that of Genesis, "fish, mammals, man" (46).

<sup>6</sup> Thomas H. Huxley, *Darwiniana*, (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1908) 54. The position is marked by theological poverty because it fails to explain why a perfect God would bumble and create beings such as trilobites and ammonites and then wipe them out. The creation of beings solely to extinguish them seems as purposeless as Darwin's theory states nature to be.

<sup>7</sup> The processes can be observed as taking place in the seas because fossils are generally preserved in sedimentary rocks which are formed as the result of the deposition of layers of mud. Huxley describes the process in the second of his "Six Lecture to Working Men 'On Our Knowledge of the Causes of the Phenomena of Organic Nature.'" (*Darwiniana*, 333-37)

<sup>8</sup> Eiseley, 46-50. It should be noted that Eiseley sees one common feature of both Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck as the "emphasis upon volition, the 'striving' of the organism for survival and adjustment." Eiseley contends that the idea of "conscious striving" is a misinterpretation. Both Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck, according to Eiseley, referred to "unconscious striving." Eiseley briefly mentions the results of an investigation by G. R. Potter on the idea of evolution in English poets of 1744-1832. Potter's study found numerous misinterpretations of evolutionary ideas in these poets, and Potter evidently felt that transcendentalists, such as Emerson, were pleased with the idea of consciously willing to evolve (Eiseley, 51-2). Shaw's misinterpretation, if such it is, is in a long line of error.

It is neither possible nor desirable to give a detailed history of pre-Lamarckian theories of evolution. This brief synopsis should, however, have brought out the main points that relate to our topic. First, it was originally thought that there had been no extinctions of species and that no new species had been created. Second, the recognition that fossils were previously unknown species extinguished the first notion. Third, catastrophism made an attempt to save the appearances of the Biblical story. This idea still contradicts a literal interpretation of Genesis. Fourth, rather than account for species by postulating several distinct creations Hutton was able to postulate uniform geological processes operating through vast stretches of time. This hypothesis, it should be noted, does not violate the principle of Occam's razor in the way that catastrophism does.<sup>9</sup> Finally, if the principle of uniformitarianism is applied to biology, it should be possible to account for extinctions and the emergence of new species by mechanisms that are in operation today.

### **Lamarck and the *Zoological Philosophy***

Lamarck's attempt at formulating a theory of evolution can be seen in his *Zoological Philosophy*. An examination of this should aid us in determining the extent to which Lamarck insisted on "conscious striving" by an organism.

Lamarck's theory was characterized by Shaw as emphasizing the willed changes in the organism. This emphasis on the will of the animal should, if it exists, pervade the *Zoological Philosophy*. What emphasis does Lamarck place on the will, and does such an emphasis pervade Lamarck's book?

Pietro Corsi, in his book, *The Age of Lamarck: Evolutionary Theories in France 1790–1830*, criticizes his subject on two points. First, concerning Lamarck's knowledge outside his own fields of botany and invertebrate biology, Corsi says, "Lamarck had scant knowledge of anatomy, or at least seemed unfamiliar with dissection methods."<sup>10</sup> Second he notes that Lamarck's prose is difficult to interpret and that it is:

...hardly surprising that Lamarck's thought should have spawned such a wide variety of interpretations, not only by naturalists of the first half of the nineteenth century but also by historians of the transformist doctrine. Some have sought to portray Lamarck as theoretician of life's intrinsic capacity to mastermind the increasing complexity of organized being through an immanent or divinely preordained plan. Undeniably, many quotations can be found to support such a view. Opposite interpretations, emphasizing the exclusive role of the environment, have focused on other passages of the naturalist's works. In both cases, exegetes have often resorted to the dubious method of isolating the passages that bear out their view from the general context of Lamarck's thought and from the problems he faced in developing the successive versions of his ideas.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> It requires only that the processes be continuous and ongoing. The special creation hypotheses require multiple interventions for no apparent reason; a case of multiplying essences needlessly.

<sup>10</sup> Pietro Corsi, *The Age of Lamarck: Evolutionary Theories in France 1790–1830*, trans. Jonathan Mandelbaum, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) 63. This is said in the context of discussing Lamarck's first work on shells, which was published in 1792. Corsi points out in the same paragraph that Cuvier, unlike Lamarck, took the trouble to examine the animals within marine shells.

<sup>11</sup> Corsi, 198. Corsi's book provides a historical setting for the development of Lamarck's theory, but does not provide any extensive commentary on the accuracy of his observations, nor does it offer much aid in interpreting Lamarck's anatomical observations.

One summary of Lamarckian beliefs is that given by Carl H. Mills. Mills lists six major tenets to Lamarck's theory: 1) All organic bodies are natural products produced through eons of time. 2) Nature fashions only the simplest organic bodies immediately. 3) The properties and conditions where an organism originates causes gradual development of the organs, and is the cause of diversity. 4) Growth is inherent in every part of the organism; this gives rise to "the different kinds of multiplication and reproduction." 5) Changing conditions have caused the modification of organisms over time. 6) Every living body has undergone changes "in its organization and its parts;" species are therefore only relatively constant and are younger than nature.<sup>12</sup> None of the cardinal points that Mills recognizes includes the idea of will.

If the generalization that Lamarck believed that animals change because they want to change is to be supported, where does Lamarck deal with the question of the will? He situates the will in the physical organism, specifically the nervous system. The functions of the nervous system, as stated by Lamarck, are:

1. That of instigating muscular activity;
2. That of giving rise to feeling or to the sensations which constitute it;
3. That of producing the emotions of the inner feeling;
4. That, lastly, of forming ideas, judgments, thoughts, imagination, memory, etc.<sup>13</sup>(300)

The will is to be found in the last category. Lamarck assigns the functions found in item four to the "accessory organ." This organ is described as being passive because of its softness. The action of the nervous fluid, by which Lamarck apparently meant the fluid to be found in the spinal column, produces ideas, thoughts, and so on (302–3). This means that every event that might be described as a mental event is due to non-mental occurrences. It is essentially a materialist theory of the mind.

Lamarck's actual treatment of the will occupies a scant seven pages (355–62) in the *Zoological Philosophy* and postulates that it is present only in vertebrates. Further, it is not present in the whole set of vertebrates, but only in that subset that possesses the special organ for intelligence. This special organ is described by Lamarck as, "a part added on to the brain, and containing the nucleus or centre of communication of the nerves." It is further described as being "confused [in vertebrates] with the medullary mass under the name of brain, although it only consists of the two wrinkled hemispheres which cover it over" (279). Lamarck's opening statement in his chapter on the will shows clearly that he does not consider all actions to be voluntary:

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<sup>12</sup> Mills, 10–11. Our discussion focuses on points 3–6 of Mills's list.

<sup>13</sup> Jean Baptiste Pierre Antoine de Lamarck, *Zoological Philosophy: An Exposition with Regard to the Natural History of Animals*, trans. Hugh Elliot, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984) 300. Subsequent references are cited in the text. This volume also contains introductory essays by Richard W. Burkhardt, "The Zoological Philosophy of J. B. Lamarck," and David L. Hull, "Lamarck Among the Anglos." Georges Cuvier's eulogy of Lamarck, the "Biographical Memoir of M. de Lamarck," is also included. These items are listed separately in the bibliography.

In the present chapter I propose to show that the will, which has been regarded as the source of all actions in animals, can only be present in those which possess a special organ for intelligence; and that even in those, which include man himself, it is not always the motive of the actions performed. (355)

Lamarck's "which has been regarded" implies that the will has been regarded as the source of all animal action by most people. Further, he sees will as belonging to the faculty of intelligence and allocated only to those that possess the "special organ."

The will is defined by Lamarck as "nothing else than a determination following upon a judgment, and hence only the result of an intellectual act." Animals that are lacking the organ for intelligence cannot be said to will (355). As a result of his classification Lamarck sees three sources for their actions:

(1) The external causes which excite the irritability of animals; (2) the inner feeling moved by sensations; (3) the inner feeling moved by the will (356).

Lamarck regards as an error the identification of all animal actions with willed activity. Apparently the cause of the error is in the confusion of actions motivated by sensation with those that are motivated by will (357). Only those creatures, almost exclusively vertebrates, that possess a brain can be said to perform willed actions, even if those actions are in the aid of some instinct, such as hunger. This is mainly due to the fact that they "obviously carry out various acts of intelligence, and certainly have the special organ which renders them capable of such acts" (358). Animals are not as free as humans "to vary their habits," and are "more subject to habit." The final statement that Lamarck makes on the will is to place it not as a faculty but as something which results from the action of a faculty of the psyche.

We shall enquire therefore what really are the acts of the understanding which constitute attention, thought, memory, and judgments. We shall find that these four acts are the principal ones, the type or source of all the rest, and that it is wrong to place in the first rank *will*, which is only a result of certain judgments, *desire* which is only a moral need, and *sensations* which have nothing to do with intellect. (380)

Apparently a willed action is the result of judgments that are made by the intellect or understanding.

Lamarck's theory is not Vitalist, at least not in the same way that Shaw's life force, or Bergson's *élan vitalis*. Further, he does not believe in a will exterior to the organism, which we will see to be the hallmark of Shaw's belief. He believes in the identity of thought and matter and is therefore a materialist. The will exists only in those organisms that have intelligence and that have a special organ for intelligence.

These statements by Lamarck preclude us from accepting the theory that he believed that prokaryotes and eukaryotes evolved into trilobites and cetaceans and avians because they wanted to swim or fly. One way in which he could be said to indicate this belief is through his imagery, some of which implies conscious willing on the part of the animal. These instances of implied will come in passages where he is illustrating use and disuse. One of Lamarck's examples of disuse will be echoed by Shaw over a hundred years later. In discussing the loss of sight among certain animals Lamarck says:

Light does not penetrate everywhere; consequently animals which habitually live in places where it does not penetrate, have no opportunity of exercising their organ of sight, if nature has endowed them with one. Now animals belonging to a plan of organization of which eyes were a necessary part, must have originally had them. Since, however, there are found among them some which have lost the use of this organ and which show nothing more than hidden and covered up vestiges of them, it becomes clear that the shrinkage and even disappearance of the organ in question are the results of a permanent disuse of that organ. (116)<sup>14</sup>

When Lamarck gives an example of how an animal acquires a characteristic due to the influence of the environment, he gives the example of giraffe, or camelopard. The giraffe lives in barren areas of Africa and browses on tree leaves. As a result the giraffe must “make constant efforts to reach them [the leaves].” This habit, of eating tree leaves, has resulted in the giraffe’s front legs becoming longer than its rear legs and the neck being “lengthened to such a degree that the giraffe, without standing up on its hind legs, attains a height of six metres (nearly 20 feet)” (122). Shaw refers to this passage several times in the preface to *Back to Methuselah* (II, xxii–xxiii, xli).

Shaw may have misinterpreted Lamarck, which is always a possibility, or he may have arrived at his understanding of Lamarck through someone else. He could have read Lamarck, presumably in the original French,<sup>15</sup> and misunderstood what he read. He could have read and understood Lamarck correctly but combined his ideas with those of another author. This was a real propensity in Shaw. Finally, he could have adopted the understanding or misunderstanding of someone else. One possible source of misunderstanding is Cuvier’s eulogy of Lamarck, and this is discussed briefly below.

### Lamarck and Cuvier’s *Éloge*

Cuvier’s eulogy of Lamarck is most notable for its hostility towards its subject. Cuvier states Lamarck’s position as follows:

It is the *desire* and the attempt to swim that produces membranes in the feet of aquatic birds; wading in the water, and at the same time the desire to avoid wet, has lengthened the legs of such as frequent the sides of rivers; and it is the desire of flying that has converted the arms of all birds into wings and their hairs and scales into feathers. (446)

Cuvier is alluding not to anything in the *Zoological Philosophy* but to a famous example in Lamarck’s *Recherches sur l’organisation des corps vivans* which appeared seven years previous to the former work. Burkhardt, in his introductory essay, cites the passage:

One may perceive that the bird of the shore, which does not at all like to swim, and which however needs to draw near to the water to find its prey, will be continually exposed to sinking in the mud. Wishing [*voulant*] to avoid immersing its body in the liquid [it] acquires the habit of stretching and elongating its

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<sup>14</sup> See Shaw, II, xxii–xxiii.

<sup>15</sup> Eiseley cites a translation of Lamarck’s *Zoological Philosophy* from 1914. This is too late to have been a used by Shaw in formulating the philosophy expressed by Shaw in *Man and Superman*.

legs. The result of this for the generations of these birds that continue to live in this manner is that the individuals will find themselves elevated as on stilts, on long naked legs. (xxx)

Cuvier describes the Lamarckian system as resting on the suppositions that “It is the seminal which organizes the embryo” and that, “efforts and desires may engender organs.” His next comment is particularly telling:

A system established on such foundations may amuse the imagination of a poet; a metaphysician may derive from it an entirely new series of systems; but it cannot for a moment bear the examination of any one who has dissected a hand, a viscus, or even a feather. (447)

Burkhardt remarks that this misrepresentation was relatively common. He cites, for example, a letter that Charles Darwin wrote J. D. Hooker in 1844, a paper by Alfred Russel Wallace that was delivered to the Linnean Society in 1858, and others (xxx). We have seen the truth of Burkhardt’s remark that “What counted for Lamarck in the way animals responded to their environments was not the *desires* of the animals but rather their *habits*” (xxxi). This is a crucial distinction, one that both Shaw and Cuvier seemed to have ignored. Shaw’s assumption appears to have been that all habits begin with voluntary action and therefore were products of willed activity.

Lamarck’s biological and evolutionary thought has not, except in the unfortunate case of Lysenko, where it dominated Russian biology under Stalin, produced any fruit, at least not in the biological sciences; what influence it has had has been in the field of literature, and this influence is primarily in the work of Samuel Butler and Shaw.

A generous estimate from a man who is not a Lamarckian can close out our discussion of Lamarck. Huxley, in an 1878 essay “Evolution in Biology” says “The ‘Biologie’ and the ‘Philosophie Zoologique’ are both very remarkable productions, and are still worthy of attentive study, but they fell upon evil times. . . . For many years it was the fashion to speak of Lamarck with ridicule, while Treviranus was altogether ignored” (Huxley, 212).

### **Darwin and *The Origin of the Species***

Darwin’s theory is better known than Lamarck’s. This is due to a number of causes, some which may have nothing to do with the intrinsic merits of his theory. For one thing Darwin appears to be a better writer than Lamarck. He is clear in his meaning, whereas Lamarck often leaves one guessing as to just what he means. Darwin’s theory has had a number of able partisans, such as Thomas Henry Huxley. It has been widely publicized through events such as the “Monkey Trial” of 1925.<sup>16</sup>

Darwin opened editions of the *Origin of the Species* subsequent to the first with “An Historical Sketch of the Progress of Opinion on the Origin of Species, Previously to the Publication of the first Edition of This Work” in which he summarizes the work of his

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<sup>16</sup> The trial is best known because of the confrontation between Clarence Darrow and William Jennings Bryan. A partial transcript of the trial can be read in Arthur Weinberg’s compilation of Darrow’s speeches from his his trials and debates entitled *Attorney for the Damned*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), 174–228. Darrow’s examination of Bryan begins on page 192. This case served as the basis for the play and motion picture *Inherit the Wind*.

predecessors. After paying a brief nod to Aristotle's *Physics*, he devotes a paragraph to Lamarck:

Lamarck was the first man whose conclusions on the subject excited much attention. This justly celebrated naturalist first published his views in 1801; he much enlarged them in 1809 in his *Philosophie zoologique*, and subsequently, in 1815, in the Introduction to his *Hist. nat. des animaux sans vertèbres*. In these works he upholds the doctrine that all species, including man, are descended from other species. He first did the eminent service of arousing attention to the probability of all change in the organic, as well as in the inorganic world, being the result of law, and not of miraculous interposition. Lamarck seems to have been chiefly led to his conclusion on the gradual change of species by the difficulty of distinguishing species and varieties, by the almost perfect gradation of forms in certain groups, and by the analogy of domestic productions. With respect to the means of modification, he attributed something to the direct action of the physical conditions of life, something to the crossing of already existing forms, and much to use and disuse, that is, to the effects of habit. To this latter agency he seems to attribute all the beautiful adaptation in nature;—such as the long neck of the giraffe for browsing on the branches of trees. But he likewise believed in a law of progressive development; and as all the forms of life thus tend to progress, in order to account for the existence at the present day of simple productions, he maintains that such forms are now spontaneously generated.<sup>17</sup>

In a footnote Darwin refers to his grandfather and says, “It is curious how largely my grandfather, Dr. Erasmus Darwin, anticipated the views and erroneous grounds of opinion of Lamarck in his *Zoonomia*... published in 1794” (49, 1). Darwin, at this time, regards Lamarck as being “justly celebrated.” He finds Lamarck’s views ultimately to be erroneous. One of Lamarck’s errors consists of his belief in use and disuse. Further, Lamarck believed in the spontaneous generation of life in order to account for the continued existence of the lower forms of life. Darwin was not always so generous to Lamarck. Burkhardt, in his introductory essay to the *Zoological Philosophy*, quotes a letter that Darwin wrote J. D. Hooker in 1844: “Heaven forbid me from Lamarck[’s] nonsense of a ‘tendency to progression,’ ‘adaptations from the slow willing of animals,’ etc.!” (xxx). Loren Eiseley has also noted various Darwinian passages in which Darwin falls back on the Lamarckian hypothesis. One instance that Eiseley points out is in Darwin’s theory of pangenesis, in which somatic modifications can be passed on to the germ cells. This is a mechanism for Lamarckian inheritance, since it means that acquired characteristics can be inherited.<sup>18</sup>

Darwin opens the *Origin* by positioning himself in opposition to Lamarck but without explicitly invoking him. He describes how naturalists tend to see “external conditions, such as climate, food, &c.” as the only cause of variation in species. Darwin admits to the truth of this but then continues:

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<sup>17</sup> Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*, Great Books of the Western World, Gen. Ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952) 49, 1. All subsequent references to the *Origin*, or to *The Descent of Man*, are from this edition and are cited by volume and page number in the text.

<sup>18</sup> Eiseley, 217. See also pages 240 and 252 of Eiseley.



... it is preposterous to attribute to mere external conditions, the structure, for instance, of the woodpecker, with its feet, tail, beak, and tongue, so admirably adapted to catch insects under the bark of trees. In the case of the mistletoe, which draws its nourishment from certain trees, which has seed that must be transported by certain birds, and which has flowers with separate sexes absolutely requiring the agency of certain insects to bring pollen from one flower to the other, it is equally preposterous to account for the structure of this parasite, with its relations to several distinct organic beings by the effects of external conditions, or of habit, or of the volition of the plant itself. (49, 6–7)

Darwin differs from Lamarck in several important ways. In the realm of discourse it can be noted that Darwin uses not one but two examples. Further, once he has named an example he draws it out with a series of details. The woodpecker example is drawn out by the specification of “feet, tail, beak, and tongue.” The tongue is then emphasized by the qualifying phrase “so admirably adapted . . . .” The mistletoe is thematized and then a series of qualifiers is added; each of the qualifying clauses signals a uniqueness that parallels that of the “feet, tail, beak, and tongue” of the woodpecker. The final qualifying clause is also the longest. It is in this clause Darwin uses the phrase “absolutely requiring,” which suggests that he is stating something universal to this species. The flowers of the mistletoe cannot be pollinated without “certain” insects participating. He then dismisses as preposterous attempts to account for this complexity by referring to external conditions, habit, or “the volition of the plant itself.” In all of these he is referring to Lamarckian tenets. Darwin has concretized his biological theory through two specific images; this is something that Lamarck rarely does and which accounts for some of his obscurity.

In the examples given from Lamarck there is a consideration of one item in relation to another item. The bird that wishes to avoid getting its feathers wet develops long legs to lift its body out of the water. The camelopard that wishes to eat from the tops of the acacia tree stretches its neck. Darwin’s examples, on the other hand, emphasize a multiplicity of related features. The woodpecker is cited for its feet, tail, beak and tongue; the mistletoe is cited for its process of nourishment and its reproductive mechanism.

Gillian Beer, in *Darwin’s Plots*, describes Darwin’s language as multivocal and as “expressive rather than rigorous.” Darwin’s style, according to Beer, “Is not an austere Cartesian style.” If, as she says, “There are few lean sentences in *The Origin of the Species*,” that can certainly be seen in the example quoted above.<sup>19</sup> The sentence beginning “In the case . . .” is eighty-six words long. Darwin begins this sentence with two prepositional phrases and makes the mistletoe, which is the patient, less important by placing it in the second phrase.<sup>20</sup> The mistletoe then is modified by a series of successive subordinate clauses beginning with “which.” The sentence then resumes its course with “it is equally preposterous” and culminates with a series of nine prepositional phrases.<sup>21</sup> The effect of this serial piling up of clauses and phrases is to qualify the subject by setting it in a constantly modified relationship marked by the preposition “of.”

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<sup>19</sup> Gillian Beer, *Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Fiction*, (London: Ark, 1985) 38, 39.

<sup>20</sup> “Patient” is used in the sense of Fillmore’s case grammar.

<sup>21</sup> The phrases are: (1) for the structure, (2) of this parasite, (3) with its relations, (4) to several distinct organic beings, (5) by the effects, (6) of external conditions, (7) of habit, (8) of the volition, (9) of the plant itself.

Darwin's piling up of evidence is reflected in the micro-structure of his sentence. Lamarck's example of "the bird of the shore" is markedly less specific. He does not name any specific bird, such as an ibis, crane, egret, heron, or flamingo, that inhabits the seashore or marshes.<sup>22</sup> Darwin's woodpecker is a specific bird despite the fact that he does not name a species of woodpecker. Lamarck's "bird of the shore" can never be distinguished from the innumerable varieties and species of birds that inhabit environments near water.

Darwin does not reject habit, or use and disuse, as being agents of evolutionary change. In a section of the first chapter of the *Origin* he says that, "Changed habits produce an inherited effect, as in the period of flowering plants when transported from one climate to another." Darwin goes on to describe one kind of change due to habit:

...I find in the domestic duck that the bones of the wing weigh less and the bones of the leg more, in proportion to the whole skeleton, than do the same bones in the wild-duck; and this change may be safely attributed to the domestic duck flying much less, and walking more, than its wild parents. (49, 10)

Darwin discusses "correlated variation" in which variations of seemingly unrelated parts occur together and finds it mysterious (49, 11). The mystery is largely due to the absence of any mechanism for explaining the laws of heredity. As pointed out earlier, Mendel's laws of genetics were not promulgated until 1865 and were forgotten until their rediscovery in 1900. Both Darwin and Huxley were therefore unable to offer any explanation for the occurrence of the phenomena that they observed. Darwin was able to write the following:

The laws governing inheritance are for the most part unknown. No one can say why the same peculiarity in different individuals of the same species, or in different species, is sometimes inherited and sometimes not so; why the child often reverts in certain characters to its grandfather or grandmother or more remote ancestor; why a peculiarity is often transmitted from one sex to both sexes, or to one sex alone, more commonly but not exclusively to the like sex. (49, 11)

The kind of mutation and the pattern of inheritance that Huxley describes can probably be traced through a pattern of dominant and recessive genes. The appearance of a mutation is what was referred to as a "sport," i.e., a characteristic unique to an individual within a species and which marks it out as something different from the usual.

Darwin and Huxley, as already noted, had no mechanism to account for the appearance of these sports. What can be noted about this is that Darwin sees a pattern to human selection. The human breeder sees some oddity in an individual and breeds the animal so that the characteristic is passed on to successive generations. This is accomplished in one part by destroying the members that do not meet the criterion for the breed that the human is attempting to establish.

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<sup>22</sup> As a non-ornithologist I am obviously unfamiliar with the varieties of birds that inhabit the seashore and marshes. I believe that all of the birds named are long-legged birds. The point made here though is that Lamarck is unspecific and that this lack of specificity dooms his argument to being a mishmash of generalities. As such it fails to be good induction because it does not accumulate individual items and build up to a general deduction.

Darwin gives an account of how species can be produced by human intervention. He says that some effect may be attributed to external conditions or to habit, but goes on to qualify this semi-Lamarckian statement:

Some effect may be attributed to the direct and definite action of the external conditions of life, and some to habit; but it would be a bold man who would account by such agencies for the differences between a dray- and a racehorse, an greyhound and bloodhound, a carrier and tumbler pigeon. (49, 18)

This statement is made as a refutation to Lamarck's theory. Evidently more than one characteristic differentiates the various animals named. That is, there is more than one characteristic that sets apart the dray-horse from the race horse, the greyhound from the bloodhound, and so on. If this is the case, then a simple cause, such as environmental differences, cannot be sufficient to account for the manifold differences between species. If this is the case, Darwin must find some other mechanism to account for the changes in species.

He finds this in the geometrical increase of population. Gillian Beer attributes Darwin's "struggle for existence" to Malthus.<sup>23</sup> The Malthusian idea is that population increases geometrically while food supply increases arithmetically. At first the increases in both series will be close to even. The two series diverge increasingly the further out they are carried and the ratio between, for example, the members of step 8 of each series, is greater than the ratio between the members of step of 7 of each series. Loren Eiseley, however, notes that the idea actually is shared with Augustin de Candolle's "war of nature" and may have come to Darwin via the third volume of Lyell's *Principles of Geology*.<sup>24</sup>

Darwin describes this theory of the struggle for existence as:

... the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms; for in this case there can be no artificial increase of food, and no prudential restraint from marriage. (49, 33)

If Malthus was correct, then at some point the population must outrun the food supply to such an extent that some members of the population must die of starvation. This will bring the population back into equilibrium. This is obviously true in closed environments in which the population cannot move elsewhere. The pressure of population growth can thus be used as a means of explaining the necessity for colonial expansion. The expansion of population into previously unpopulated areas allows for the colonists to produce sufficient food to feed themselves. In order for the population to grow continuously it must move into an infinite number of new colonies; this is impossible in a closed system but is possible in an open one, or one which can be opened. This pressure means that those animals that can procure food, or which can procure more food than their fellows, will be better able to survive. The traits which give a being an advantage in obtaining food are thus survival traits and contribute to the survival of the species. What this means is essentially that, as Samuel Butler remarks, the unsuccessful beings "go away" (into extinction).

Darwin's theory may derive from Malthus or de Candolle, but his description of the factors contributing to evolution is not a simple one which postulates that this pressure of

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<sup>23</sup> Beer, 7.

<sup>24</sup> Eiseley, 101.

competition is by itself a sufficient explanation for the changes in species. Darwin, unlike Lamarck, is concerned with systems.

The struggle for existence is not the only struggle that animals are involved in. There is also the struggle involved in sexual selection.

This form of selection depends, not on a struggle for existence in relation to other organic beings or to external conditions, but on a struggle between the individuals of one sex, generally the males, for the possession of the other sex. The result is not death to the unsuccessful competitor, but few or no offspring. Sexual selection is, therefore, less rigorous than natural selection. (49, 43)

Darwin considers how characteristics that help an individual might be perpetuated. A single example would still be strongly disfavored in the struggle for survival. Suppose, says Darwin, following a writer in the *North British Review*, that an animal is born into a group that has a survival rate of 1% and that this animal has a characteristic that doubles its chances of surviving. The characteristic, if passed on to as many as half its young, would still have only a slightly better chance of surviving and producing. The chance is diminished according to Darwin with each succeeding generation. If, however, a large number of beings with this characteristic, such as strongly curved beaks, are preserved and others with less strongly marked beaks are destroyed, the characteristic would be preserved.

What is needed for natural selection is a large number of individuals and long stretches of time. Darwin did not have these long stretches of time available in the Neptunist theories of geology. In Lyell and Hutton, however, he had the possibility of vast stretches of time during which organic changes could take place and species could evolve. Darwin's use of language at this point is interesting:

Though Nature grants long periods of time for the work of natural selection, she does not grant an indefinite period; for as all organic beings are *striving* [italics mine] to seize on each place in the economy of nature, if any one species does not become modified and improved in a corresponding degree with its competitors, it will be exterminated. (49, 49)

There is the poetic anthropomorphizing of nature, but this can be dismissed for the moment. What is interesting is that "all organic beings are *striving*," which suggests the imputation of will and effort to an organic being. The animal is striving "to seize" a place. In this instance the "organic beings" are agents, but in the following clause they become "species," and they also become patients since they are "modified" and "improved" by something. The sentence moves from a Lamarckian image of willed activity to an image that does not connote activity as strongly as the "striving" and "seizing" do.

References to nature and to natural selection are almost invariably anthropomorphic. When Darwin says:

But I do believe that natural selection will generally act very slowly, only at long intervals of time, and only on a few of the inhabitants of the same region. I further believe that those slow, intermittent results accord well with what geology tells us of the rate and manner at which the inhabitants of the world have changed. (49, 52)...

it is obvious that natural selection has been anthropomorphized into a being that can act. The attribution of agency is more than just grammatical. The anthropomorphizing of a being is an attribute inherent in language. Gillian Beer points out, "Language is anthropocentric. It places man at the centre of signification."<sup>25</sup> When I say that my cat thinks, or I look at her and wonder what she is dreaming about as she lies in her favorite spot on the sofa, I am attributing something human to her, i.e., the powers of thought and of dreams. I cannot know the contents of her thoughts. In the same manner when Darwin speaks about "Nature," or "natural selection," he is forced by the nature of language to attribute agency and personality to inanimate objects. Beer also points out, "Language always includes agency, and agency and intention are frequently impossible to distinguish in language."<sup>26</sup>

### **Darwin and the Rejection of Teleology**

David L. Hull, in *Darwin and His Critics*, has an extensive discussion of the role of teleology in science in the pre-Darwinian era. He distinguishes two types of teleology, the Platonic or external teleology, in which there is a universal mind that gives everything a purpose, and the Aristotelian, or immanent, teleology. He describes the Aristotelian teleology in these words:

For Aristotle the ends were internal to the subject. Individuals did what was best for themselves by themselves. Every natural kind (or species) had a static, immutable essence as its formal cause. These essences made a thing what it was. These essences also served as final and efficient causes.<sup>27</sup>

Charles Coulston Gillispie, in *Genesis and Geology*, devotes his first chapter to an exploration of teleology, natural religion, and their relation to pre-Darwinian science. He points out that:

Boyle and Newton, for example, did not make the sharp modern distinction between science and theology, and they were highly serious about both their theological and their scientific studies.<sup>28</sup>

Gillispie goes on to point out that Halley had written a paper in which he used an earthly collision with a comet as a means of unleashing a flood as powerful as that of Noah's. Since the Biblical flood had deposited marine fossils on dry land, it was not "an inappropriate subject for papers in *Philosophical Transactions*."<sup>29</sup>

This attitude towards teleology was also reflected in the definition of a natural law. To us a natural law may be said to represent a statistical probability that certain things will occur. For example, the second law of thermodynamics says that the tendency of any sys-

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<sup>25</sup> Beer, 53.

<sup>26</sup> Beer, 53. This extends beyond the realm of biology. The same tendency can be noted in talking about any phenomenon. For example Eliot's description of how words, "slip, slide, perish, / Decay with imprecision," in *Four Quartets* attributes agency and living being to words. (T. S. Eliot, *The Complete Poems and Plays: 1909-1950*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, World, 1962) 121.)

<sup>27</sup> David L. Hull, *Darwin and His Critics: The Reception of Darwin's Theory of Evolution by the Scientific Community*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973) 55-6.

<sup>28</sup> Gillispie, 4.

<sup>29</sup> Gillispie, 9.

tem is towards disorder. Life, however, is organized and appears to violate this law. The tendency, however, is not for isolated pockets of organization but for systems as a whole. The overall tendency of the universe is for disorder to be maximized. The attitude of Gravesande was more in line with what a lawyer means by law, a promulgation by someone in authority that such a thing will happen:

A Law of Nature then is *the rule and Law, according to which God resolved that certain motions should always, that is, in all Cases, be performed.* Every Law does immediately depend upon the will of God. [Italicized in the original.]<sup>30</sup>

The law of nature is here equated with a performative utterance by God.

It would seem to follow that if we can know the laws of nature, then we can know something about God. This enterprise is not all that dissimilar from Stephen Hawking's statement that the study of cosmology will help us to "know the mind of God."<sup>31</sup> The eighteenth and nineteenth century enterprise in natural theology can be seen reflected in Paley's attempt to write a natural theology in which he attempted to derive some notion of God's attributes from the natural creation.

Paley's argument was that the existence of a watch (design) implies a watchmaker (designer). Gillispie quotes Paley on the presence of design in the universe:

There cannot be design without a designer; contrivance without a contriver; order without choice; arrangement, without anything capable of arranging; subserviency and relation to a purpose, without that which could intend a purpose; means suitable to an end, without the end ever having been contemplated, or the means accommodated to it. Arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of instruments to an use, imply the presence of intelligence and mind.<sup>32</sup>

Paley's argument, according to Gillispie, is that God exists and is good because everything works together for an end, or purpose, and this purpose is the happiness of man.<sup>33</sup> The first part of the argument, that the existence of God is proven through the existence of creation, is basically the argument from the chain of efficient causes, i.e., that motion implies a mover and must result in a prime mover. An analysis shows that the second part of Paley's argument is the part most vulnerable to attack. The existence of an object does not imply anything about the creator of the object, except his existence. The existence of a painting by Mondrian, for example, provides us with limited information about his mind, but tells us nothing about the qualities of Mondrian's life or character. The fact that the universe exists and that it follows certain laws only reveals very limited aspects of the creator's mind. The attempt that Paley and the natural theologians made to look into nature and get a glimpse of "the mind of God" is futile.

Paley felt that Providence would have a meaningless role if it were not connected to hope. The imperfection of life on earth means that the yearning for happiness must be sat-

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<sup>30</sup> Quoted by Gillispie, 13.

<sup>31</sup> Stephen W. Hawking, *A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes*. (New York: Bantam Books, 1988) 175.

<sup>32</sup> Gillispie, 36-7.

<sup>33</sup> Gillispie, 37.

isfied beyond the grave. This means that Christian doctrine, with its emphasis on eternal reward and punishment in the afterlife, is “eminently credible.”<sup>34</sup>

Paley was not the only clergyman who felt that the wonders of nature reflected the glory of God. Dr. Buckland, the Dean of Westminster Abbey, was able to say in 1848:

Modern professors, in carrying their researches more closely into God’s laws, by which He regulates the movements of the material world, have been permitted to gaze more intensely on... the infinite wisdom and power and goodness of the Creator....<sup>35</sup>

This is an explicit statement of the belief that knowledge of nature leads to knowledge of God. That this belief in the connection between religion and nature was not confined to the Anglican divines can be shown by the fact that Cardinal Wiseman “collected his studies over the years in a series of lectures *On the Connexion between Science and Revealed Religion*,” and that these “were so advanced that as late as 1860, the distinguished English scientist, Sir Richard Owen, believed that could easily be supplemented in order to bring them up to date.”<sup>36</sup>

Darwin’s denial of teleology, or purpose, in evolution would not have been so effective if he had not proposed a method through which change could be accounted for without the invocation of divine assistance. The existence of the mechanism of natural selection meant that nature, or the principle of natural selection, could be substituted for a divine artificer. The Darwinian explanation dispensed with a metaphysical explanation for evolution. Jaroslav Pelikan has written on this subject and quotes a number of contemporary writers who expressed horror at the implications of Darwinism:

The theme of progress in the nineteenth century was not confined to the interpretation of the kingdom of God and the Christian message, but was manifesting itself throughout the literature, philosophy, history, and natural science of the time. “The world is just now taken, as never before,” one theologian observed, “with ideas of progress.” The most perceptive theological critics of the evolutionary philosophy recognized that, for all its threat to the Christian doctrine of the origins of the world and of humanity, its most devastating consequences lay rather in its implications for Christian eschatology and teleology and for the biblical picture of human destiny. It was “neither evolution, nor natural selection, which gives Darwinism its peculiar character and importance,” one theological critic observed; “it is that Darwin rejects all teleology, or the doctrine of final causes” in “his exclusion of design in the origin of species.” If this “strife against purpose” was successful “teleology, and therefore mind, or God, is expressly banished from the world.” Without teleology it was impossible to understand “what is meant by the fact that the supernatural works of God are dispensed by fixed laws.” It is important to remember that “progress” could be highly ambiguous: there had likewise been a “progress or atheism,” of anarchy, and of secularism.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Gillispie, 38.

<sup>35</sup> Quoted in Gillispie, 201.

<sup>36</sup> J. Derek Holmes, *More Roman Than Rome: English Catholicism in the Nineteenth Century*, (London: Burns & Oates; Shepherdstown: Patmos Press, 1978) 55.

The reaction, as shown in Pelikan's post-Darwinian quotes, is in large part due to the removal of teleology from science. The Darwinist was free to study efficient and material causes without paying any attention to the concept of final causation. Darwinism not only called into question the nature of purpose; it also called into question the origin of the human race and the Biblical story of creation. The theory that the story of creation was literally true and had been dictated to Moses had already suffered at the hands of the "Higher Criticism," coming out of Germany, which had discovered not one but four authors at work in the Pentateuch. Alec Vidler describes the situation in these words:

The conclusion that the higher animals and man had evolved from lower forms of life as a result of the struggle for existence was obviously fatal to the literal accuracy of the Book of Genesis, and, what is more, it seemed that the traditional Christian doctrines about the creation and fall of man would have to go by the board. Man appeared to owe his origin to the operation of impersonal and natural forces of laws instead of to the direct, personal action of God.<sup>38</sup>

Despite the fact that Archbishop Manning declared that evolution was "a brutal philosophy—to wit, there is no God, and the ape is our Adam," not all scientists were atheists or agnostics, nor were all Christians unscientific. This is shown when Vidler mentions that Darwin's friend Asa Gray "combined acceptance of theory of evolution with belief in orthodox Christianity." A theologian who believed in evolution, Richard William Church, was a friend of Gray's and asserted that he would not give up his faith if he found that the writers of the Bible had made mistakes.<sup>39</sup>

Gillispie has pointed out that Cardinal Newman felt that, "The facts of science, when the sense in which they were to be understood was properly appreciated, had no bearing on the spiritual truths or the historical authority of religion."<sup>40</sup> That this was Newman's position can be seen by examining Newman's *The Idea of a University*. In one lecture he states that in the physical and social world there are two books, the book of man and the book of nature, which are respectively literature and science. He does not admit of any conflict between science and Catholicism.<sup>41</sup> The sciences and theology differ in their methods of study; one is inductive and the other is deductive.<sup>42</sup>

Charles Kingsley, remembered for the attack on Newman that provoked the *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, wrote to Darwin:

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<sup>37</sup> Jaroslav Pelikan, *Christian Doctrine and Modern Culture (since 1700)*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990) 216–7, vol. 5 of *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine*. The quotations given by Pelikan are, in order, Horace Bushnell, *Nature and the Supernatural, as Together Constituting the One System of God*, 1858; John Jamieson, *The Use of Sacred History, Especially as Illustrating and Confirming the Great Doctrines of Revelation*, 1802; Charles Hodge, *What is Darwinism*, 1874; James Iverach, *Christianity and Evolution*, 1894; Charles Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, a 1981 reprint; Bushnell's *Nature and the Supernatural*; Vladimir Sergeevic Soloviev, *Wisdom*, no date.

<sup>38</sup> Alec R. Vidler, *The Church in an Age of Revolution: 1789 to the Present Day*, (Hammondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971) 116–7, vol. 5 of *The Pelican History of the Church*.

<sup>39</sup> Vidler, 118–9.

<sup>40</sup> Gillispie, 223.

<sup>41</sup> John Henry Newman, *The Idea of a University*, (Garden City: Image Books, 1959) 225–6.

<sup>42</sup> Newman, 228.



Men find that now they have got rid of an interfering God — a master-magician as I call it — they have to choose between an absolute empire of accident, and a living, immanent, everworking God.<sup>43</sup>

What emerges from this is that the reaction to Darwin on the part of the churchmen and theologians was not always a rejection, nor did it abide by strict church affiliation. Some Catholics, such as Manning, rejected the idea of evolution totally; some, such as Newman, made their peace with the idea; some Anglican and Protestant theologians, such as those quoted by Pelikan, rejected the idea; others, such as Kingsley, found it to be a springboard for their own conception of God. The reaction to Darwin's removal of teleology from the universe was thus more complex than has sometimes been portrayed. It was not a simple question of Huxley responding to Wilberforce at the Oxford debate and driving out the unscientific heathen by the force of his intellect and the intensity of his ridicule.

### **Lamarck and Darwin: A Summary**

Neither Lamarck nor Darwin, according to our interpretation, actually believed that species could will to change. Lamarck comes the closest to actually believing this by constantly referring to use and disuse and by referring to habits. This language is implicitly charged with anthropomorphic tendencies. Lamarck is, to judge by the translation, unclear even in his original French. Lamarck was primarily a botanist and a collector of sea-shells. He was deficient, according to Corsi, in his knowledge of anatomy and never performed a dissection.

Darwin's writing is clearer than Lamarck's, but he is still subject to the anthropomorphizing inherent in language. This tendency is evident even in modern writers and inheres in the idea of agency. When a thing is made the subject of a sentence, that thing, to the extent that it is described as performing an action, becomes personified. When a scientist writes that "Natural selection does . . .," then natural selection has become an agent who carries out some kind of intention.

The reaction to Darwinism was not one of simple rejection by the religious followed by widespread acceptance and a falling away in faith. The decline in religious observance had apparently already begun in the 1830s, due in part to the influence of David Strauss's *Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet*.<sup>44</sup> The acceptance of evolution as a fact, however, does pose some problems. First, any belief that the Bible is literally true and inspired down to every letter and every diacritical mark is subject to attack when any part of it can be shown to be untrue. A belief that holds to an accommodationist theory, that the authors of scripture wrote to their audience and that they wrote in such a way as to be understood then, is not contingent upon literal acceptance and can simply shrug its (metaphorical) shoulders and get on with life. This second attitude seems to have been Newman's. The second problem is which theory of evolution to accept. Statements of Darwinian theory are at best rather cold. They imply that everything is a matter of chance, that there is no purpose to life and that our destiny is simply to emulate e. e. cummings' uncle Sol and start worm farms. Lamarckian theory, as popularly interpreted, as a conscious striving after some goal or adaptation, is more amenable to somebody who has experienced a loss of religious faith

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<sup>43</sup> Paul Johnson, *A History of Christianity*, (New York: Atheneum, 1980) 376.

<sup>44</sup> Johnson, 375–6.

through a belief in evolution and yet has a need for some purpose. Butler can be found in the latter situation, and to some extent Shaw can be said to participate in the same crisis, that of having to find a purpose through some metaphysical postulate.

The Lamarckian ideology is not explicitly one of will; that is implicit in the language of Lamarck. Shaw may have picked up on the implications of the language, but these implications can also be found in Darwin and in any attempt to construct a narrative of evolutionary development. For a fuller understanding of Shaw's position on the will it is still necessary to look at the other philosophers we have named earlier and to consider the relations of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Butler to Shaw.

### Schopenhauer and *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*

Schopenhauer, like Nietzsche, is associated with a philosophy of the will; he is not usually associated with theories of evolution, but it is possible he knew of Lamarck's theory and he knew some of Darwin's theory.<sup>45</sup> Gertrude Himmelfarb, in discussing the German reaction to the *Origin* says:

In Germany the opposition was less chauvinistic but no less distinctive. It consisted of the two extremes to which German intellectual life was prone: the exact scientists—research workers, classifiers, and analysts—to whom the kind of general theory represented in the *Origin* was mystical, metaphysical nonsense; and the metaphysicians who thought it meaninglessly empirical or dangerously materialistic. In the latter camp was Schopenhauer. Although he had earlier approved of such evolutionists as Geoffroy St. Hilaire and Goethe on the grounds that they were concerned with the philosophical relationship of natural events, and had himself interpreted nature's indifference to individuals and solicitude for species as confirmation of the doctrine that only ideas and not individuals have reality, he was repelled by what he regarded as Darwin's materialism. Shortly before his death, he read an extract from the *Origin* in the *Times* which convinced him that this was yet another one of those frothy, insubstantial "soapsud or barber" books produced by superficial scientists. It was, he protested, "downright empiricism," with no sense of the inner, hidden force, the idea behind the struggle.<sup>46</sup>

Schopenhauer may be referring to Darwin in a passage in *The World as Will and Representation* when he makes one of his few comments on Lamarck and on evolutionary theory:

In his *Philosophie zoologique*... Lamarck also declares life to be a mere effect of heat and electricity: *le calorique et la matière électrique suffisent parfaitement pour composer ensemble cette cause essentielle de la vie*... Accordingly, heat and electricity would really be the thing-in-itself, and animal and plant worlds its phenomenon. The absurdity of this opinion stands out glaringly.... It is well known that all those views, so often exploded, have again appeared with renewed audacity in recent times.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Carl Mills discusses Shaw and Schopenhauer, but focuses on Schopenhauer's views on sex and bases his argument on Schopenhauer's essay "The Metaphysics of the Love of the Sexes." For further discussion of this aspect of Shaw see Mills, 63 *et seq.*

<sup>46</sup> Gertrude Himmelfarb, *Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1962) 304.

In his commentary, which occupies the second volume of the work, Schopenhauer continues his hostility towards Lamarck:

From Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, down to the *Système de la nature*, and then to Lamarck, Cabanis, and the materialism cooked up again in the last few years, we can follow the unceasing attempt to set up a *system of physics without metaphysics*, in other words, a doctrine that would make the phenomenon into the thing-in-itself. (II, 174–5)

In another reference to Lamarck, somewhat earlier, Schopenhauer asserts that the empirical sciences when they are not coupled with metaphysics are like “faces without eyes” (II, 129). Schopenhauer appears to reject not only Lamarck’s evolutionary theory but also Cuvier’s lessons in comparative anatomy:

Just as little does the inner analogy in the structure of all animals justify us in mixing and identifying the species, and in declaring the more perfect to be variations of the less perfect. (I, 144)<sup>48</sup>

The first part of the sentence seems to refer to Cuvier and comparative anatomy. Cuvier is known for beginning the field of comparative anatomy by comparing the structure of known species and identifying the similarities that exist between portions of their anatomy. The clause about the variations of the less perfect seems to be aimed at evolutionary theorists.

Schopenhauer rejects materialism in favor of an idealistic interpretation of nature. The world of sensation is phenomenal rather than noumenal and is more than merely the result of physical and chemical forces.

Schopenhauer cannot be ranked as one of the evolutionary theorists, and he cannot be said to have accepted Lamarck or Darwin. He was, as already said, a philosopher who was primarily concerned with the will, but what was the will to Schopenhauer and did it have any relationship to physical and organic reality? In an early chapter of the second book of *The World as Will and Representation* Schopenhauer expresses his conception of the relation of will and body:

The action of the body is nothing but the act of will objectified, i.e., translated into perception. Later on we shall see that this applies to every movement of the body, not merely to movement following on motives, but also to involuntary movement following on mere stimuli: indeed, that the whole body is nothing but the objectified will, i.e., will that has become representation. (I, 100)

This statement seems to mean that the will, which is something non-material, is made into a material object, such as the body. When Schopenhauer says that bodily action is “the act of will objectified,” he might mean that a bodily action is the concrete realization of the desire to do something. For example, the act of running is the objectification of the desire

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<sup>47</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, trans. E. F. J. Payne, vol. I, (New York: Dover, 1969) 142. All future references are to this edition and are cited by volume and page in the text.

<sup>48</sup> Mills points out that Shaw regarded Schopenhauer’s principal book as, “a metaphysical complement to Lamarck’s natural history that demonstrated that the driving force behind evolution is the will to live” (Mills, 37). This does not appear to be Schopenhauer’s view of Lamarck.

or will to run. Schopenhauer, however, seems to mean something different. Specifically he means that the will is capable of becoming an object that can be perceived and that everything that exists is an object made by this metaphysical will. Schopenhauer contends that there is an interaction between the will and the body:

Every true, genuine, immediate act of the will is also at once and directly a manifest act of the body; and correspondingly, on the other hand, every impression on the body is also at once and directly an impression on the will. (I, 101)

This statement might seem at first glance to be similar to Spinoza's concept of psychophysical parallelism, that an event that happens in the mind also happens in the body, but Schopenhauer is more monistic than that. It is not just that the things that happen to one also happen to the other at the same time, but that the body and the will are identical:

The identity of the body and the will further shows itself, among other things, in the fact that every vehement and excessive movement of the will, in other words, every emotion, agitates the body and its inner working directly and immediately, and disturbs the course of its vital functions. (I, 101)

The will, in its objectification, is masked as representation, the physical world. The physical world is based on sensory perception and as such is essentially delusory. The body and the will are identical, and every action that is done through the body is done by the will. Schopenhauer contends that even involuntary actions are the result of the will. By this he does not mean that we directly and individually will blood to flow through the kidneys and to filter out wastes there but that these structures are created by the metaphysical principle of the will.

The will is not simply an adjunct faculty as it is in Lamarck's system; it is primary and dominant and it runs across the animal kingdom and is to be found even in plants and rocks (I, 114).

Schopenhauer goes on to extend his concept of the will to the realm of physics. A force, to a physicist, is something that can be quantified and expressed in an equation such as  $F=MA$ . To Schopenhauer, however, a force is an aspect of will:

Hitherto, the concept of will has been subsumed under the concept of force; I, on the other hand, do exactly the reverse, and intend every force in nature to be conceived as will. (I, 111)

Gravity, which has yet to be united with the other forces in a GUT (grand unified theory), is united with them by Schopenhauer. He sees gravity and magnetism as part of the will, the objectification of the will:

For the one will, that objectifies itself in all Ideas, strives for the highest possible objectification, and in this case gives up the low grades of its phenomenon after a conflict, in order to appear in a higher grade that is so much the more powerful. No victory without struggle; since the higher Idea or objectification of will can appear only by subduing the lower Ideas, it endures the opposition of these. Although these lower Ideas have been brought into subjection, *they still constantly strive* to reach an independent and complete expression of their inner nature. The *magnet* that *has lifted* a piece of iron *keeps up a*

perpetual *struggle* with gravitation which, as the lowest objectification of the will, has a more original *right to the matter of that iron*. In this constant struggle, the *magnet even grows stronger*, since *the resistance stimulates it*, so to speak, *to greater exertion*. In the same way, every phenomenon of the will, and even that which manifests itself in the human organism, keeps up a *permanent struggle* against the many *chemical and physical forces* that, as lower Ideas, *have a prior right to that matter*. (I, 146) [Italics mine.]

This seems utterly unreal, but apparently Schopenhauer really did mean that both the magnetic attraction and the gravitational attraction were united as manifestations, or objectifications, of the will. What is particularly notable is that the italicized words and phrases express the idea of agency. In terms of the case grammar of Fillmore the pronoun “they” in the first italicized phrase is an agent.<sup>49</sup> The subject that is an agent is active and has a purpose. Schopenhauer says that the magnet lifts the iron; this puts the emphasis on the magnet as an agent and almost entirely eliminates the idea of a physical force that acts to attract the iron. The idea that gravity has some *right* to a piece of matter ignores entirely the actual relationships that exist among the three pieces of matter, i.e., the magnet, the iron, and the earth. The rest of the italicized phrases show the same insistence on the existence of a will within the material, non-organic world.

The primary area that we wish to explore, however, is the relation of the will to the organic. That Schopenhauer believed that the inorganic world was shaped, was in fact merely the objectification of one level of the will should lead to the same belief with regard to the organic world. The organic world is marked by change. Organisms are born, mature and die, and each of these processes of birth, maturation, and death is marked by a transformation in the body of the organism. Organisms develop in a multitude of ways, but each process is marked by changes in the physiology of the organism. Schopenhauer considers the relationship of cause and effect to changes in the organism and writes:

Therefore all really organic and vegetative changes in the animal body take place from stimuli, not from mere causes. But the stimulus, like every cause and motive in general, never determines more than the point of entry of the manifestation of every force in time and space, not the inner nature of the force that manifests itself. According to our previous deduction, we recognize this inner nature to be will, and to this therefore we ascribe both the unconscious and the conscious changes of the body. (I, 115)

Stimuli are those things that elicit an involuntary response.<sup>50</sup> Schopenhauer is saying that every change is an involuntary response by the organism to external forces, but the stimulus only determines how the external force will enter the body and not the way the force will manifest itself.

The will is, for Schopenhauer, everything, and it is everything in a quite literal way. The will is objectified in the external world, and this seems to place it in quite a different category from the thought of earlier philosophers. If the will was rooted in desire for Aristotle, it was something personal and rooted in actually existing creatures, whether human

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<sup>49</sup> A summary of Fillmore’s case grammar can be found in Elizabeth Closs Traugott and Mary Louise Pratt’s *Linguistics for Students of Literature*, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980) 191–202. The agent is defined as “the doer responsible for an action or event taking place” (192).

<sup>50</sup> Page 29, above.

or animal.<sup>51</sup> For Schopenhauer it was not the product of conscious activity, nor was it confined to beings. Will is a metaphysical force that is not rooted in actual beings, and so Schopenhauer was able to write these passages:

In fact, absence of all aim, of all limits, belongs to the essential nature of the will in itself, which is an endless striving. This was touched on above, when centrifugal force was mentioned. It also reveals itself in the simplest form of the lowest grade of the will's objectivity, namely gravitation, the constant striving of which we see, although a final goal for it is obviously impossible. (I, 164)

The will, considered purely in itself, is devoid of knowledge, and is only a blind, irresistible urge, as we see it appear in inorganic and vegetable nature and in their laws, and also in the vegetative part of our own life. (I, 275)

Walter Kaufmann considers that it is just this conception of the will as an irrational force that is one of the most important parts of Schopenhauer's doctrine:

Schopenhauer's greatest contribution to the discovery of the mind was his romantic conception the thing-in-itself as blind, irrational will. This eccentric metaphysical thesis, compounded of admiration for Goethe's Faust who strives ceaselessly and a somewhat dubious self-image, led others to pay more attention to our unconscious.<sup>52</sup>

The main points of Schopenhauer's doctrine can be summarized as follows:

1. The will is not something that exists only in conscious individuals; it is a metaphysical principle.
2. He rejects Lamarckism and appears to reject most of what is considered to be sound science, including Cuvier's studies in comparative anatomy.
3. He rejects Darwinism because it is materialistic.
4. Will exists even in inanimate objects, such as magnets, and in physical forces, such as magnetism.
5. The body is the will objectified, which means that it has been translated into perception. Even involuntary movement that is a response to some stimulus is the result of the will.
6. Events that affect the body also affect the will, but this is not similar to the psycho-physical parallelism of Descartes and Spinoza.
7. Schopenhauer attributes activity to even non-organic bodies, and this attribution goes beyond the level of metaphor. It appears that he means that these material, non-organic beings do perform activity.
8. All organic changes are the result of will.

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<sup>51</sup> See the discussion in the *Metaphysics*, Book IX, Chapter 2 *et passim*.

<sup>52</sup> Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Buber*, (New York: McGraw Hill Co., 1980) 40, vol. 2 of *Discovering the Mind*. Hereafter referred to as "Kaufmann, *Mind*."

## 9. The will is lacking in knowledge.

Schopenhauer's philosophical ruminations on the will and its power seem clearly to anticipate Shavian philosophy and Shavian thought in ways that Lamarck and Darwin do not. It is not sufficient to stop here and to proclaim that everything has been solved, and that Shaw's ideas on evolution are simply an extension of Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer rejected both Lamarckian and Darwinian evolution, and even if Shaw appropriated some ideas from Schopenhauer and used them in forming his drama of ideas, there were other influences at work on Shaw and other ideas beside the will that were incorporated into the Shavian evolutionary vision. Also to be explained are the idea of the Superman, and the fact that in *Man and Superman* the Superman is a goal to be striven for. The idea of the Superman is associated with Nietzsche and the doctrine preached in *Thus Spake Zarathustra* and the books that succeeded it. The same thing we will see holds true for the ultimate goal of Shavian evolution, becoming a vortex, which like the Superman is something to be willed.

### **Nietzsche: An Overview**

Lamarck is largely ignored today. Darwin is widely accepted. Schopenhauer is, while not ignored like Lamarck, relegated to classes in philosophy. Butler, who will be considered last, is known for two novels and generally not considered as a thinker or philosopher. Nietzsche is more problematic and there is much written about him, much of it bad and some of it distorted. These distortions include viewing him as a proto-Nazi, or dismissing him as an irrationalist.<sup>53</sup> It is equally possible for a normally perceptive writer such as C. S. Lewis to dismiss Nietzsche as a mere "innovator" in morals.<sup>54</sup> Kaufmann, in his volume *Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Buber*, has this to say about recent interpreters of Nietzsche:

In brief, one discounts what mattered most to Nietzsche himself and plays games with him. Snippets, more often than not from Nietzsche's notebooks, are used as counters, and a premium is placed on clever and surprising moves. Rather oddly, those who play this game seem to think of themselves as avant-garde. They are so lacking in historical perspective that they fail to realize how they are latter-day scholastics doing what generations of theologians have done for centuries with the Bible and Aristotle.<sup>55</sup>

A little later on Kaufmann remarks on the same point:

Such snippets of quotations can be used in a great variety of ways that are basically uncongenial to Nietzsche—the current French Nietzsche literature furnishes many examples of that—and Jaspers used Nietzsche to introduce us to his own mode of "philosophizing."<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Cf. Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1950). Further references to this text are cited as "Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*."

<sup>54</sup> C. S. Lewis, *The Abolition of Man: or Reflection on Education with Special Reference to the Teaching of English in the Upper Forms of Schools*, (New York: Macmillan, 1947) 58-9. For Lewis an innovation in morals is distinguished from a development in morals. In another work Lewis refers to Nietzsche's philosophy as "cheering oneself up."

<sup>55</sup> Kaufmann, *Mind*, 71.

Nietzsche is considered by some to be an irrationalist. Kaufmann, in his *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, attributes the development of the idea that Nietzsche was an irrationalist to Bäumler's early writings about Nietzsche.<sup>57</sup> That Nietzsche was, in some sense, an anti-rationalist is a view still held today, as can be seen in this statement:

In fact, Nietzsche actually went a great deal further than contemporary rhetoricians have been willing to go. He not only placed language at the forefront of his rhetorical theory, but used its enhanced philosophical position to launch a full-scale attack on logic and rationality, a step rhetoricians apparently have been loath to take, despite their current fascination with the world of symbols, sometimes at the expense of considering reasoning or strategies of argumentation.<sup>58</sup>

This is from the introduction to a translation of Nietzsche's lecture notes at Basel and any reference to them should bear in mind Kaufmann's stricture: "They are an important source of information concerning Nietzsche's relation to the ancient Greeks; they are 'full' notes and can be read continuously; and they present no great difficulty provided one keeps in mind that they represent lectures which Nietzsche gave while working on some of his earlier books."<sup>59</sup> It should also be noted that Gilman, Blair, and Parker stress Nietzsche's essay "On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense." Kaufmann's evaluation of this essay should be borne in mind:

The setting of these reflections owes much to Darwin, but for Nietzsche the doctrine of evolution was continuous with Goethe's emphasis on development, and he did not become a materialist. Nor did he ever publish even parts of his fragment "On Truth and Lie." The brilliance of its style and the haunting power of its imagery far surpass the books of that early period, and the organization of his later works would have made it easy to find a place for at least some of these pages. It is doubly remarkable that he did not see fit to make any use of this material.<sup>60</sup>

Kaufmann's position on Nietzsche's notes and unpublished material is usually that it is of less importance than the published material, and the failure to incorporate it in published material shows that either it was not worked through, or that it represents a position that Nietzsche rejected.

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<sup>56</sup> Kaufmann, *Mind*, 166. It is not clear what, or whom, Kaufmann is referring to but he may have in mind the French deconstructionists such as Derrida and his disciples. Kaufmann apparently wrote this in the late 1970s. Derrida's *De la Grammatologie* was published in French in 1967 and was translated in 1976. Derrida's *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles* appeared in 1979.

<sup>57</sup> Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*. On page 35 Kaufmann refers to "Bäumler's near-perfect perversion of Nietzsche" (Note 22). On page 57 he refers to Bäumler's, and the Nazi's, preference for *The Will to Power* (Nietzsche's notebooks) and says "No serious scholar has ever preferred to the notes to the books, but most of them consider books and notes on the same plane.... [I]t seems wholly unjustifiable." On page 230 Kaufmann says, "The 'Heraclelean' world-picture which Oehler and Bäumler consider proof of Nietzsche's irrationalism was derived, in the main, from Goethe, Hegel, and Leibniz—hardly 'irrationalists.'"

<sup>58</sup> Sander L. Gilman, Carole Blair, and David J. Parent, introduction, *Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language*, by Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. Sander L. Gilman, Carole Blair, and David J. Parent (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) xvii.

<sup>59</sup> Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 56.

<sup>60</sup> Kaufmann, *Mind*, 70.



His alleged irrationalism is only one of a number of things Nietzsche is known for; he is also known for inspiring Richard Strauss's *Also Sprach Zarathustra*; for the phrases such as "big blonde beast," for his anti-feminism, and for his final breakdown and insanity. Over and above these, however, Nietzsche is known for his distinction between the slave morality and the master morality and for his doctrine of the *Übermensch*. Some of these elements found their way into the Shavian ethos, and others did not. Some were fused into Shaw's evolutionary thought, and some were not. Nietzsche, unlike Schopenhauer, was not *homo unius libri*. His thoughts on will, evolution, and morality are found throughout his *oeuvre*, often in the form of brilliant aphorisms.

The question of Nietzsche's relationship to Shaw and to Shavian doctrines of evolution then revolves around a number of primary questions. What is Nietzsche's relation to Darwinism? Does the *Übermensch* have any relationship to Darwinian or Lamarckian evolution? What is the doctrine of the Will to Power, and does it have any relation to physiology or biology? Does the Will to Power have any relation to Schopenhauer's conception of the will? What are the ethics of the *Übermensch*, and is there any relation between Nietzsche's ethics and the Shavian ethos as expressed in *Man and Superman*, *Back to Methuselah* and the other plays? The second part of the last question will be considered in detail in chapters two and three, while the present section of this chapter will be concerned with an exposition of Nietzsche's ethical doctrines.

Kaufmann, in describing the "Nietzsche legend"<sup>61</sup> attributes a number of misconceptions to Nietzsche's sister, among them the misrepresentation of the *Übermensch*:

There are some other misconceptions for which Nietzsche's sister is at least partly responsible. His conception of the superman—as different from man as man is from the ape—might in any case have supplied a Darwin-conscious age with a convenient tag for its own faith in progress. This construction, however, was aided and abetted not only by her exegesis, but also by her long delay of the posthumous publication of *Ecce Homo* which contains a vitriolic denunciation of this misinterpretation. Around the turn of the century, the legend thus associated Nietzsche with a Darwinistic superman.<sup>62</sup>

## Nietzsche and Darwinism

Nietzsche's earliest work *Die Geburt der Tragödie* (*The Birth of Tragedy*), although it shows the influence of Schopenhauer, is not as important for our concerns as the first essay from his *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen* (*Untimely Meditations*). The first essay *David Strauss, der Bekenner und Schriftsteller* (*David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer*) contains Nietzsche's reaction to Strauss's late book *Der alte und neue Glaube* (*The Old Faith and the New*) and to Darwinism.

Kaufmann characterizes Nietzsche's reaction to Strauss's book in these terms:

The typical mediocrity, however, which most provokes Nietzsche is the comfortable and untroubled renunciation of Christianity, coupled with an easy conviction that Darwin was one of mankind's greatest benefactors and that —

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<sup>61</sup> This is the title of the first chapter in *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*.

<sup>62</sup> Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 7.

though Strauss gives no reason for this—traditional values can of course be maintained.<sup>63</sup>

Nietzsche had said of Strauss:

He announces with admirable frankness that he is no longer a Christian, but he does not wish to disturb anyone's peace of mind; it seems to him contradictory to found an association in order to overthrow an association—which is in fact not so very contradictory. With a certain rude contentment he covers himself in the hairy cloak of our ape-genealogists and praises Darwin as one of the greatest benefactors of mankind—but it confuses us to see that his ethics are constructed entirely independently of the question: "What is our conception of the world?"<sup>64</sup> (*Strauss*, 7)

Kaufmann sees themes of the later works here.<sup>65</sup> Nietzsche continues and describes the task that Strauss should have set himself and the way in which he failed in that task:

Strauss has not yet even learned that no idea can ever make men better or more moral, and that preaching morals is as easy as finding grounds for them is difficult; his task was much rather to take the phenomena of human goodness, compassion, love and self-abnegation, which do in fact exist, and derive and explain them from his Darwinist presuppositions.... [A]ccording to Darwin, he is precisely a creature of nature and nothing else, and has evolved to the height of being man by quite other laws: precisely, in fact, by always forgetting that other creatures similar to him possessed equivalent rights, precisely by feeling himself the stronger and gradually eliminating the other, weaker examples of his species. (*Strauss*, 7)<sup>66</sup>

Darwin's doctrine eliminated man's privileged place in the biological chain of being. If it could be shown that reason was not something unique to man, that there was no reason to assign it to a spiritual faculty that was implanted in man by some supernatural agency, which was what some of the Darwinists did attempt to do, then man was a simple product of nature and not differentiated from the animals.<sup>67</sup> Nietzsche divorces the physical world from any metaphysical or moral interpretation of that world:

...an honest natural scientist believes that the world conforms unconditionally to laws, without however asserting anything as to the ethical or intellectual value of these laws: he would regard any such assertions as the extreme

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<sup>63</sup> Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 112.

<sup>64</sup> Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 29.

<sup>65</sup> Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 113. Kaufmann identifies these as "The problem of the old faith and the new, the challenge of Darwin, and the sanction and derivation of moral values." Kaufmann in a later passage in the same book says that "Nietzsche was aroused from his dogmatic slumber by Darwin, as Kant had been by Hume a century earlier; and again it was a question of creating a new picture of man in reply to the 'true but deadly' nihilism from beyond the Channel" (Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 141).

<sup>66</sup> Nietzsche, *Untimely*, 30-31.

<sup>67</sup> See Beer, 12-19, for her discussion of Darwin's impact on man's self-esteem. Himmelfarb quotes Darwin as saying "I look upon all human feeling as traceable to some germ in the animals" (Himmelfarb, 384). See also Greene's discussion of social Darwinism, although his comments on Nietzsche are not to be taken seriously (Greene 333-4). See also Greene's discussion of Darwin and the intellectual gradations between men and animals (Greene, 321 *et sequela*).

anthropomorphism of a reason that overstepped the bounds of the permitted.  
(*Strauss*, 7)<sup>68</sup>

It follows from this that any attempt to say that a physical law, such as evolution, enjoins us to regard all men as brothers, or to identify with the lobster waiting for the pot (because we share the same DNA) is an “extreme anthropomorphism.” Neither toleration, nor vegetarianism, can be deduced from biological principles. What is given instead is a machine. Nietzsche characterizes Strauss’s position as liberating man from a merciful God and replacing him with a universe that is “a rigid machine.” He then goes on to add the cautionary note, “Take care you are not mangled in its wheels!” (*Strauss*, 33)<sup>69</sup>

These comments, written in 1872, when Nietzsche was 28 and the *Origin of Species* was 13, show his reaction to Darwin’s hypotheses. The dominant tone is irony and mockery, and the truth of R. J. Hollingdale’s statement that “Darwin’s specific contribution to theory of evolution influenced him only in a negative sense,” is borne out.<sup>70</sup> In an earlier book on Nietzsche, Hollingdale has described the crisis brought about by Darwin’s theory and the importance Nietzsche attached to it:

It is unnecessary to stress that before Darwin evolution was one of a number of theories concerning the genesis of the human race, while after Darwin it appeared to be the *proved* theory. The philosophical crisis produced by Darwin was essentially the crisis of evolution, which became a pressing 'problem' only after he had shown, by his hypothesis of natural selection, that there existed a mechanism through which it could actually have taken place. Nietzsche accepted the fundamental implication of Darwin's hypothesis, namely that mankind had evolved from the animals in a purely naturalistic way through chance and accident: there appeared to be purpose in evolution, but Darwin had shown that the higher animals and man could have evolved in just the way they did entirely by fortuitous variations in individuals. Natural selection was for Nietzsche essentially evolution freed from every metaphysical implication....<sup>71</sup>

Nietzsche returned briefly to a consideration of evolution and Darwinism in a number of passages in *Human, All Too Human* and it is worth considering these and some of his reflections on morality. Nietzsche starts by rejecting the notion that certain things, which may be socially conditioned, are in fact instinctual and part of man’s essential makeup:

Now, everything *essential* in human development occurred in primeval times, long before those four thousand years with which we are more or less familiar. Man probably hasn’t changed much more in these years. But the philosopher sees “instincts” in present-day man, and assumes that they belong to the unchangeable facts of human nature, that they can, to that extent, provide a key to the understanding of the world in general. This entire teleology is predicated on the ability to speak about man of the last four thousand years as if he

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<sup>68</sup> Nietzsche, *Untimely*, 31.

<sup>69</sup> Nietzsche, *Untimely*, 33.

<sup>70</sup> R. J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), 37. Henceforth cited as “Hollingdale, *Nietzsche*.”

<sup>71</sup> R. J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), 88-89. Subsequent references are cited as “Hollingdale, *Philosophy*.”

were eternal, the natural direction of all things in the world from the beginning. But everything has evolved; there are no *eternal facts*, nor are there any absolute truths. Thus *historical philosophizing* is necessary henceforth, and the virtue of modesty as well. (*Human*, 2)<sup>72</sup>

Nietzsche, in this passage, accepts evolution as a *fact*, but this does not mean that he has changed his position on Darwinism. Darwinism is still, for Nietzsche a hypothesis, and one that he is at great pains to reject in favor of Lamarckism. The following words of Nietzsche are clearly Lamarckian:

*How seeming becomes being.* Ultimately, not even the deepest pain can keep the actor from thinking of the impression of his part and the overall theatrical effect, not even, for example, at his child's funeral. He will be his own audience, and cry about his own pain as he expresses it. The hypocrite who always plays one and the same role finally ceases to be a hypocrite. Priests, for example, who are usually conscious or unconscious hypocrites when they are young men, finally end by becoming natural, and then they really are priests, with no affectation. Or if the father does not get that far, perhaps the son, using his father's headway, inherits the habit. If someone wants to *seem* to be something, stubbornly and for a long time, he eventually finds it hard to *be* anything else. The profession of everyman, even the artist, begins with hypocrisy, as he imitates from the outside, copies what is effective. (*Human*, 51)<sup>73</sup>

The apparent praise of hypocrisy may appear shocking, but it is firmly in the ethical tradition of Aristotle who said "We become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts."<sup>74</sup> The hypocrisy, in the position of Aristotle, is in the difference between outward appearance, bravery, and inner reality, fear. Both Aristotle and Nietzsche are emphasizing that it is the performance of the action that confers a quality on a person. The good person performs good actions. More will be said of this when we discuss one of the aphorisms of *Daybreak*.

The essential point of this aphorism is that Nietzsche believes in the inheritance of acquired characteristics. The particular characteristics that he is talking about happen to be moral characteristics, but he is not discussing the heredity versus environment issue here. He is clearly saying that *habits* are inherited. In this he is in the Lamarckian tradition and may be viewed as a precursor of Shavian evolutionary thought. Hollingdale sees this conception as central to Nietzsche's thought:

If any single conception could be called basic Nietzsche's thought it would be this. Its consequence, that there are no eternal facts or absolute truths, is one he went on to draw in every department of life. That man "has become" is in itself a denial of the existence of "human nature" and an objection to the idea that "man" can be defined: this opens the road to a philosophy of conscious self-modification—there being no standard man but only man at this or that stage of evolution—and thus to the "superman" and to "existentialism."<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits*, trans. Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984) 14. Henceforth cited as "Nietzsche, *Human*."

<sup>73</sup> Nietzsche, *Human* 50–1.

<sup>74</sup> This can be found in *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 1. The Bekker number is 1103<sup>a</sup>34–1103<sup>b</sup>2.

<sup>75</sup> Hollingdale, *Nietzsche*, 61.

Nietzsche, as Kaufmann repeatedly points out, writes as a “good European,” and in one aphorism (475) he advocates the achievement of a mixed European race, in which the Jews will be an essential element. This aphorism, aside from calling for a mixture of races, makes an excellent statement of Nietzsche’s anti-anti-Semitism.<sup>76</sup> The race-mixing may be seen as part of Nietzsche’s Lamarckism. Each race passes on its characteristics, characteristics that derive from habits, and is melded into a race that is superior to any of its constituent parts.

In *Daybreak* he continues to maintain his Lamarckian stance. In one aphorism he discusses “*Refined cruelty as virtue.*” In this aphorism he contends that there is “a morality which rests entirely on the *drive to distinction.*” This drive means that a person wants to make the sight of himself painful to another by causing the other to experience feelings of envy and an awareness “of his own impotence and degradation.” This morality is a “refined cruelty.” Nietzsche then continues:

In its ultimate foundation—in this case that means its first generation. For when the habit of some distinguishing action is *inherited*, the thought that lies behind it is not inherited with it (thoughts are not hereditary, only feelings): and provided it is not again reproduced by education, even the second generation fails to experience any pleasure in cruelty in connection with it, but only pleasure in the habit as such. *This* pleasure, however, is the first stage of the ‘good’. (*Daybreak*, 30)<sup>77</sup>

Nietzsche here refers to habit and its inheritance. Like later Lamarckians, for example Butler, he argues that the cause is not inherited but that its effects are.<sup>78</sup> Lamarck, however, did not argue that feelings were hereditary, only that *habits* were. Nietzsche, in this passage is arguing that a certain kind of morality is rooted in the need to inflict cruelty on others and that the thought behind this morality vanishes with the first generation, unless it is reinforced by education. The pleasure to be found in this morality then is connected not with the cruelty but with the *habit*. The pleasure to be found in the habit is the first stage in which the ethical valuation of “good” is made. Nietzsche is in this aphorism extending Lamarckism into the moral and ethical realm.

If Darwin had implied a mechanistic universe, Nietzsche was at pains to deny it. In aphorism 109 of *The Gay Science* he cautions against thinking of the world as a living entity. It is not even a machine; “it is certainly not constructed for one purpose, and calling it a ‘machine’ does it far too much honor.” The nature of the world is that of chaos not because it lacks necessity but because there is a lack of order. This order is an anthropomorphic conception imposed on the world by man. No judgments apply to the universe; there are no laws in nature, only necessity. Purpose does not exist in the universe, so there can be

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<sup>76</sup> Nietzsche, *Human*, 228–9. That Nietzsche refers to “the youthful Jew of the stock exchange” as “the most repugnant invention of the whole human race” is not necessarily to be taken as an example of anti-Semitism. Given the earlier passages in the *Schopenhauer* essay he may have been more incensed by the stock exchange than by the Jewishness of the member brokers. In any case it is outweighed by the tribute to the Jews that follows.

<sup>77</sup> Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *Daybreak: Thoughts On the Prejudices of Morality*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) 22–3.

<sup>78</sup> For example Samuel Butler’s description of Dr. Brown Sequard’s experiment and his comments on it. The description and commentary can be found in Samuel Butler, *The Essential Samuel Butler*, ed. G.D.H. Cole (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., n.d.), 381–3 and 397–8

no accidents. Finally, Nietzsche asks, “When will we complete our de-deification of nature? When may we begin to “*naturalize*” humanity in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?”<sup>79</sup> All attempts at anthropomorphizing the world or nature result in its deification. As Beer has suggested, all attempts at writing about nature or natural selection involve attributing agency to these things. The attribution of agency, to say that “Natural selection picks . . .,” is to say that there is an agent that exists independent of observation. This agent may be substituted for another agent that is recognized as a final cause, i.e., God. If a child asks “Why do some people have black skin?” and the reply is “Because they are genetically adapted to the tropical climate of Africa as a result of natural selection,” there is no fundamental difference between that answer and the answer “Because God wills it.” In the case of the first reply the mechanism of natural selection has been substituted for the will of God. This substitution results in a deification of natural selection. It is also a substitution of efficient causation for final causation. The second answer may be no more satisfying in an intellectual sense, but it does avoid the pitfall of substituting mechanism for purpose.<sup>80</sup> Nietzsche does not talk in terms of causation, but what he says of the “deification of nature” suggests that he has in mind this process whereby a mechanism is postulated as the cause of its effects.

Nietzsche in two aphorisms of Book V of *The Gay Science*, which was written in 1886, continues his attack on Darwin and on his deification of nature. Nietzsche is commenting on Spinoza’s emphasis on self-preservation:

That our modern natural sciences have become so thoroughly entangled in this Spinozistic dogma (most recently and worst of all, Darwinism with its incomprehensibly one-sided doctrine of the “struggle for existence”) is probably due to the origins of most natural scientists. . . . The whole of English Darwinism breathes something like the musty air of English overpopulation, like the smell of the distress and overcrowding of small people. . . . [I]n nature it is not conditions of distress that are *dominant* but overflow and squandering, even to the point of absurdity. The struggle for existence is only an *exception*, a temporary restriction of the will to life. The great and small struggle always revolves around superiority, around growth and expansion, around power—in accordance with the will to power which is the will of life. (*Gay*, 349)<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs*, trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Vintage, 1974) 167–9. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s comments on this passage, i.e., “this need for power through anthropomorphic defining compels humanity to create an unending proliferation of interpretations whose only ‘origin,’ that shudder in the nerve strings, being a direct sign of nothing, leads to no primary signified,” seem to wrench the passage out of context. (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, introduction, *Of Grammatology*, by Jacques Derrida, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) xxiii.). Nietzsche is denying the meanings that are imposed on the universe but he goes on to suggest that it is possible to reintegrate man into nature.

<sup>80</sup> The four causes, formal, material, efficient, and final correspond to three questions: What . . . ? (formal and material); How . . . ? (efficient); Why . . . ? (final). Natural selection may be a “How,” but it does not answer the question “Why?,” which is a question of purpose.

<sup>81</sup> Nietzsche, *Gay*, 292.

The sarcasm is noticeable. The reference to “English overpopulation” is probably a reference to Malthus’s essay on population.<sup>82</sup> Even more noticeable is the emphasis on abundance and overflowing. In a subsequent aphorism he maintains that Darwinism is a natural outgrowth of Hegelianism; this occurs in the context of a discussion of “What is German?” and is dismissed without further elaboration (*Gay*, 357).<sup>83</sup>

In aphorism 264 of *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche links the two types of moralities (master and slave) to Lamarckism. The various types of morality are inherited:

One cannot erase from the soul of a human being what his ancestors liked most to do and did constantly . . . . It is simply not possible that a human being should *not* have the qualities and preferences of his parents and ancestors in his body, whatever appearances may suggest to the contrary. This is the problem of race. (*Beyond*, 264)<sup>84</sup>

Kaufmann glosses this by pointing out that Nietzsche is expressing the Lamarckian belief in the inheritance of acquired characteristics. This position was, as Kaufmann points out, “anathema to Nazi racists.” Kaufmann’s contention is that Nietzsche’s “Lamarckism is not just an odd fact about Nietzsche but symptomatic of his conception of body and spirit: he ridiculed belief in ‘pure’ spirit but believed just as little in any ‘pure’ body; he claimed that neither could be understood without the other.”<sup>85</sup> Nietzsche’s position, that moralities are acquired by heredity, seems to rest on the assumption that the environment, i.e., education, has little or no influence on one’s moral code. From an existential and experiential viewpoint, this would seem to be contradicted by the presence of rebellious instincts in offspring. It does appear that, after their initial rebellion, children frequently do metamorphose into copies of their ancestors. Samuel Butler uses this very idea in his novel *The Way of All Flesh*, but suggests that frequently it is the grandparent and not the parent that appears in the child.

Nietzsche’s anti-Darwinian position runs throughout *Beyond Good and Evil* and pops up in several places. For example, in the chapter “On the Prejudices of Philosophers” aphorism 14 contains these lines:

In this overcoming of the world, and interpreting of the world in the manner of Plato, there was an *enjoyment* different from that which the physicists of today offer us—and also the Darwinists and anti-teleologists among the workers in physiology, with their principle of the “smallest possible force” and the greatest possible stupidity. (*Beyond*, 14)<sup>86</sup>

In a later aphorism Nietzsche takes aim at Darwin:

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<sup>82</sup> Kaufmann, in a note to his translation, refers to a passage in *The Twilight of the Idols* where Nietzsche says that “One should not mistake Malthus for nature” (Nietzsche, *Gay*, 292.).

<sup>83</sup> Nietzsche, *Gay*, 305. The whole aphorism runs from 304–10.

<sup>84</sup> Nietzsche, *Basic*, 403–4.

<sup>85</sup> Nietzsche, *Basic*, 404. Lamarckism would be “anathema to Nazi racists” because it would imply that the Jews, or Negroes (such as Jesse Owen) were not inherently inferior. Darwinism does not *necessarily* postulate equality between races. (The word Negro was used, in preference to Black or Afro-American, or some other term because that was the word used in polite society in the 1930’s when the Berlin Olympics took place.)

<sup>86</sup> Nietzsche, *Basic*, 212.

Perhaps the chasm between *know* and *can* is greater, also uncannier, than people suppose: those who can do things in the grand style, the creative, may possibly have to be lacking in knowledge—while, on the other hand, for scientific discoveries of the type of Darwin’s a certain narrowness, aridity, and industrious diligence, something English in short, may not be a bad disposition. (*Beyond*, 252)<sup>87</sup>

In the aphorism that immediately follows Nietzsche links Darwin, John Stuart Mill, and Herbert Spencer together as “respectable but mediocre Englishmen” (*Beyond*, 253). Nietzsche’s attacks on Darwin, et al., is actually an *ad hominem* attack, but that in itself is expressive of his distaste for the Darwinian position.

What should be obvious from what has been said here is that Nietzsche maintains an anti-Darwinian, pro-Lamarckian position, and that he links this with the inheritance of one of the two types of morality. What he calls the noble and slave races are neither racial categories based on skin color, skull type, or some other anthropometric methodology, nor categories derived from ethnic groupings such Sephardic, Ashkenazic, Polish, or other groupings, but types of men that represent these moralities.

In the chapter “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man” in *The Twilight of the Idols* Nietzsche continues the attack on Darwin and Darwinism. In aphorism 14 he contends that the “struggle for *existence*” is “asserted rather than proved.”<sup>88</sup> It is not the best types that are bred but the weak that prevail over the strong. Nietzsche’s contention is that “species do not grow in perfection: the weak prevail over the strong again and again, for they are the great majority—and they are also more *intelligent*.”<sup>89</sup> It is tempting to disagree with this contention that the weak are dominant over the strong, but what Nietzsche is getting at is that Darwinian variations do not work in favor of those traits that are most desirable but instead tend to average out and to be lost in the genetic shuffle.

Nietzsche’s sister attempted to present *The Will to Power* as Nietzsche’s major work, his attempt at a systematic philosophy. It is not a system. It is not a book. It is not a book in the sense that it is not a finished product in which Nietzsche sat down and wrote an extended essay or a series of aphorisms connected by themes and ideas. It is a book only in the sense that it is a number of printed pages bound together in a sequential manner and glued (in the paperback edition) together. It is a series of notes Nietzsche made and entered into one or more notebooks. Reproductions of the notebooks reveal them to be written in what appears to be an illegible scrawl that resembles the tracings of an EKG or EEG machine more than they do handwriting. These pages are heavily cancelled and bear numerous strikeouts and signs of revision. As such, they are not to be taken as seriously as Nietzsche’s published writings. The stricture cited before, that Nietzsche’s notes are to be considered primarily in relation to his published writings, seems to be a valid one, and comments on the notes i.e., on *The Will to Power* are to be construed only in relation to the works already discussed.<sup>90</sup>

Kaufmann said that sections 618–39 of *The Will to Power* “might well be called Nietzsche’s *Physics*,” alluding to the works of Aristotle. Despite the fact that Nietzsche’s notes “were not fully thought through nor completely integrated with the rest of Nietzsche’s

<sup>87</sup> Nietzsche, *Basic*, 381.

<sup>88</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 522. Footnote 82 Page 41, above. See also aphorism 685 of *The Will to Power* quoted on page 46, below.

<sup>89</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 523.



philosophy,” they are still valuable as indicators of his position *vis a vis* the mechanistic biology of Darwin.<sup>91</sup>

In 628 [1885–1886] Nietzsche asserts that the reduction of an event to mathematical formulae is only a description of the event, not an epistemological method. In 630 [1885] even chemical laws are reduced to a series of power relationships. This does not seem too far from Schopenhauer’s discussion of magnetism.<sup>92</sup> This theme continues in notes 631–33 [1885–1886, and 633 is March–June 1888]. Section 632 denies the notion of law that was put forward by Gravesande:

“Regularity” in succession is only a metaphorical expression, *as if* a rule were being followed here; not a fact. In the same way “conformity with a law.” We discover a formula by which to express an ever-recurring kind of result: we have therewith discovered no “law,” even less a force that is the cause of the recurrence of a succession of results. That something always happens thus and thus is here interpreted as if a creature always acted thus and thus as a result of obedience to a law or a lawgiver, while it would be free to act otherwise were it not for the “law.”<sup>93</sup>

Nietzsche is saying substantially the same thing that a parent might say to the child who asks what we did before the law of gravity was passed. The law of gravity is not a law that is generated by a lawgiver; there can be no question of violating the law of gravity or the second law of thermodynamics; these things are inherent in the nature of reality itself. The error of interpretation lies “in the fictitious insertion of a subject.”<sup>94</sup> This is not the position that we saw taken by the natural theologians such as Paley and Gravesande. Physical laws are laws because they were legislated as such by God at the moment of creation, therefore God can and could have made the universe in a completely different fashion.

Nietzsche, like both Butler and Shaw, emphasizes that the unconscious is the true genius.

*Against Darwinism.* The utility of an organ does not explain its origin; on the contrary! For most of the time during which a property is forming it does not preserve the individual and is of no use to him, least of all in the struggle with external circumstances and enemies....

The influence of “external circumstances” is overestimated by Darwin to a ridiculous extent: the essential thing in the life process is precisely the tremendous shaping, form-creating force working from within which *utilizes* and *exploits* “external circumstances”—The new forms molded from within are not formed with an end in view; but in the struggle of the parts a new form is not left long without being related to a partial usefulness and then, according to its use, develops itself more and more completely. (*Will*, 647) [1883–1888]<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> See the discussion on page 33, above. Reproductions of pages from Nietzsche’s notebooks are included in Kaufmann’s translation of *The Will to Power*. See Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, ed. Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Vintage, 1968), plates I–VIII (after xxxii.) Hereafter cited as “Nietzsche, *Will*” The date given by Kaufmann and Hollingdale will appear in the text in brackets after the first citation of the aphorism number.

<sup>91</sup> Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 230.

<sup>92</sup> Nietzsche, *Will*, 335–6. For Schopenhauer’s views on magnetism see the discussion on page 30, above..

<sup>93</sup> Nietzsche, *Will*, 336–7. For Gravesande see the discussion beginning on page 24, above.

<sup>94</sup> Nietzsche, *Will*, 337.

Nietzsche does not equate usefulness with utility; he is no utilitarian. Self preservation is not the goal of an individual or species. That goal might be strength and splendor and those creatures that are longest lived, such as turtles and tortoises, might be those that are out of the evolutionary mainstream.

New organs, from Nietzsche's perspective, are not molded by "external circumstances," which is Darwin's hypothesis, but arise from an internal compulsion within the organism. Darwin had hypothesized that an organism changes because of the struggle for food and that the unexplained changes that gave the organism an advantage would be preserved and passed on to its progeny. The phrase "according to its use" could mean "according to its purpose," but this seems unlikely, since Nietzsche has denied teleology. The more likely reading is "according to the degree to which it is used," and this is Lamarckian evolution again. Nietzsche is thus placing himself in a position that is decidedly pro-Lamarckian and anti-Darwinian.

Aphorisms 684 and 685, both of which date from the period March–June 1888, continue the attack on Darwinism:

*Anti-Darwin.* The domestication of man: what definite value can it have? or has domestication in general any definite value?— There are grounds for denying the latter.

The school of Darwin certainly makes a great effort to convince us of the reverse: it wants to show that the effect of domestication can become profound, even fundamental. In the meantime, we stick to our old opinion: up to now, domestication has produced only quite superficial effects—when it has not produced degeneration. And everything that eludes the hand and discipline of man returns almost at once to its natural state. The type remains constant: one cannot "*denaturer la nature...*"

But one nowhere finds any example of *unconscious selection* (absolutely not). The most disparate individuals unite with one another, the extremes are submerged in the mass. Everything competes to preserve its type; creatures with exterior markings to protect them from danger do not lose them when they encounter conditions in which they live without danger—When they live in places in which their dress ceases to hide them they do not by any means adapt to the new milieu....

There are no *transitional forms*.—

...Primitive creatures are said to be the ancestors of those now existing. But a look at the fauna and flora of the Tertiary merely permits us to think of an as yet unexplored country that harbors types that do not exist elsewhere, while those existing elsewhere are missing.

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*My general view.—first proposition:* man as a species is not progressing. Higher types are indeed attained, but they do not last. The level of the species is *not* raised.

*Second proposition:* man as a species does not represent any progress compared with any other animal. The whole animal and vegetable kingdom does

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<sup>95</sup> Nietzsche, *Will*, 344. Kaufmann notes that the manuscript continues: "If only that had been preserved which proved useful *all the time*, then above all the noxious, destructive, disintegrating capacities—the senseless, accidental,..."

not evolve from the lower to the higher—but all at the same time, in utter disorder, over and against each other. The richest and most complex forms—for the expression “higher type” means no more than this—perish more easily: only the lowest preserve an apparent indestructibility. The former are achieved only rarely and maintain their superiority with difficulty; the latter are favored by a compromising fruitfulness.

Among men, too, the higher types, the lucky strokes of evolution, perish most easily as fortunes change. They are exposed to every kind of decadence: they are extreme, and that almost means decadents....

*Third proposition:* the domestication (the “culture”) of man does not go deep—Where it does go deep it at once becomes degeneration (type: the Christian). The “savage” (or, in moral terms, the evil man) is a return to nature—and in a certain sense his recovery his *cure* from “culture”—(*Will*, 684) [March-June 1888]<sup>96</sup>

Several points need to be emphasized here. Nietzsche phrases the opening in a polemical, almost *ad hominem*, fashion. The opening reference to “domestication” with its follow-up question about the use of domestication in general may be a reference to Darwin’s 1868 book *Variation of Plants and Animals Under Domestication*. That this is the case may be seen from the references to the school of Darwin and its contention that domestication can produce profound effects in species. Nietzsche’s contention is that domestication has produced degeneration. Insofar as man is domesticated and removed from his primitive, wild environment, he is forced to degenerate. That everything falls back into its wild state when the hand of man is not present can be seen by looking at the ruins of Mayan or Aztec civilizations. In those instances the jungle has encroached on the temples and monumental architecture of the lost peoples and threatened to destroy it. It was only the utmost vigilance that kept nature from destroying civilization.

The Darwinian hypothesis is that the weaker members of any species should “go away”; they should be weeded out. Nietzsche contends that the very fact that they are weaker is what gives them an edge for survival. Their weakness makes them smarter, cleverer, than their bigger lumbering opponents. The tiny cockroach has survived almost unchanged for two hundred million years, while the larger dinosaurs, the apatosaurus (or brontosaurus to everyone except a few ultra-correct paleontologists), the tyrannosaurus, and the allosaurus have vanished from the face of the earth. Mammals, although we like to think of them as the dominant species, are far outnumbered in both number of species and absolute numbers by insects. The mammals themselves proved to be smarter than the large, rumbling behemoths of the Tertiary and Jurassic periods and survived where the lords of creation could not.

There is no bias that will preserve traits. It is not uncommon to see a beautiful woman with an ugly man, or vice versa; this indiscriminate pairing and mating militates against the preservation of type. The type still remains true even when the conditions under which it acquired its characteristics vanishes. The species that are relocated to a different habitat do not therefore change themselves to adapt to the new environment.

When Nietzsche says that “there are no transitional forms,” he makes the most common charge against Darwin, that there are no missing links between one form and the oth-

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<sup>96</sup> Nietzsche, *Will*, 361-4.

er. This means that if I cannot find an intermediate form between *Australopithecus Africanus* and *Homo Erectus* I cannot show that AA evolved into HE. But suppose that I could find a form that was intermediate between the two, which we'll call AA<sub>h1</sub>. I would then have to find two more forms, because the objection could be made that I have no in-

**Examples of  
*Australopithecus* and *Homo  
Erectus*<sup>a</sup>**

Lucy (AA)

Turkana  
Boy (HE)



a. Pictures from the Talk Origins Archives

termediate forms between AA and AA<sub>h1</sub>, nor do I have an intermediate form between AA<sub>h1</sub> and HE. If these forms do show up, I then have to introduce more intermediate forms between each of the existing forms to show a continuity between forms. Ultimately each new discovery produces the need for two more discoveries, one before and one after it, so that the number of forms to be produced grows exponentially. It is therefore necessary to produce one individual from every generation in order to adduce a smooth evolutionary line. This has not been done, and in Nietzsche's time even more was left undone than at present. Nietzsche was, from this perspective, right in asserting that there are no transitional forms. Nothing less than a complete history could satisfy this demand.

Cæsar is cited as an example of a lucky stroke, but since he is a unique example he did not reproduce. Only types reproduce, the characteristics that make for the "lucky strokes" do not breed true, or else the individual is somehow removed from breeding.

The attack continues in 685. Darwin is wrong, according to Nietzsche, because what his theory predicts, the emergence of better, higher men, does not occur.

*Anti-Darwin.*—What surprises me most when I survey the broad destinies of man is that I always see before me the opposite of that which Darwin and his school see or *want* to see today: selection in favor of the stronger, better-constituted, and the progress of the species. Precisely the opposite is palpable: the elimination of the lucky strokes, the uselessness of the more highly developed types, the inevitable dominion of the average, even the *sub-average* types. If we are not shown why man should be an exception among creatures, I incline to the prejudice that the school of Darwin has been deluded everywhere.

That will to power in which I recognize the ultimate ground and character of all change provides us with the reason why selection is not in favor of the exceptions and lucky strokes: the strongest and most fortunate are weak when opposed by organized herd instincts, by the timidity of the weak, by the vast majority. My general view of the world of values shows that it is not the lucky strokes, the select types, that have the upper hand in the supreme values that are today placed over mankind; rather it is the decadent types—perhaps there is nothing in the world more interesting than this *unwelcome* spectacle—

... That *species* represent any progress is the most unreasonable assertion in the world: so far they represent one level. That the higher organisms have evolved from the lower has not been demonstrated in a single case. I see how the lower preponderate through their numbers, their shrewdness, their cunning—I do not see how an accidental variation gives an advantage, at least not

for so long a period; why an accidental change should grow so strong would be something else needing explanation....

*In summa*: growth in the *power* of a species is perhaps guaranteed less by a preponderance of its children of fortune, of strong members, than by a preponderance of average and lower types—The latter possess great fruitfulness and duration; with the former comes an increase in danger, rapid wastage, speedy reduction in numbers. (Will, 685) [March-June 1888]<sup>97</sup>

If Darwin was right, then there should be a continual improvement among species, among men. This simply does not occur; it is primarily those who are weaker that prosper. From Nietzsche's perspective the most highly favored members, those who are at the right hand side of the chart, are outnumbered by their inferiors. The distribution of favors proceeding on a purely random basis means that it is not the best that will survive but those most nearly average. They will have the favor when it comes to sexual selection, or to survival.

The will to power that is in the great mass of men is stronger, in that mass, than it can ever be in the strongest individual. The mass has a *herd instinct* that permits it to clump together against the more fortunate examples. The strong, the elite must be defended against the weak, but it is these who have gained the upper hand through their morality. This morality is essentially a negation of life. Nietzsche sums up by again asserting that it is the weak who have inherited the earth and the strong who pose a continual danger to the mass of mankind.

### **Nietzsche and the Critique of Morality and Christianity**

In *Human, All Too Human* Nietzsche begins his attack on morality. What Nietzsche's attack on morality is commonly thought to mean needs to be stated before it can be shown what he actually meant. The phrase "transvaluation of all values," which was the planned title for a book Nietzsche never wrote, suggests a turning upside down of all values. Nietzsche, it might be supposed, advocated a position like that of Milton's Satan and chose evil to be his good. Alternatively it might be taken to mean that he advocated the morality of de Sade; the frequent references to cruelty could be construed that way, if they are taken out of context. Kaufmann has discussed these points at considerable length in his book on Nietzsche.<sup>98</sup>

Nietzsche begins his attack on morality by asserting that:

Since man no longer believes that a God is guiding the destinies of the world as a whole, or that, despite all apparent twists, the path of mankind is leading somewhere glorious, men must set themselves ecumenical goals embracing the whole earth. The older morality, namely Kant's, demands from the individual those actions that one desires from all men—a nice, naive idea, as if everyone without further ado would know which manner of action would ben-

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<sup>97</sup> Nietzsche, *Will*, 364–5.

<sup>98</sup> See Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 88–96, *et passim*. Kaufmann makes the point that there is a similarity between Nietzsche's urging one to be hard, even on other people, and the Biblical injunction to leave father and mother. It would be interesting to draw up a comparison between the "hard" sayings of Nietzsche and the "hard" sayings of Jesus (such as the one that caused Origen to castrate himself.)

efit the whole of mankind, that is, which actions were desirable at all. (*Human*, 25)<sup>99</sup>

The relevant point here is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a moral principle that is universal. Contrary to the assertion of someone like Sartre, who contends that in choosing I choose for all men, Nietzsche asserts that the Kantian morality, with its dependence on absolutes, must give way to the fact that no one can know what is good for another.

In *Daybreak*, or *The Dawn*, Nietzsche begins what Kaufmann refers to as his “vivisection” of morality.<sup>100</sup> Nietzsche attempts to construct a psychology here based on the concepts of fear and power. It will not be until *Zarathustra* that Nietzsche will proclaim the unitary concept of the will to power. At this point Nietzsche is tied to a psychological dualism. At the time that he writes both *Daybreak* and *The Gay Science* Nietzsche rejects a monistic psychology and, as Kaufmann points out, pours scorn on Schopenhauer’s concept of the will.<sup>101</sup>

Nietzsche, in *Zarathustra*, had talked about the creation of new values. In the section “On Self-Overcoming” Zarathustra had said, “And whoever must be a creator in good and evil, verily, he must first be an annihilator and break values. Thus the highest evil belongs to the highest goodness: but this is creative” (*Zarathustra*, II, 12).<sup>102</sup> The concept of value creation is continued in *Beyond Good and Evil* and in *The Genealogy of Morals*.

Nietzsche is, as Kaufmann puts it, “thinking experimentally” in *Beyond Good and Evil* and not attempting to legislate morality.<sup>103</sup> Nietzsche defines his attempt at psychology as an attempt “To understand it as morphology and *the doctrine of the development of the will to power*” (*Beyond*, 23).<sup>104</sup>

Nietzsche’s doctrine of morality, here as elsewhere, is still that of sublimation, i.e., that drives can be redirected, “sublimated” so that they lose their destructive capacity. In aphorism 109 of *Daybreak* he had already sounded this note in discussing self-mastery:

Thus: avoiding opportunities, implanting regularity into the drive, engendering satiety and disgust with it and associating it with a painful idea (such as that of disgrace, evil consequence or offended pride), then dislocation of forces and finally a general weakening and exhaustion....<sup>105</sup>

The sixth means of weakening a drive is the path of the ascetic. Nietzsche has passed out of the stage in which he regarded the saint as a desirable type of human being, the stage of the Schopenhauer meditation, so presumably what he means by sublimation is either that one or more, perhaps even all five of the other methods, work in tandem to achieve sublimation of the instincts.

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<sup>99</sup> Nietzsche, *Human*, 30–1.

<sup>100</sup> *Daybreak* and *The Dawn* both, of course, refer to *Die Morgenröte*. *Daybreak* is the title used by Hollingdale in his translation of the work. For Kaufmann’s reference to “vivisection,” see his *Nietzsche*, 161.

<sup>101</sup> Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 162. The reference that Kaufmann cites is *The Gay Science*, aphorism 99; this aphorism will be discussed briefly in the section on *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*.

<sup>102</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 228.

<sup>103</sup> Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 189.

<sup>104</sup> Nietzsche, *Basic*, 221.

<sup>105</sup> Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, 110.

The same holds true for Nietzsche's invocation of the "blond beast." The beast, which is not human but rather a lion, or some other literal beast, functions as a symbol of the "unsublimated animal passion."<sup>106</sup>

In aphorism 260 Nietzsche defines two types of morality:

There are *master morality* and *slave morality*—I add immediately that in all the higher and more mixed cultures there also appear attempts at mediation between these two moralities, and yet more often the interpenetration and mutual misunderstanding of both, and at times they occur directly alongside each other—even in the same human being, within a *single* soul. The moral discrimination of values has originated either among a ruling group whose consciousness of its difference from the ruled group was accompanied by delight—or among the ruled, the slaves and dependents of every degree. (*Beyond*, 260)<sup>107</sup>

Nietzsche continues, in this aphorism, by postulating that the master and slave moralities arrive at two fundamentally opposed evaluations. When the ruling group, or the masters, determine the "good," the evaluation is based on the feelings of exaltation that proceed from distinction and rank. Nietzsche does not refer to it in this passage, but perhaps the closest approximation that can be made is to consider the Homeric heroes as exemplars of the noble morality. Achilles, for example, has the element of haughtiness that Nietzsche points out. The noble person despises those in whom these states do not find expression. The opposition here is between "good" and "bad," and the "bad" is equated with the "contemptible." This opposition is the same as that which exists between Achilles and Thersites in Homer. Nietzsche explains his classification of the noble human being as one who:

honors himself as one who is powerful, also as one who has power over himself, who knows how to speak and be silent, who delights in being severe and hard with himself and respects all severity and hardness. (*Beyond*, 260)<sup>108</sup>

Kaufmann points out that Nietzsche's approval of master morality was not wholehearted and that in *The Twilight of the Idols* he expresses his distaste for the laws of Manu about outcasts. Kaufmann refers to section 142 of *The Will to Power* and aphorism 57 of *The Antichrist* as additional evidence for his view.

The slave morality, on the other hand, is characterized by the fact that those who promulgate this morality are the dispossessed, the suffering, the unfree. A slave will value those who treat him kindly and condemn those who are harsh. His valuations are based on the amount of comfort that is brought to him by others, and so his valuations tend towards an emphasis on kindness, pity, and so on. This is where Nietzsche finds the origin of

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<sup>106</sup> Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 196. For the reader who doubts that the beast is a lion see *The Genealogy of Morals*, I, 11 and II, 17. See also Kaufmann's note on the blond beast that accompanies each of those sections (Nietzsche, *Basic*, 476–9, 522–3).

<sup>107</sup> Nietzsche, *Basic*, 394.

<sup>108</sup> Nietzsche, *Basic*, 395. This does seem to be the kind of thing that a proto-Nazi might say, but many popular institutions have rituals that emphasize secrecy and silence. Two examples that come to mind are the fraternal organizations, such as Skull and Bones at Yale, and certain rituals in the Boy Scouts. Neither of these is proto- or crypto-Nazi.

“good” and “evil.” That which is evil is that which inspires fear. For the master morality, on the other hand, the “good” inspire fear, while the “bad” inspire contempt.

What is most notable in *Beyond Good and Evil*, however, is that Nietzsche nowhere acts as a legislator; he does not substitute his table of shalt and shalt-nots for that of Moses. In *The Genealogy of Morals* Nietzsche returns to the task of elaborating the distinction between the noble and the slave morality. He also introduces the “blonde beast” and its attendant imagery.

In *The Genealogy of Morals* Nietzsche locates the origin of “the slave revolt in morality” in *ressentiment*, or resentment.<sup>109</sup> The creative action of *ressentiment* is able to take place because there is a denial of the actualization of resentful impulses through action. The slave morality effectively denies whatever is different from itself. Nietzsche describes this morality as needing “a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all—its action is fundamentally reaction” (*Genealogy*, I, 10).<sup>110</sup>

The noble morality is rooted in self-affirmation. The noble man is one that has a high degree of self-esteem, but his self-esteem is rooted in a firm recognition of his talents and capabilities. Nietzsche’s concept of nobility has notable parallels to Aristotle’s concept, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, of the megalopsychic, or great-souled, man.<sup>111</sup> The great-souled man differs from the vain man in that his estimations of worth are correct.<sup>112</sup> Nietzsche’s description of the noble man, such as Mirabeau, who is unable to forgive because he has forgotten the wrongs done to him, is almost an anticipation of Shaw’s *Cæsar*.<sup>113</sup>

In the following aphorism the *blonde Bestie* appears. Nietzsche’s context, he is discussing the appearance of the powerful, instinctual drives in the noble man, makes it clear that the *blonde Bestie* appears in all races.

There they savor a freedom from all social constraints, they compensate themselves in the wilderness for the tension engendered by protracted confinement and enclosure within the peace of society, they go *back* to the innocent conscience of the beast of prey, as triumphant monsters who perhaps emerge from a disgusting procession of murder, arson, rape, and torture exhilarated and undisturbed of soul, as if it were no more than a students’ prank, convinced they have provided the poets with a lot more material for song and praise. One cannot fail to see at the bottom of all these noble races the beast of prey, the splendid *blond beast* prowling about avidly in search of spoil and victory; this hidden core needs to erupt from time to time, the animal has to get out again and go back to the wilderness: the Roman, Arabian, Germanic, Japanese nobility, the Homeric heroes, the Scandinavian Vikings—they all shared this need (*Genealogy*, I, 11)<sup>114</sup>

Nietzsche is referring to a blonde beast of prey, obviously, to anyone who has spent time at a zoo, or a circus—a lion. The linkage with Arabs and Japanese shows that it is not spe-

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<sup>109</sup> Nietzsche uses the French word *ressentiment*, because German lacks an equivalent. I have followed Nietzsche, and most of his translators and commentators in using the French rather than the English word.

<sup>110</sup> Nietzsche, *Basic*, 473. The *Genealogy* is cited in the text by essay number and by section.

<sup>111</sup> See Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 334-6. Aristotle’s discussion can be found in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, IV, 3

<sup>112</sup> This obviously differs from the cult of self-esteem in which one is supposed to have a high degree of self-esteem regardless of achievement or capability of achievement.

<sup>113</sup> See the discussion of *Cæsar and Cleopatra* on page 105, below.

<sup>114</sup> Nietzsche, *Basic*, 476-7.



cific to one ethnic group but is something which cuts across ethnic lines. When later Nietzsche queries whether there is any similarity between the primitive German tribes and the present-day Germans he makes clear that he is not talking about some Aryan dream offered up by his anti-Semitic sister and her husband.

The nature of the *blond Bestie* is to be destructive. The nay-saying lion is Nietzsche's, and Zarathustra's, symbol for the second of the three metamorphoses of the spirit. The camel is the beast of burden. It accepts and is passively yea-saying. The lion destroys what exists, much as the wrecker's ball and dynamite demolish an existing building in order to prepare the ground for the erection of a new one. The third symbol that Nietzsche uses is that of the creative child. The child is responsible for the creation of new values.<sup>115</sup>

The second and third of Nietzsche's essays in *The Genealogy* are provocative and disturbing. His discussion, in the second essay, of the origin of punishment and his critique of justice may be relevant to Shaw's little essay *The Crime of Imprisonment*. His discussion of the role of how justice ultimately overcomes itself and becomes mercy, and his discussion of the role of revenge in justice are relevant to any discussion of the judicial process and to penology.<sup>116</sup>

In *The Twilight of the Idols* Nietzsche's chapter "The 'Improvers' of Mankind," describes two tendencies to be found in morality—the *taming* of man and the *breeding* of a certain type of man. Both of these tendencies are aimed at improving mankind. Nietzsche compares the taming of man to the process involved in taming beasts in a menagerie. The medieval church weakened man by making him into a "Christian."<sup>117</sup> Taming means that the race becomes docile and obedient. Breeding means that a certain type of man, a scholar, a warrior, a merchant, or a servant is to be produced.

Section three of this chapter continues with a commentary of the attempt of the laws of Manu to breed four distinct races within the Hindu caste system. The attempt to breed different types of men is contrasted with the "Christian atmosphere of disease and dungeons" and is described as a "healthier, higher, and *wider* world." Nietzsche's insistence on breeding can be torn out of context and made to mean that he elevates cruelty to a high position in his morality, (by implying that he favors the treatment accorded the untouchables). Nietzsche continues by saying that "this organization too found it necessary to be *terrible*—this time not in the struggle with beasts, but with their counter-concept, the unbred man, the mishmash man, the chandala." Nietzsche's use of *terrible* indicates he does not favor Manu's laws. The measures, such as the edict that "the only nourishment permitted to chandala shall be garlic and onions," are those that "contradict our feeling." Nietzsche cites several examples of the laws governing the chandalas. These laws, as cited by Nietzsche, are: chandalas may drink water from "the approaches to swamps and from holes made by the footsteps of animals"; chandalas may not wash their laundry or themselves; "Sudra women may not assist chandala women in childbirth"; chandala women may not assist each other in labor. The consequences of this were, according to Nietzsche, epidemics, venereal disease, and male and female circumcision. This attempt at breeding rac-

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<sup>115</sup> The description of the three metamorphoses of the spirit can be found in Zarathustra, I, 1 (Nietzsche, *Portable*, 137–42).

<sup>116</sup> See *Genealogy* II, 10–15 (Nietzsche, *Basic*, 508–19). Nietzsche in II, 10 says "As the power and self-confidence of a community increase, the penal law always becomes more moderate; every weakening or imperiling of the former brings with it a restoration of the harsher forms of the latter" (Nietzsche, *Basic*, 508).

<sup>117</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 502–3.

es of men is an attempt at breeding people of consistent bloodlines, i.e., “pure blood.” The concept of “pure blood,” Nietzsche says in section four, is revealed to be “the opposite of a harmless concept.”<sup>118</sup>

Both of these attempts at improving mankind (taming and breeding) are related to morals. The one is an attempt at restraining the instincts within man. The other, which seems to be related to eugenics, is devoted to producing certain types of men. Implicit in Nietzsche’s attack on the morality derived from breeding is a condemnation of attempts to link the *Übermensch* and Darwinism. The *Übermensch* is not consciously bred by selecting for certain traits in the manner of a pigeon fancier, which is the path of Darwinian selection. The condemnation is present because Nietzsche has linked both taming and breeding to “the priest,” and to the *pia fraus* that underlies all morality.<sup>119</sup>

Nietzsche’s attack on Christian morality continues in *The Antichrist*, but, interestingly enough, his attack is not centered so much on the character and teaching of Jesus as it is on what he regards as Paul’s distortion and perversion of the “evangel.” This is a stance that Shaw took in his 1915 preface to *Androcles and the Lion*, and it occurs in a letter that Shaw wrote in 1888 concerning the Whitechapel murders of Jack the Ripper.<sup>120</sup> This attack on Paul may not be original to Nietzsche, but it is a position he maintained with a fair degree of consistency throughout his life.

Themes that we have already noticed, the will to power, the critique of Christian morality, and so on, continue to appear in *The Antichrist*. We find Nietzsche defining the good in terms of power:

What is good? Everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power, power itself.

What is bad? Everything that is born of weakness.

What is happiness? The feeling that power is *growing*, that resistance is overcome.

Not contentedness but more power; not peace but war; not virtue but fitness (Renaissance virtue, *virtù*, virtue that is moraline-free).

The weak and the failures shall perish: first principle of *our* love of man. And they shall even be given every possible assistance.

What is more harmful than any vice. Active pity for all the failures and all the weak: Christianity. (*Antichrist*, 2)<sup>121</sup>

The section of the passage beginning with “The weak and the failures” would seem to give license to the Nazi mass exterminations, but this was not Nietzsche’s position. That it was not his position can be seen through a careful reading of the works already discussed. For example, in the *Genealogy*, he contends that the strength of a society might be gauged by the number of parasites and criminals that it can endure (*Genealogy*, II, 10).<sup>122</sup> In a later aphorism within *The Antichrist* (number 57) Nietzsche denies the implications of this

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<sup>118</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 503–4.

<sup>119</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 502, 505.

<sup>120</sup> See the letter to the editor of *The Star* cited on page 76, below.

<sup>121</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 570. Kaufmann’s footnote on “moraline” is that it is “The coinage of a man who neither smoked nor drank coffee” (Nietzsche, *Portable*, 570).

<sup>122</sup> Nietzsche, *Basic*, 508.

statement: “When the exceptional human being treats the mediocre more tenderly than himself and his peers, this is not mere politeness of the heart—it is simply his *duty*.”<sup>123</sup>

The Nietzschean critique of Christianity rests on the element of *ressentiment* (resentment) that is present in the Christian *ethos*. When Paul urges his congregation to do good to those that do evil to them, it is so they will enjoy the spectacle of them suffering (Romans 12: 19–21).<sup>124</sup> Nietzsche gives Zarathustra’s and his position on revenge:

But if you have an enemy, do not requite him evil with good, for that would put him to shame. Rather prove that he did you some good.

And rather be angry than put to shame. And if you are cursed, I do not like it that you want to bless. Rather join in the cursing. (*Zarathustra*, I, 19)<sup>125</sup>

Kaufmann’s comment on this passage is that “Much of this is surely closer to the gospel than what Nietzsche is attacking.”<sup>126</sup> The point that Nietzsche makes with a fair degree of consistency is that Christian *dogma* as evidenced by Paul, Tertullian, Aquinas, *et al.* is at variance with the *practice* of Jesus. This leads him to his portrait of Jesus in aphorism 35:

This “bringer of glad tidings” died as he had lived, as he had taught—*not* to “redeem men” but to show how one must live.... And he begs, he suffers, he loves *with* those, *in* those who do him evil. *Not* to resist, *not* to be angry, *not* to hold responsible—but to resist not even the evil one—to *love* him. (Antichrist, 35)<sup>127</sup>

Jesus is an exemplar. The teachings of Paul and the revision of the Christian doctrine by Luther, so that faith rather than works became the means of Christian justification, are explicitly rejected by Nietzsche. Kaufmann’s discussion of Nietzsche’s perception of Luther can be summarized briefly here. Essentially the Lutheran emphasis on faith over works derives from the inability of Luther to carry out Christian works. The Christian practice is essentially that which is embodied in the practice, not necessarily in the teachings, of Jesus. This perception of Jesus as embodying certain values in a practical way is one of the ways in which Nietzsche and Shaw might be joined.

### Nietzsche and the *Übermensch*

In *Zarathustra* the first mention is made of the *Übermensch* or superman. The idea of progress towards an inevitable superhuman being may have been congenial to the Victorian era, but Nietzsche’s *Übermensch* was not a Darwinian event. Nietzsche himself was at pains to repudiate such an interpretation:

The word “overman,” as the designation a type of supreme achievement, as opposed to “modern” men, to “good” men, to Christians and other nihilists—a word that in the mouth of a Zarathustra, the annihilator of morality, becomes a very pensive word—has been understood almost everywhere with the utmost innocence in the sense of those very values whose opposite Zarathustra

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<sup>123</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 647.

<sup>124</sup> Paul is quoting from Deuteronomy 32: 35 and Proverbs 25: 21–2.

<sup>125</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 180.

<sup>126</sup> Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 326.

<sup>127</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 608–9.

was meant to represent—that is, as an “idealistic” type of a higher kind of man, half “saint,” half “genius.”

Other scholarly oxen have suspected me of Darwinism on that account. Even the “hero worship” of that unconscious and involuntary counterfeiter, Carlyle, which I have repudiated so maliciously, has been read into it. Those to whom I said in confidence that they should sooner look even for a Cesare Borgia than for a Parsifal did not believe their own ears. (*Ecce*, III, 1)<sup>128</sup>

Nietzsche had, in his meditation on Schopenhauer, identified the task of humanity as producing examples of the saint, the artist, and the philosopher. These examples are not the last men in point of historic time but occur throughout history.<sup>129</sup> Hollingdale describes the superman as a “cipher.”<sup>130</sup>

The psychological content of this cipher links it with his psychology of will to power: the superman is the embodiment of sublimated will to power; but the meaning has not been exhausted when the cipher has been elucidated psychologically. The superman is more than the embodiment of a psychological theory: he is also the embodiment of life-affirmation through acceptance of the totality of life, and especially of the suffering entailed in living; in which aspect he is also described by the cipher “the Dionysian man”.<sup>131</sup>

Zarathustra’s proclamation of the *Übermensch* comes immediately after he has announced the death of God (*Zarathustra*, Prologue, 2 & 3).<sup>132</sup> His most interesting statement in this connection, however, comes somewhat later:

Once one said God when one looked upon distant seas; but now I have taught you to say: overman.

God is a conjecture; but I desire that your conjectures should not reach beyond your creative will. Could you *create* a god? Then do not speak to me of any gods. But you could well create the overman. Perhaps not you yourselves, my brothers. But into fathers and forefathers of the overman you could re-create yourselves: and let this be your best creation.

God is a conjecture; but I desire that your conjectures should be limited by what is thinkable. Could you think a god? But this is what the will to truth

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<sup>128</sup> Nietzsche, *Basic*, 717. Carl Mills perceives, correctly, that, “There are similarities between Shaw and Nietzsche, but their supermen are not as similar as critics have made them out to be.” He errs in his next sentence when he asserts that, “Nietzsche’s superman is closer to Carlyle’s hero than he is to Shaw’s superman”. This is an obvious error, given Nietzsche’s own valuation, unless we interpret Mills as meaning that there is no resemblance among the three, an interpretation that Mills’s text does not seem to bear out (Mills, 128).

Mills does, in the same passage recognize Nietzsche’s anti-Darwinism and his rejection of socialism. Mills considers the Shavian Superman to be, “a synthesis of ideas suggested to him by Carlyle, Ibsen, Wagner, and Nietzsche” (Mills 128–9). Shaw’s debt to Carlyle is not dealt with here. For discussion of Ibsen and Wagner see the sections below on *The Quintessence of Ibsenism* and *The Perfect Wagnerite*.

<sup>129</sup> Page 35, above. See also aphorism 6 of the meditation on Schopenhauer for more of Nietzsche’s discussion of this point. Shavian examples of the Superman will be discussed in chapter two, when Tanner’s pamphlet is discussed.

<sup>130</sup> The term is appropriated by Hollingdale from Karl Jaspers. Hollingdale says, “A ‘cipher’ in Jasper’s use of the word is ‘the embodiment of transcendence’ which cannot be annulled by equating it with the object signified” (Hollingdale, *Nietzsche*, 12).

<sup>131</sup> Hollingdale, *Nietzsche*, 12.

<sup>132</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 124 and following.

should mean to you: that everything is changed into what thinkable for man, visible for man, feelable by man. You should think through your senses to their consequences. (*Zarathustra*, II, 2)<sup>133</sup>

God had represented “being,” but with the “death of God” there is no longer anything to give meaning to the concept. The *Übermensch* is the replacement for God, and it is into the *Übermensch* that all of man’s hopes, longings, and fears are to poured.<sup>134</sup>

Nietzsche, in an aphorism for *The Twilight of the Idols*, gives his conception of the great man and of genius. The great man lies at the end of an age; he is a finale:

The great human being is a finale; the great age—the Renaissance, for example—is a finale. The genius, in work and deed, is necessarily a squanderer: that he squanders himself, that is his greatness. The instinct of self-preservation is suspended, as it were; the overpowering pressure of outflowing forces forbids him any care or caution... He flows out, he overflows, he uses himself up, he does not spare himself—and this is a calamitous, involuntary fatality, no less than a river’s flooding the land. Yet, because much is owed to such explosives, much has also been given them in return: for example, a kind of higher morality. After all, that is the way of human gratitude: it *misunderstands* its benefactors. (*Twilight*, “Skirmishes,” 44)<sup>135</sup>

Kaufmann’s comment on this aphorism is:

For Nietzsche, the *Übermensch* does not have instrumental value for the maintenance of society: he is valuable in himself because he embodies the state of being for which all of us long; he has the only ultimate value there is; and society is censured insofar as it insists on conformity and impedes his development.<sup>136</sup>

In aphorism 49 Goethe is cited as a type of the great man; he is “not a German event, but a European one.” Goethe bore the strongest instincts of the eighteenth century within himself, “the sensibility, the idolatry of nature, the anti-historic, the idealistic, the unreal and revolutionary....” The kind of being that Goethe created out of himself was one that was whole; Goethe fought with himself “the mutual extraneousness of reason, senses, feeling, and will.” Nietzsche concludes by referring to him as a “Dionysian” man.<sup>137</sup> Kaufmann, in his *Nietzsche*, concurs in evaluating Goethe as Nietzsche’s example of the *Übermensch*.<sup>138</sup>

The Nietzschean *Übermensch* can be seen to be an occurrence that is not primarily biological. He is the product of an emotional and intellectual event. He is the man who has powerful feelings and intellect, but whose feelings are controlled, not extirpated. A survey of Nietzsche’s next book, *The Antichrist*, will show that his critique of Christian morality is aimed at what he considers the priestly drive to extirpate the passions. In aphorism 1 of the chapter “Morality as Anti-Nature” of *Gotzen-Dämmerung* Nietzsche had said that

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<sup>133</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 197–8.

<sup>134</sup> Hollingdale, *Nietzsche*, 98–9.

<sup>135</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 548.

<sup>136</sup> Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 276.

<sup>137</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 554.

<sup>138</sup> Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 278.

“The Church fights passion with excision in every sense: its practice, its “cure,” is *castratism*.”<sup>139</sup> This is precisely what the *Übermensch* does not do. In him the passions are controlled, or sublimated, so that, for instance, strong sexual drives may be directed towards the creation of art, or to science, or to philosophy. This attitude of control and redirection of the passions is precisely what Nietzsche sees as Goethe’s dominant characteristic.

Section 639 of *The Will to Power* contains a passage that is suggestive of Don Juan’s criterion for the Superman:

The sole way of maintaining a meaning for the concept “God” would be: God *not* as the driving force, but God as a maximal state, as an epoch—a point in the evolution of the will to power by means of which further evolution just as much as previous evolution up to him could be explained. (*Will*, 639) [Spring–Fall 1887]<sup>140</sup>

### Nietzsche and the Will to Power

In aphorism 99 of *The Gay Science* Nietzsche criticizes what he considers to be Schopenhauer’s “mystical embarrassments and subterfuges.” His list of these “mystical embarrassments and subterfuges” includes:

... the unprovable doctrine of the *One Will*... the *denial of the individual* (“all lions are at bottom only one lion:” “the plurality of individuals is mere appearance,” even as *development* is mere appearance: he calls Lamarck’s idea “an ingenious but absurd error”).... (*Gay*, 99)<sup>141</sup>

That Nietzsche would later turn to a monistic conception and use the will to power as a means of explaining numerous phenomena does not imply that he in any way returns to a Schopenhauerian conception of the will. Nietzsche, in rejecting the Schopenhauer’s “*One Will*,” rejects a tradition of German Idealism. The concept of the will to power, which is not enunciated until *Zarathustra*, “is primarily a psychological hypothesis, although Nietzsche occasionally wondered whether it could not perhaps be extended to all living beings and possibly even beyond that realm to inorganic nature.”<sup>142</sup>

Nietzsche, through *Zarathustra*, proclaims the will to power in the section entitled “On the Thousand and One Goals.”

A tablet of the good hangs over every people. Behold, it is the tablet of their overcoming; behold it is the voice of their will to power.

Praiseworthy is whatever seems difficult to a people; whatever seems indispensable and difficult is called good; and whatever liberates even out of the deepest need, the rarest, the most difficult—that they call holy. (*Zarathustra*, I, 15)<sup>143</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 487.

<sup>140</sup> Nietzsche, *Will*, 340.

<sup>141</sup> Nietzsche, *Gay*, 153. Kaufmann, in commenting on this aphorism, points out that in one of his notes Nietzsche “describes Hegel and Lamarck as the proponents of a truer doctrine of evolution than Darwin’s” (Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 258).

<sup>142</sup> Kaufmann, *Mind*, 77.

<sup>143</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 170. *Zarathustra* is cited by part and chapter number, thus “*Zarathustra* I, 15.”

What is difficult is praiseworthy. This is not a formulation that suggests conquest of others as much as it does that of achieving what is most difficult for oneself. A physical image of what Nietzsche means can be seen in athletic contests. This linkage to athletic struggles is not as farfetched as it seems. Zarathustra continues with a summary of the values of four nations, and the first example is that of the Greeks:

“You shall always be the first and excel all others: your jealous soul shall love no one, unless it be the friend”—that made the soul of the Greek quiver: thus he walked the path of his greatness.<sup>144</sup>

This is the image of the *agon*, or struggle. Nietzsche, in an early essay, had stated that the impulse behind Greek culture was that of the struggle, the contest.<sup>145</sup> It is noteworthy that the only people who are named who are “powerful and eternal” are the Jews. The Jews have become powerful solely on the basis of their morality.<sup>146</sup>

Kaufmann’s contention is that Nietzsche is at this point positing the idea that rather than there being a qualitative difference between brawn and brains there is “a quantitative difference between degrees of power.”<sup>147</sup> The talk of self-overcoming suggests a dialectical thought rather than a monistic one. The problem here is the nature of the thing that did the overcoming, and the nature of the thing that was overcome. It is easy enough to say one aspect of the personality overcame another aspect of the personality, but that is to split an integral whole, a human being, into parts, and after all even multiple personalities inhabit only one body.

In the section “On Self-Overcoming” Nietzsche presents the will to truth as a form of the will to power. It is a drive to make all things thinkable:

“Will to truth,” you who are wisest call that which impels you and fills you with lust?

A will to the thinkability of all beings: this I call your will. You want to *make* all being thinkable, for you doubt with well-founded suspicion that it is already thinkable. But it shall yield and bend for you. Thus your will wants it. It shall become smooth and serve the spirit as its mirror and reflection. That is your whole will, you who are wisest: a will to power—when you speak of good and evil too, and of valuations. You still want to create the world before which you can kneel: that is your ultimate hope and intoxication. (*Zarathustra*, II, 12)<sup>148</sup>

Hollingdale comments that, “Every living thing ‘is an obeying thing’: and even that which commands itself is still obedient, inasmuch as it obeys its own commands....”<sup>149</sup> This leaves unanswered the question as to how the split between the part that commands and the part that obeys is dealt with by Nietzsche. That Nietzsche recognized that there is a split is made clear in Zarathustra’s subsequent comments:

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<sup>144</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 170.

<sup>145</sup> See the essay “Homer’s Contest.” Nietzsche, *Portable*, 32–9. See also Hollingdale’s comments in his *Nietzsche*, 78–9

<sup>146</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 171. See also Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 174.

<sup>147</sup> Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 174.

<sup>148</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 225.

<sup>149</sup> Hollingdale, *Nietzsche*, 91.

What persuades the living to obey and command, and to practice obedience even when it commands?

Hear, then, my word, you who are wisest. Test in all seriousness whether I have crawled into the very heart of life and into the very roots of its heart.

Where I found the living, there I found will power, and even in the will of those who serve I found the will to be master. (*Zarathustra*, II, 12)<sup>150</sup>

### Nietzsche: A Summary

In this lengthy treatment of Nietzsche's philosophy we have tried to sketch in some detail his philosophy and its development. We asked a number of questions at the outset and should now be prepared to give at least partial answers. We asked about Nietzsche's relation to Darwinism, and we have found that he accepted the notion of evolution but he denied that evolution tended in the direction of progress. On the contrary, it could just as easily lead to degeneration. He saw the typical man as being inferior to the heroic man, to the *Übermensch*, and this meant that the weaker flourished at the expense of the stronger.

We asked if the *Übermensch* had any relation to either the Lamarckian or the Darwinian theories of evolution. Here we have seen that the *Übermensch* is not a biological phenomenon but a moral one. He is the man in whom passions (affects) are strong but who is able to sublimate and redirect them to his own ends. He is in short a man who has overcome himself, and perhaps the foremost example of this type of man is Goethe.

The will to power is related to this question, and we have seen that in his notes Nietzsche explores the possibility that it exists in beings other than men and that it plays a role in shaping physiology. This is not the explicit position of his published writings, and probably had no influence on Shaw. The will to power does not originally have any relation to the Schopenhauerian will. It is not a metaphysical principle that creates reality, but rather something that is inherent in man and probably in the animal world as well.

The ethics of the *Übermensch* are not the ethics of Milton's Satan or of the Marquis de Sade. The references to cruelty and to hardness appear to be extreme and certainly are meant to be shocking, but the cruelty and the hardness are directed inward and can be interpreted in ways that are not all that different from the counsels on *asceticism* (self discipline) of some saints. The primary ethical basis of Nietzsche's revaluation of all values is that he looks at the virtues and sees the hypocrisy that is resident in these very virtues. For Nietzsche there is a considerable difference between the person who aids a bum on a grate out of a surplus of good feeling, because he has the power to help, and the person who goes out and uses the bum to manifest his own *ressentiment* at society and mankind in general for its mistreatment of him. In the latter person the ethics that are operative are those that Nietzsche identifies as those of the Christian, the slanderer of life and of mankind. In the former, particularly in light of what Nietzsche said in *The Antichrist*, there is a different motivation, a different *ethos*, operating, and it is the different origin of the ethical impulse that Nietzsche sees in the noble man. Essentially the two moralities revolve around the difference between *ressentiment*, which manifests itself in acts of revenge, pettiness, malice and so on, and the ethics of the great-souled man who recognizes his talents and abilities and demands that much be given to him as a result of an accurate estimation of his own

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<sup>150</sup> Nietzsche, *Portable*, 226.



worth. In this respect Nietzsche is in tune, as we have seen, with Aristotle's conception of *megalopsychia*.

Nietzsche's philosophy, as complex and manifold as it is, represents what may be a source of enormous influence on Shaw. Even if the influence is minimal, there are still grounds for exploring the relationship between Nietzsche and Shaw further.

### **Samuel Butler and Evolutionary Theory**

Samuel Butler started out as a Darwinist and became a Lamarckian. His views on many things were as unorthodox as his views on biology. He believed that Nausicaa wrote *The Odyssey*, and he wrote a book, *The Authoress of the Odyssey*, to prove this contention. He parodied Victorian philistinism, but his heroes, if we are to believe that Ernest Pontifex's admiration for Towneley is an accurate portrait, were upper class snobs.

Butler believed that, even though he was not a scientist, he had made contributions to evolutionary theory. Butler is quoted by R. A. Streatfeild, in his preface to the third edition of *Life and Habit*, as saying that these contributions were "The identity of heredity and memory," "the re-introduction of teleology into organic life," and "an attempt to suggest an explanation of the physics of memory." Butler adds a fourth contribution that he wishes to make, the connection of vibrations with "the physical constitution of that body in which the memory resides...."<sup>151</sup>

Butler's early Darwinism can be found in the chapters on machines in *Erewhon*, and his later vitalist position can be found in *Life and Habit; Evolution, Old and New; Unconscious Memory; and Luck, or Cunning*. His later evolutionary views can be shown to be instantiated on a metaphorical level in *The Way of All Flesh* and to shape the way in which Ernest is described in that book.

#### ***Erewhon* and the Book of Machines**

Gertrude Himmelfarb recognized a Darwinian argument in *Erewhon*:

In his youth Butler had been an enthusiastic admirer of Darwin, and even his two early works, *Darwin among the Machines* and *Erewhon*, which have been commonly taken to be satires on Darwinism, were, in fact, Butler's way of expressing appreciation by stretching an idea to its imaginative limits.<sup>152</sup>

That the argument was stretched to its limits can be seen almost immediately when Butler begins discussing consciousness. The need to account for consciousness cannot be fulfilled in a strictly Darwinistic conception of evolution, and Butler, as we shall see, makes sharp deviations from the Darwinian version of evolution.

The Darwinian argument of *Erewhon* is conveyed in the three chapters that make up *The Book of the Machines*. This is supposed to be a dissertation written by a philosopher that purports to show that machines will eventually become the dominant species and enslave man. The argument starts off with a geological speculation:

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<sup>151</sup> Samuel Butler, *Life and Habit*, 1877, (London: Jonathan Cape; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1923) xiv, vol 4 of *The Shrewsbury Edition of the Works of Samuel Butler*, eds Henry Festing Jones and A. T. Bartholomew, 20 vols., 1923. All future references will be cited by page in the text.

<sup>152</sup> Himmelfarb, 436-7.

There was a time, when the earth was all appearance utterly destitute both of animal and vegetable life, and when according to the opinion of our best philosophers it was simply a hot round ball with a crust gradually cooling. Now if a human being had existed while the earth was in this state.... Would he not have denied that it contained any potentiality of consciousness? Yet in the course of time consciousness came. Is it not possible then that there may be even yet new channels dug out for consciousness, though we can detect no signs of them at present?<sup>153</sup>

Butler does not raise the question of what consciousness is or how it can exist in material bodies. Its existence is sufficient for him, as is the possibility that consciousness could exist in new as well as in present biological forms. It is therefore possible that new advances in machinery could bring with them an increase in consciousness:

A mollusc has not much consciousness. Reflect upon the extraordinary advance which machines have made during the last few hundred years, and note how slowly the animal and vegetable kingdom are advancing.... Assume for the sake of argument that conscious beings have existed for some twenty million years: see what strides machines have made in the last thousand. (199)

Butler asserts a kind of knowledge on the part of plants. This knowledge, obviously, cannot be intellectual knowledge, because a plant has no brain. Butler continues on by asserting that plants must grow because of an inner necessity which resides within them. A plant, such as a potato, does not say anything about its needs for sunlight, nourishment, and so on. Rather it sends out tubers and other parts to accumulate these things:

The potato says these things by doing them, which is the best of languages. What is consciousness if this is not consciousness? (178)

What the potato has said is that it will express its strength by sending out tubers and by overshadowing any neighbors that are too weak to compete with it. Butler, or the Ludite philosopher, is explicitly attributing consciousness and will to plants, a claim that neither Darwin nor Lamarck made. At this point, however, Butler had not broken with Darwin, and it can be asserted that he is not making a Lamarckian statement. He is attempting to show that machines can evolve. To do this he has to attribute life of some kind to them, and this means that he must show that there is a kind of consciousness inherent in all of life. That this consciousness is different from that of humankind does not particularly bother him. The assertion implicit here is that in order for a being to recognize a certain object as being food for it, it must *know* that the object is food.

Butler has met the objection that the potato does things by a purely chemical and mechanical means by asserting that it is therefore necessary to inquire "whether every sensation is not chemical and mechanical in its operation" (178).

The Erewhonian philosopher, having assumed that consciousness exists on a cellular level, proceeds to raise the possibility that either what we have called mechanical and unconscious contains "more elements of consciousness than has been allowed," in which case

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<sup>153</sup> Samuel Butler, *Erewhon*, 1872 (1901), (London: Jonathan Cape; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1923) 175, vol 2 of *The Shrewsbury Edition of the Works of Samuel Butler*, eds Henry Festing Jones and A. T. Bartholomew, 20 vols., 1923. All subsequent references are cited by page in the text.

the higher machines contain elements of consciousness; or, if the theory of evolution is true, but there is no consciousness in vegetables and minerals, we have descended from beings that had no consciousness. In the latter case there is no implausibility in suggesting that machines may become conscious (179–80).

The Erewhonian philosopher's argument proceeds by analogy: "What is a man's eye but a machine for the little creature that sits behind in his brain to look through" (182). The dead eye is nearly as good as the living eye except for the fact that the little creature behind the eye is gone.<sup>154</sup> Many of Butler's arguments here consist of analogies. The wood or coal necessary to stoke a steam, or vapor, engine is feeding the engine. The process of converting the energy released by the combustion of fuel is digestion, and so on. Ultimately machines even have a reproductive system of sorts. This involves the assemblage of parts in the factory. If a machine is made by another machine that is of some apparently unrelated type, that is no objection to saying that the machine reproduces. Different insects, after all, do not resemble their mature selves at various stages of development. Butler's example is that of a thimble being produced by some machine other than a thimble. Every machine is "a city or society," and "each member of [it] was bred truly after its kind." To say that this reproductive facility does not arise from a "single centre" is not scientific; each machine has "its own special breeders," whose sole function is to breed only one part and the combination of the parts into the whole is merely "another department of the mechanical reproductive system" (190).

The Erewhonian philosopher divides machines into "genera, subgenera, species, varieties, subvarieties, and so forth." This is the Linnean system of biological classification but is applied in a systematic way to machines. The philosopher is therefore able to point out the similarities that exist between the organs of one machine and that of another.

The idea which was to become a hallmark of the later Butler and to figure prominently in *The Way of All Flesh* is enunciated here:

A man is the resultant and exponent of all the forces that have been brought to bear upon him, whether before his birth or afterwards. His action at any moment depends solely upon his constitution, and on the intensity and direction of the various agencies to which he is, and has been subjected. Some of these will counteract each other; but as he is by nature, and as he has been acted on, and is now acted on from without, so will he do, as certainly and regularly as though he were a machine. (194)

In the later works of Butler this idea will be encapsulated into the idea that because a man starts life as part of somebody else, or two somebody elses, that he contains the effects of all the events that have happened to them. Since this applies to his immediate ancestors as well as to him, that means that they encapsulate the experiences of their ancestors. This keeps spreading by the power of two until ultimately every person contains the experience of everybody that preceded him back to the primal amoeba.

The Luddite Erewhonian philosopher is answered by another philosopher, and this philosopher contends that machines are merely an extension of the motor and sensory apparatus of man. The spade is an inorganic extension of the arm that has been adapted to

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<sup>154</sup> Strangely enough Butler seems to have anticipated corneal transplants. The cornea of a dead person is furnished to a living one.

digging; the computer is an inorganic extension of the brain that has been adapted to calculating. It is the second writer who sounds a note best characterized as social Darwinism:

The one serious danger which this writer apprehended was that the machines would so equalize men's powers, and so lessen the severity of competition, that many persons of inferior physique would escape detection and transmit their inferiority to their descendants. He feared that the removal of the present pressure might cause a degeneracy of the human race, and indeed that the whole body might become purely rudimentary, the man himself being nothing but soul and mechanism, an intelligent but passionless principle of mechanical action. (203)

This is phrased in unmistakably Darwinian language. The emphasis on competition and the use of "pressure" is suggestive of passages in Darwin where the emphasis is placed on the competition for food brought about by the pressure of growing populations. Present here is the idea that persons of inferior physique must be prevented from breeding. This means that the herd of men is to be culled and the rejected specimens kept from breeding either by enforced chastity, sterilization, or elimination. This would prevent their inferiority from being passed on. The idea of Social Darwinism was that the poor and the homeless and the dispossessed were those incapable of surviving in the world and that to offer them relief would be not only to prolong their misery, but also to encourage them to breed and to produce more of their kind.

Butler here anticipates Shaw's *Back to Methuselah* with his prediction that "the whole body might become purely rudimentary." He also anticipates Lilith's speech at the end of that play when he refers to "that old philosophic enemy, matter, the inherently and essentially evil..." (204).

In these three chapters Butler has attempted to use machines as an analogy to illustrate the evolution of life from inanimate matter. In order to do this, however, he has had to do something that Darwin did not do in the *Origin*. He had to inquire into the origins of consciousness. To account for consciousness arising from a purely material source, it is necessary either to postulate that consciousness is inherent in matter, or that there is no difference in kind between the consciousness of machines and the consciousness of biological beings. This attempt to account for consciousness almost immediately causes him to depart from strict Darwinism. He attributes volition to the potato, which, as we have already said, is something that neither Darwin nor Lamarck ever did. If beings are descended from a common ancestor, and the only way in which they can do something is by doing what their ancestors did, then they must in some fashion remember the actions of their ancestors. That they do not consciously remember them but act on the unconscious memories of their ancestor's actions means that Butler has done two things. He has departed from strict Darwinism, and he has found a means of accounting for heredity that will serve to satisfy his need to provide a philosophical foundation for his beliefs.

### **Life and Habit**

Butler, in *Life and Habit*, continues to present his views on evolution. He also continues to use analogy as a method of argument. His first analogy is that of a piano player. The pianist who has learned a piece perfectly is able to play it without consciously attending to the position of his fingers on the keyboard. This means that he has acquired a habit by

practice and that it has become largely unconscious. The pianist has forgotten the finger drills and the exercises that brought him to perfection. The same, of course, applies to other arts and skills, such as ice skating or typing. The fact that one has to pay attention to something means that one is not perfect in the art. The fact that a typist has to look at the keyboard means that the typist is not a very good typist. Now if these things are true, then it follows that the same can be said for the habits that we acquired before birth. These must have been learned at some time, but we have done them so often that they have become unconscious. The analogy thus proceeds if we learn things and forget the process of learning them and these things, such as typing, piano playing, and bicycling are unconscious. Then it follows that other processes, breathing, circulating blood, digesting food, are activities that we once consciously performed and have forgotten (2-5). Butler states his conclusion thus:

We draw the inference, therefore, as regards pianoforte or violin playing, that the greater the familiarity or knowledge of the art, the less is there consciousness of such knowledge... On the other hand, we observe that the less the familiarity or knowledge, the greater the consciousness of whatever knowledge there is (4).

Playing the piano is something which is “acquired long after birth,” and is “never thoroughly familiarized to the point of absolutely unconscious performance” (8). The only exceptions are those individuals of genius who manage to forget that they know that they know.

Butler’s answer to the problem of the human expert, the one who understands without being educated, is that he has learned these things in his past life either directly or through his ancestors. Butler’s contention is “that on becoming intense, knowledge seems also to become unaware of the grounds on which it rests, or that it has or requires grounds at all, or indeed even exists.” Butler also maintains that this intuition is just as “scientific” as the professorial scientism. “The nice sensible people who know what’s what” are just as scientific as the “professorial classes” (29).

This distinction between the “nice sensible people” and the “professorial classes” leads Butler to make a distinction between two kinds of knowledge. The first is the knowledge of the pioneer. This is knowledge that is recently acquired and that the pioneer himself has not so fully mastered that he is unconscious of it.

When Butler leaves the epistemological questions and turns to the question of voluntary actions, his response is much the same; the will is also something that can be exercised unconsciously:

What is true of knowing is also true of willing. The more intensely we will, the less is our will deliberate and capable of being recognized as will at all. So that it is common to hear men declare under certain circumstances that they had no will, but were forced into their own action under stress or temptation. But in the more ordinary actions of life, we observe, as in walking or breathing, that we do not will anything utterly and without remnant of hesitation, till we have lost sight of the fact that we are exercising our will.(36)

Every action is therefore willed. I must consciously will to type the next character of this sentence and must will to hit the space bar to separate words from each other. That I do

not consciously will this for every letter only means that the exercise of the will has become habitual to me as I type. Typing is, however, a relatively late acquisition, something most of us learn in our teens. Other actions are learned earlier, such actions as eating and drinking. An infant learns to drink from a cup sometime in his first year and to eat from a plate and to take solid food sometime after that. The infant is already born with a certain amount of knowledge. For example, he knows how to suck once he is given the breast or the bottle. Butler's argument is that all of these actions imply that they were at some time voluntary and that the earlier the action is learned the more intense and the more unconscious it becomes. These actions must be part of the child's experience and in such a way that they are experienced "in the child's own person" (38).

Take again the processes of digestion, the action of the heart, and the oxygenization of the blood—processes of extreme intricacy, done almost entirely unconsciously, and quite beyond the control of our volition. (39)

He breaks actions down into three categories:

I. [Actions] [t]hat we are *most conscious of and have most control over*, such habits as speech, the upright position, the arts and sciences—which are acquisitions peculiar to the human race, always acquired after birth, and not common to ourselves and any ancestor who had not become entirely human.

II. [Actions] [t]hat we are *less conscious of and have less control over*, eating and drinking (provided the food be normal), swallowing, breathing, seeing and hearing—which were acquisitions of our prehuman ancestry, and for which we had provided ourselves with all the necessary apparatus before we saw light, but which are still, geologically speaking, recent.

III. [Actions] [t]hat we are *most unconscious of and have least control over*, our digestion and circulation—powers possessed even by our invertebrate ancestry, and geologically speaking, of extreme antiquity. (42)

This provides Butler with a hierarchy of actions. The key determinant in this hierarchy is the relative geological age at which these powers were acquired. This principle provides Butler with a means of explaining how actions, such as the circulation of the blood, can be voluntary, even though they are done unconsciously. Butler uses an example of the infant sucking at the mother's breast:

Shall we say that a baby of a day old sucks (which involves the whole principle of the pump and hence a profound practical knowledge of the laws of pneumatics and hydrostatics), digests, oxygenizes its blood—millions of years before anyone had discovered oxygen—sees and hears, operations that involve an unconscious knowledge of the facts concerning optics and acoustics compared with which the conscious discoveries of Newton are insignificant—shall we say that a baby can do all these things at once, doing them so well and so regularly without being even able to give them attention, and yet without mistake, and shall we also say at the same time that it has not learnt to do them, and never did them before?

Such an assertion would contradict the whole experience of mankind. Surely the *onus probandi* must rest with him who makes it. (44–5)

Butler's great principle, which enables him to have the will involved in evolution and to have the unconscious memory as the principle of heredity, is that a man is continuous with his parents. In other words, he proposes that there is a continuity between the soma plasm and the germ plasm. Body and sperm, or body and ovum, share in the same identity and the same experience according to Butler. This leads him to denigrate the birth experience because it represents a discontinuity between man and sperm, woman and ovum, woman and child:

Birth has been made too much of. It is a salient feature in the history of the individual, but not more salient than a hundred others, and far less so than the commencement of his existence as a single cell uniting in itself elements derived from both parents, or perhaps than any point in his whole existence as an embryo. For many years after we are born we are still very incomplete. We cease to oxygenize our blood vicariously as soon as we are born, but we still derive our sustenance from our mothers. Birth is the beginning of doubt, the first hankering after scepticism, the dreaming of a dawn of trouble, the end of certainty and of settled convictions. (49)

These views lead Butler to conclude that birth is not the time when we start living, but "it is the point at which we leave off knowing how to live" (50).

Butler raises the question of recapitulation, the belief that ontogeny repeats phylogeny, and asks:

Why should the embryo of any animal go through so many stages—embryological allusion to forefathers of a widely different type? And why, again, should the germs of the same kind of creature always go through the same stages? If the germ of any animal now living is, in its simplest state, but part of the personal identity of one of the original germs of all life whatsoever, and hence, if any now living organism must be considered without quibble as being itself millions of years old, and as imbued with an intense though unconscious memory of all that it has done sufficiently often enough to have made a permanent impression; if this be so, we can answer the above questions perfectly well. The creature goes through so many intermediate stages between its earliest state and its latest development, for the simplest of all reasons, namely, because this is the road by which it has always hitherto travelled to its present differentiation; this is the road it knows, and into every turn and up or down of which it has been guided by the force of circumstances and the balance of considerations. (102)

Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny because that is the only way that the creature knows how to become what it is destined to become. This doctrine is crucial to understanding *The Way of All Flesh*, and is the heart of Butler's doctrine. We are continuous with our ancestors, and so every movement of evolution is an addition to the material that must be recapitulated in the womb. In Butler's view we recapitulate our phylogeny because it is the only route for us to take.

The way in which this affects Butler's evolutionary theory is as follows: If our personalities are continuous with our parents and theirs with their parents and so forth to the  $n^{\text{th}}$  generation, it follows that we remember the actions of our ancestors. If we encounter

a new situation, but not one that is so new as to leave us utterly at a loss, we can fuse the new with the old. Butler puts it “in plain English,” as:

...if any one gives us a new idea which is not too far ahead of us, such an idea is often of great service to us, and may give new life to our work—in fact, we soon go back, unless we more or less frequently come into contact with new ideas, and are capable of understanding and making use of them; if, on the other hand, they are too new, and too little led up to, so that we find them too strange and hard to be able to understand them and adopt them, then they put us out, with every degree of completeness, from simply causing us to fail in this or that particular part, to rendering us incapable of even trying to do our work at all, from pure despair of succeeding. (135)

The implication of this for evolution is that if an organism encounters some new challenge, it will try to respond in ways that are similar to the ways in which it met previous challenges. This will bring about an adaptation in the organism and hence contribute to evolution.

Butler explicitly associates evolution with desire and will:

I do not forget that artificial breeding has modified the original type of the horse and the dog, till it has at length produced the dray-horse and the greyhound; but in each case man has had to get use and disuse—that is to say, the desires of the animal itself—to help him. (166)

Earlier passages in the same chapter convey the same idea: animals change because they want to change. Here is an explicit statement of the belief that we saw Shaw enunciate in the preface to *Back to Methuselah*.<sup>155</sup>

Butler devotes two chapters of criticism to Darwin’s hypothesis. One is entitled “Lamarck and Mr. Darwin,” and the second one is entitled “Mr. Mivart and Mr. Darwin.” In the chapter devoted to Lamarck and Darwin, Butler gives a synopsis of Lamarck’s theory:

The more simple bodies...are easily formed, and this being the case, it is easy to conceive how in the lapse of time animals of a more complex structure should be produced, *for it must be admitted as a fundamental law, that the production a new organ in an animal body results from any new want or desire it may experience.* [Italics Butler’s] (206–7)

This is not Butler’s summary of Lamarck, but a summary which he quotes from volume 36 of the *Naturalist’s Library*, an 1843 publication. Since Butler never quotes Lamarck directly, at least not in *Life and Habit*, that leaves the possibility that Butler did not know Lamarck’s writings directly. He may have known him only by selected quotations or by the representations of other writers. That Butler may have known Lamarck only indirectly is supported in his statement:

Nor do *I gather* that Lamarck insisted on continued personality and memory so as to account for heredity at all, and so as to see life as a single, or as at any rate, only a few, vast compound animals, but without the connecting organism

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<sup>155</sup> Page 1, above.



between each component item in the whole creature, which is found in animals that are strictly called compound. [*Italics mine.*] (207)

In another spot Butler says of Lamarck, “He also *appears* to have mixed up matter with his system...” [*Italics mine*] (209). The italicized words in these fragments are words that are normally used to indicate indirect knowledge or lack of detailed familiarity. These phrases are inexact, and their inexactness gives us reason to believe that at this stage Butler did not know Lamarck directly.

Butler’s main contributions to evolutionary theory, in *Life and Habit*, can be summed up as follows:

1. The organism is identical with its ancestors.
2. Every instinctive action represents a memory of a previous action.
3. Heredity and memory are identical.
4. Personal identity, as it is commonly thought of, is denied.
5. The “great principle” of evolution is the organism’s “sense of need” (242).
6. “Life, then, is faith founded upon experience, which experience is in turn founded upon faith—or more simply, it is memory” (243).

These are the basic elements of Butler’s belief in evolution as of 1876–7, when *Life and Habit* was written.

### **Evolution, Old and New**

Butler claimed that he had re-introduced teleology into biology and that he had done this in *Evolution, Old and New*.<sup>156</sup> Rather than an intensive look at Butler’s remaining evolutionary works, a brief summary of the principal points that he raises is in order here.

Butler starts out by asserting that organs are living tools and that as tools they have a function. No tool is made without a purpose, so organic tools must have been made by a mind that had a purpose in mind. Butler rejects the idea of a creative God and so the mind that fashions the organ must reside in the creature that uses the tool.<sup>157</sup> Most of the book is devoted to sketches of the early evolutionists, including Buffon, and Erasmus Darwin. Butler also devotes several chapters to Lamarck. Butler recognizes that Lamarck believed that animals could not feel unless they had a nervous system and a spinal marrow (31, 224). He recognizes that both Lamarck and Darwin reject purpose in evolution (34).

By the time of the first edition (1879) of *Evolution, Old and New* Butler had read Lamarck, in French, in an edition of 1873 (231). A considerable portion of this edition is translated in the “Summary of ‘Philosophie Zoologique’” (230–77). Butler denies Lamarck’s assertion that lower animals cannot think and feel:

Who can tell what ideas a worm does or does not form? We can watch its actions, and see that they are such as involve what we call design and a perception of its own interest. (225)

<sup>156</sup> Page 59, above.

<sup>157</sup> Samuel Butler, *Evolution, Old and New*, 1879, (London: Jonathan Cape; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1923) 1–3, vol 5 of *The Shrewsbury Edition of the Works of Samuel Butler*, eds Henry Festing Jones and A. T. Bartholomew, 20 vols., 1924. Hereafter cited in the text.

This is a view that is almost behavioristic in its design. The behaviorist asserts that we can know only what we observe. We can observe behavior, such as pigeons pecking at levers or mice running mazes, but we cannot observe mental states. Butler contends that we can observe the behavior of worms and by seeing if the behavior is such as that which implies thought determine that the worm thinks.

Butler's conclusions can be summarized as these: the Darwinian theory has removed teleology from evolution (7); the fact that organs are tools implies a designer, but this designer is the organism itself (1-3). Lamarck is recognized by Butler as denying teleology, but Lamarck does, according to Butler, assert that mind can influence the body. Finally, Butler asserts that if each step in the process of evolution has been purposive, then the whole of evolution is purposive (338). Butler has thus reintroduced teleology back into evolutionary studies just as he claimed.

### **Unconscious Memory**

In *Unconscious Memory*, Butler gives an exposition and translation of a paper by Ewald Hering of the University of Prague and compares it to Edward Von Hartmann's "Philosophy of the Unconscious." Details of these theories need not concern us now. Butler does, however, state that he arrived at his theory of the unconscious prior to knowing the work of Dr. Hering.<sup>158</sup>

Butler makes the following points in *Unconscious Memory*:

1. The early followers of Charles Darwin, among whom he counts himself, did not know that the earlier writers on evolution had found the accumulation of variations in species not to be "fortuitous and indefinite," but to be the result of a "sense of need" (5-6).
2. He denies the possibility of an extra-terrestrial origin for life, and he denies the possibility of a creative God (a "quasi-anthropomorphic being") (13).
3. He questions the mechanistic interpretation of nature, but finds that such a belief implies a designer (14-5).
4. He asserts that we are able to do something in the biological realm out of habit and contends that this implies that we and our ancestors are identical (18).
5. He acknowledges that he read Lamarck after writing *Life and Habit* (31-32).
6. He extends the principle, already stated, of our identity with our ancestors, to embrace all life.
7. He adopts Hering's belief that "memory is due to vibrations of the molecules of the nerve fibres, which under certain circumstances recur, and bring about a corresponding recurrence of visible action"<sup>159</sup> (59).
8. Butler concludes that "The true theory of unconscious action, then, is that of Professor Hering." Hering holds, according to Butler, that "the action of all living beings, from the moment of conception to that of fullest development, to

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<sup>158</sup> Samuel Butler, *Unconscious Memory*, 1880, (London: Jonathan Cape; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1923) 3, vol 6 of *The Shrewsbury Edition of the Works of Samuel Butler*, eds Henry Festing Jones and A. T. Bartholomew, 20 vols., 1924. Hereafter cited in the text.

be founded in volition and design.” This involves the “older ‘Darwinism’ and theory of Lamarck” (161).

Most of this, except for the credit he gives to Hering for his independent discovery of the identity of parent and offspring, is present in *Life and Habit*. What is new is the conception that memory is to be explained in terms of molecular vibrations. This constitutes Butler’s attempt to explain the “physics” of memory.

### **Luck, or Cunning**

*Luck, or Cunning* is Butler’s last book on evolution and is by and large a repetition of much that he has said in his previous books.<sup>160</sup> He repeats the idea that heredity is a species of memory. As a corollary of this, it follows that old age and senility are due to not remembering what we have already done (3). He again recognizes that Lamarck did not speak of design but insists that his ideas are a corollary to Lamarck’s philosophy (7). He repeats that he found Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, and Lamarck to offer a way out of the quandary as regards descent and design, if their ideas were joined to the concept that “heredity is only a mode of memory” (9). Charles Darwin, according to Butler, substituted “the survival of the luckiest fittest, for the survival of the most cunning fittest, as held by Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck” (132). Butler concludes by saying that:

The theory that luck is the main means of organic modification is the most absolute denial of God which it is possible for the human mind to conceive—while the view that God is in all His creatures, He in them and they in Him, is only expressed in other words by declaring that main means of organic modification is, not luck, but cunning.

Except for the 1890 essay “The Deadlock in Darwinism,” this is the final word that Butler wrote on evolution. Butler has throughout these four books insisted on the identity of parent and child, on the unconscious self as being the true genius of any person, and on the volitional aspect of evolution. In his final book, *The Way of All Flesh*, he used the evolutionary metaphor to shape his narrative structure.

### **The Way of All Flesh**

*The Way of All Flesh* opens not with the birth of Ernest Pontifex, Butler’s *alter ego* and protagonist, but with a description of his great-grandfather. Old Mr. Pontifex is described as having learned to draw and in a curious passage the narrator, Overton, comments,

*I wonder how they will actually cease and come to an end as drawings, and into what new phases of being they will then enter.*<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>159</sup> The acceptance of this idea involves Butler in the absurd idea that when light strikes the eye a counter of some sort goes off and says “This packet of light has 482,000,000,000,000 vibrations in it and is therefore red; this other packet has 707,000,000,000,000 vibrations and is therefore violet.” The number of vibrations is a function of energy and the color that is perceived is the result of a chemical reaction that occurs within the eye.

<sup>160</sup> Samuel Butler, *Luck, or Cunning?*, 1887, (London: Jonathan Cape; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1923) vol 8 of *The Shrewsbury Edition of the Works of Samuel Butler*, eds Henry Festing Jones and A. T. Bartholomew, 20 vols., 1924.

Drawings are not ordinarily thought of as having an end and entering into new phases of being. The emphasis here is not on the drawings but on the process of change by which one thing becomes transformed into another. A little later on Old Mr. Pontifex is described as being a musician, a builder and a player of organs (2), talents that will reappear in Ernest Pontifex three generations later.

In this passage, which opens the novel, two key ideas are already encapsulated, the idea of development and change and the idea of heredity. Butler's concept of heredity was not one of straight descent, but one that envisioned leaps over generations in the passing on of talents and abilities.

The child and the parent are continuous; they are one until such time as the child leaves the parent either as a spermatozoon or as a fully developed fetus. Butler, through Overton, suggests that the "weak place in George Pontifex's armour" comes from not having had great wealth earlier in the family; that it is necessary for the enjoyment of great wealth to be part of the "transmitted education of some generations" (19).

In a passage of Thomas Huxley's from "The Origin of Species," of 1860, Huxley speaks of the inheritance of a mutated characteristic, having six fingers or toes, and comments:

In these instances, therefore, the variety, as it were, leaped over one generation to reproduce itself in full force in the next.<sup>162</sup>

We see in Butler's comments the idea that the emergence of a new type must be preceded by a period of fallowness in which the organism gathers energy for a new leap to a higher level.

Butler here establishes the heredity out of which Ernest comes and lays the groundwork for the emergence in Ernest of characteristics that were in his great-grandfather and that will reappear in him. Butler takes seriously the idea of a man's children being a continuation of himself, with the result that we are all more or less exact reproductions of our ancestors. As Georg Roppen remarks:

If it be granted, moreover, that growth and reproduction is a process of memory, then the total history of life appears in a new light. It reveals how organisms have been able to vary, how, in fact, evolution has been a creative and advancing process....<sup>163</sup>

When Ernest is sent to school, we find Butler enunciating a central principle of his creed. It is a characteristic of man, or indeed of any highly evolved species, Butler argues, that much that is done is done unconsciously. He constructs an imaginary dialogue between the "dumb Ernest" (dumb in this context meaning mute) and the conscious Ernest. The "dumb Ernest" says:

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<sup>161</sup> Samuel Butler, *The Way of All Flesh*, 1903, (London: Jonathan Cape; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1923) 1, vol 17 of *The Shrewsbury Edition of the Works of Samuel Butler*, eds Henry Festing Jones and A. T. Bartholomew, 20 vols., 1923. Italics mine. All future references are to this edition and are cited by page in the text. Unless otherwise indicated all italics in the Butler quotations are mine.

<sup>162</sup> Huxley, *Darwiniana*, 38.

<sup>163</sup> Roppen, 334.

This conscious self of yours, Ernest, is a prig begotten of prigs and trained of priggishness....Obey *me* [italics Butler's], your true self....I, Ernest, am the God who made you. (131)

This emphasis on the unconscious self and the idea that the natural processes of growth depend on the attention of the self, even though in an unconscious manner, are linked to Butler's views on evolution. If an organism can do something, it must have learned how to do it. The passage from *The Way of All Flesh* is parallel to the passage from *Life and Habit*, in which he reflects on this very point and contends that a day-old baby has a *practical* knowledge of pneumatics, hydrostatics, optics and acoustics.<sup>164</sup>

The intellectual crux of the novel comes at the opening of Chapter 47, when Overton says "It must be remembered that the year 1858 was the last of a term during which the peace of the Church of England was singularly unbroken" (205). The peace was broken by the publication of Darwin's *Origin* and the realization that Darwin had found a means to to effectively banish mind and teleology from the universe. This banishment negated the purpose that could be seen in the theories of special creation. The horrified reaction to Darwin, at least as depicted by Huxley, can be seen in the essay "The Origin of Species," in which he refers to the "pietists", "bigots", and "old ladies of both sexes." Huxley denounces the theory of special creation and points out that it is just as inconsistent "with the Hebrew view as any other hypothesis," at least as that view is "at present maintained by men of science." Ultimately the doctrine of special creation is "a mere specious mask for our ignorance."<sup>165</sup>

The cause of this hostile reaction on the part of the clerical audience, and the intellectual, if not the emotional, reason for Butler's rejection of Darwinism, can be found in Darwin's rejection of teleology.

Butler's belief in a purpose to evolution, in the play of the cards rather than in the mere dealing of them, and in Lamarckism, leads to a different destiny for Ernest than he would have had at the hands of a determinist, such as Zola. This is one of the hallmarks of Lamarckism, as interpreted by Butler, the belief in the power of the will to effect changes in the living organism and for these changes to be passed on to succeeding generations. Lamarck had stated something like this doctrine in the *Recherches sur l'organisation des corps vivans* of 1801 in his example of the crane that *wishes* to avoid immersing its body in liquid<sup>166</sup> and in his later example of the giraffe, which because of its feeding habits stretches its neck, given in the *Zoological Philosophy* of 1809.<sup>167</sup>

Habit, for Lamarck and for Butler, was to become the means of the acquisition of organs. Habits are acquired by use or disuse, that is to say: one acquires an organ through trying to do something, and this results in an organic adaptation that becomes a new organ.

When Ernest greets Mr. Shaw, the freethinker, with his admiration for Whateley's *Historic Doubts*, he is taken aback by Mr. Shaw's witty comment. Butler uses a Lamarckian image here, when he has Ernest ask himself why the clever people in Cambridge had not come up with the same answer.

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<sup>164</sup> Page 64, above.

<sup>165</sup> Huxley, *Darwiniana*, 22, 54, 58.

<sup>166</sup> See Burkhardt, xxx.

<sup>167</sup> Lamarck, 122. Page 16, above.

The answer is easy: they did not develop it for the same reason that a hen had never developed webbed feet—that is to say, because they did not want to do so; but this was before the days of Evolution, and Ernest could not as yet know anything of the great principle that underlies it. (260)

The principle of evolution here is not natural selection, but wishing, desiring. The seed planted by Mr. Shaw results in Ernest going to the British Museum Reading Room to read *Vestiges of Creation*.

Ernest is so stunned by his encounters with Mr. Shaw and with Chambers' book that he fails "to realize the change which was coming over him. In each case the momentum of old habits carried him forward in the old direction" (262). The key word here is *habit*. Ernest's intellectual habits are undergoing a change, and with them his psychological habits as well. Ernest has up to this point been a mere embryo, in fact a relatively undeveloped embryo, almost, in fact, a blastoderm.

Heredity is for Butler a determinant of behavior, but his people are not solely determined by the influence of heredity and environment. Ernest can change his destiny by an act of the will, and Overton, upon Ernest's release from prison, points out "the rapidity with which development follows misfortune, if the sufferer is young and of a sound temperament" (295). When Ernest leaves prison, Butler has a number of comments on the process of accommodation between the "changed and unchanged selves" and the "changed and unchanged surroundings." The successful being accommodates the "internal and external changes." There is, however, no difference between the internal and external; subject and object are one. Butler recognizes this as absurd and illogical, but suggests that one must learn to live with this absurdity (304).

Butler returns to the influence of the environment when he calls poverty "a quasi-embryonic condition, through which a man had better pass if he is to hold his later developments securely" (346) and to his theory of effort in his image of the fly on the top of a cup of coffee. The "supermuscan effort" may result in the fly experiencing an "increase in moral and physical power which might even descend in some measure to his offspring" (358). These passages parallel and symbolize Ernest's attempts to find a trade for himself, first as a tailor and later as a writer, and Ernest's relationships with people. The fly serves as a metaphor for Ernest's entanglement in the social world. His involvement with people that he admired would have, in Butler's view, resulted in Ernest modifying his views to the extent of putting on a mask and tying his tongue. Butler acknowledges that the fly would not have gotten "the increased moral power if he could have helped it, and he will not knowingly alight upon another cup of hot coffee" (358–9).

The second reference, that of the fly, striving through "supermuscan effort" to liberate itself from the hot coffee, concretizes the ideas of habit and effort that are involved in the Lamarckian view of evolution. The fly's attempts at liberation result in an adaptation, an acquisition, that affects its somatoplasm and hence its germplasm. Ernest's attempts to liberate himself from the influence of the social world which, like the hot coffee surrounding and threatening the fly, surrounds and threatens him, must in some measure cause an adaptation in Ernest, an adaptation that can be passed on to his future offspring.

Georg Roppen has listed six major mnemonic laws in Butler's evolutionary theory. These are as follows: first, there is a tendency to remember and repeat the sensory impressions we have most recently received or the actions we have most recently performed. Second, habitual actions will be repeated by our descendants. Third, habitual actions or memories

may be changed by new ideas as long as the new ideas do not seriously conflict with the established habits. The fourth law is that we tend to forget an action once it has become habitual and instinctive. Fifth is the law of association which claims that the once forgotten memories can be recalled by the organism's unconscious memories to resolve problems that have already been resolved by its ancestors. The sixth law is that a memory can recur that breaks the chain of associations and that this accounts for the reversion to older types and structures.<sup>168</sup> These laws can be seen in our discussion of Butler's evolutionary books and in the incidents of *The Way of All Flesh*. Examples of the way in which Butler's evolutionary doctrine is instantiated at the level of plot can be found throughout the text.

### **The Question of Shaw's Knowledge Prior to *Man and Superman***

Our reading of Lamarck and Darwin insists that neither of them explicitly believed that organisms changed through the application of their will to their bodies. Schopenhauer, on the other hand, believed that organisms were the manifestation or representation (*vorstellung*) of a metaphysical principle which he called will. Nietzsche started out as a disciple of Schopenhauer but departed from his philosophy in a number of ways, and his concept of the will to power is not a metaphysical concept. Nietzsche did experiment with the idea of the will to power as explaining the phenomena of nature, but these experiments were in his notebooks and not primarily in his published works. Butler, as we have seen, did explicitly believe in the will as the creative force behind evolution. The problem then becomes one of determining the extent of Shaw's knowledge of these writers and then relating it to his own writings and showing what modifications these ideas underwent at his hands. The first part of the problem can be stated in a paraphrase of a question that was popular in the early 70's: "What did Shaw know, and when did he know it?"

Rather than looking, in this section, at Shaw's published writings, we will look at Shaw's letters and diaries.<sup>169</sup> Shaw's published writings, including *The Quintessence of Ibsenism*, *The Perfect Wagnerite*, and selected plays will be discussed in the chapters that follow. Shaw's dramatic writings, including the prefaces, and his extended essays, such as *The Quintessence of Ibsenism*, are not scholarly tomes. These writings do not indicate, as a rule, when he read something. The published writings also fail to provide us with an accurate guide to the extent of his reading. A reference to Goethe, for example, in a dramatic preface does not indicate that Shaw knew Goethe in detail, and such references are lacking in the apparatus that enables one to pinpoint the exact source of his statement, or when he read the work in question. The letters, diaries, and book reviews may be taken to form a more reliable indicator of Shaw's current interests and reading than the dramatic texts because they concentrate on Shaw's daily experiences and contain a more contemporaneous response to situations than do the dramatic texts or the non-dramatic writings of the same period. This should assist us in forming some idea of the period when Shaw became acquainted with the writers under discussion.

There is no mention of Lamarck in Shaw's diaries. The first mention of Lamarck in the published letters is in a letter to E. C. Chapman dated the 29th of July, 1891:

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<sup>168</sup> Roppen, 333-4.

<sup>169</sup> George Bernard Shaw, *Bernard Shaw: The Diaries 1885-1897 With Early Autobiographical Notebooks and Diaries, and an Abortive 1917 Diary*. ed. Stanley Weintraub (University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982) 2 vols. Subsequent references are cited by volume and page in the text.

Darwin searched with extraordinary diligence for facts to support his theory of natural selection. Surely you do not contend that he was equally eager in discovering the facts that support the Lamarckian theory of functional adaptation. Writers like Samuel Butler have had no difficulty in convicting him of gross partiality towards his own theory. And yet you will not easily find a more unquestionably honest investigator than Darwin.<sup>170</sup>

What can be seen in Shaw's reference here is the following: that he shows some familiarity with Darwin, enough to comment on his diligence in gathering facts; that he considers the Lamarckian theory to be one of functional adaptation, i.e., use and disuse; that he is aware of Butler's writings about Darwin and evolution. Shaw makes reference to Butler on another occasion. This time he is writing to William Archer, the letter is dated the 10th of November 1891. Shaw refers to Archer's translation of *Ghosts* and his conventional moral standards, and compares him unfavorably to Butler (Letters, I, 325–6).

Shaw's criticism of Darwin can be seen to date back even earlier than this. In a letter to Edward Aveling dated May 17, 1887, Shaw writes, "Darwin clearly overstressed natural selection." Here the criticism of Darwin is rather slight. At this point Shaw evidently felt that there was some basis for the doctrine of natural selection, but he had not yet abandoned it in favor of willed evolution. Shaw also noted a lecture on Darwin in his diary entry for 12 January 1888 (*Diaries*, I, 338).

There is another, much later, reference to Lamarckism in a letter to H. G. Wells dated 12th December 1901:

Besides, this turning from the simple truth of Lamarckism to the mechanical rationalism of Natural Selection is very unpromising. A man who cannot see that the fundamental way for a camelopard to lengthen his neck is to want it longer, and to want it hard enough, and who explains the camelopard by a far-fetched fiction of an accidentally long necked Romeo of the herd meeting an accidentally long necked Juliet, and browsing on foliage which the other Montagues and Capulets could not reach, ought really to be locked up! Tell Reid to read Samuel Butler's *Luck or Cunning*, [sic] and to bear in mind that the difference, so far, between the Pentateuch and the scriptures of the scientific materialism of the sixties, is the difference between shrewd nonsense and DAMNED nonsense.<sup>171</sup>

Shaw's knowledge of Darwin's antagonist, Butler, can be dated to 28 February 1887 when he read *Luck, or Cunning* in the British Museum (*Diaries*, I, 246). He met Butler on 15 November 1889 and heard him lecture 5 March 1893 and 24 April 1893 (*Diaries*, I, 453, 559; II, 913, 926). *Luck, or Cunning* is Butler's last book on evolution, but it does appear to be the first book of his that Shaw read. This means that Shaw's knowledge of Lamarck could derive from Butler's interpretation of the *Zoological Philosophy*. Butler first encountered Lamarck in an article *about* Lamarck, and only later from a reading *of* Lamarck's book. This means, that if Shaw read Lamarck after he read Butler, which appears to be the case, he would have received his voluntarist reading of Lamarck from Butler.

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<sup>170</sup> George Bernard Shaw, *Collected Letters 1874–1897*, ed. Dan H. Laurence, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. 1965) 301. Hereafter cited in the text "Letters, I."

<sup>171</sup> George Bernard Shaw, *Collected Letters 1898–1910*, ed. Dan H. Laurence, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. 1972) 246. Hereafter cited in the text "Letters, II."



In a letter to William Archer dated 25th October 1891 Shaw comments on Schopenhauer and his relation to *The Quintessence of Ibsenism*:

As to Schopenhauer, you have seized only the vaguest generalization of his synthesis—so vague that it seems identical with your equally vague generalization of mine.... I have taken his distinction between the intellect and the will, a natural fact which has always been preached (as I have pointed out) in one form or another. but which he undoubtedly brought clearly into the light of modern thought. That does not make me a Schopenhaurist, or Ibsen one. His pessimism and his conviction that the will was the devil and the intellect the divine saviour, marks him off from me and from Ibsen in the clearest and most fundamental way.... My whole book is a protest against the Genganger, the dread of the will and the blind faith in the intellect. And as to pessimism, not only ought the last page of my first Fabian Essay to publicly absolve me from all suspicion of it, but the Quintessence first disposes of it by implication on the simple ground that it *is* an ISM.... The fact is, you have done just what you think I did: you have fished one notion out of Schopenhauer, or rather out of his reputation, and you call that Schopenhauerism. In any case, the second and third sentences of your third paragraph simply mean that I have given “my” doctrine a wantonly obscurantist air by using the terms of a philosophic synthesis which marked a great advance towards lucidity of thought. Of course you dont [sic] mean this; but just conceive the confusion of mind you must have attained in order unsuspectingly to leave such holes in your article. (*Letters*, I, 316–7)

Shaw claims to have taken over Schopenhauer’s distinction between intellect and will but not his pessimism. Schopenhauer’s belief was that the will created the world of appearance, which was illusory, and which he termed Maya (the Sanskrit word for illusion). The way of redemption, for Schopenhauer, can be found in asceticism, or in artistic activity. Both of these attempt to negate the will and cut through the veil of illusion. Shaw is placing himself in opposition to Schopenhauer on this point and contending that the will is primal and not evil or illusory. Shaw further implies he was familiar with Schopenhauer and that he made use of the whole of his philosophy.

Shaw asserts that the distinction between Will and Reason is not new, which is true, but then he goes on to say that he has pointed out the antiquity of the notion and the forms in which it existed before Schopenhauer’s grandfather was born. This is common Shavian practice. Shaw typically asserts, as we will see in later passages, that idea X is similar to idea Y. This may be correct up to a point, but Shaw typically goes beyond the point at which it is correct, links disparate ideas, and then claims that because they are similar they are identical.<sup>172</sup>

This letter to Archer may show some familiarity with Schopenhauer—certainly it shows more than a passing knowledge—but it does not necessarily indicate any depth. The entries in the diaries record that Shaw read Schopenhauer’s essay on the metaphysics of love on 22 October 1888 (*Diaries*, I, 424). He seems to have read more of Schopenhauer in 1891 and 1892, when the diaries record two more entries 27 July 1891 and 24 January 1892 (*Diaries*, II, 742, 789). Neither of these entries includes any commentary on Shaw’s reading.

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<sup>172</sup> See the discussion beginning on page 85, below.

There are several passing references to Nietzsche in the letters and one letter that is rather amusing, in that it assumes a somewhat Nietzschean attitude. Jack the Ripper began preying on London prostitutes during 1888. Some writers asked “Is Christianity a Failure?” Shaw wrote a letter to *The Star* dated September 19, 1888:

Sir:

Why do you try to put the Whitechapel murders on me? Sir Charles Warren is quite right not to catch the unfortunate murderer, whose conviction and punishment would be conducted on my father's old lines of an eye for an eye, which I have always consistently repudiated. As to the eighteen centuries of what you call Christianity, I have nothing to do with it. It was invented by an aristocrat of the Roman set) [St. Paul], a university man whose epistles are the silliest middle class stuff on record. When I see my name mixed up with it in your excellent paper, I feel as if nails were going into me—and I know what that sensation is like better than you do. Trusting that you will excuse this intrusion on your valuable space,

I am, Sir &c

J.C. [Jesus Christ] (*Letters*, I, 197)

While it does not necessarily show Nietzsche's influence, this letter does show an attitude similar to that of Nietzsche. Shaw, like Nietzsche, does not regard Jesus as the inventor of Christianity, that honor he gives to St. Paul. Unlike Nietzsche's characterization of Paul, in *The Antichrist*, as the most Jewish of the Jews, Shaw characterizes Paul as an upper class British snob. But, like Nietzsche, he repudiates the idea of revenge and punishment and attributes it to the Biblical Jehovah.

Shaw has said that his first acquaintance with Nietzsche came through a German mathematician, a Miss Borchardt. The diaries put the date for this meeting at 30 January 1894 (*Diaries* II, 1009). The first definite evidence that Shaw had read Nietzsche can be found in a letter to Janet Achurch dated the 4th of April, 1896. The C. C. referred to is Charles Charrington, Janet Achurch's husband, and the translation is that by Thomas Common of *Nietzsche contra Wagner*:

The translation of Nietzsche's work—the first volume, at least—is out. If C. C. gets a chance of borrowing it, tell him to do so. He would enjoy some of it. (*Letters*, I, 621)

Shaw reviewed the translation in the April 11, 1896 issue of *Saturday Review*.

Between 1898 and 1902, the year preceding the performance and publication of *Man and Superman*, the following references to Nietzsche occur:

1. In a letter to William Archer dated 24th January 1900, Shaw, in referring to *Mrs. Warren's Profession* says: “I put on the stage for the first time a dramatization of those three generations which we have both seen arise: the old fashioned pious people, the generation of Mrs Fawcett, Lydia Becker, Stuart Mill &c, and the new Socialist-Nietzsche generation” (*Letters*, II, 138).

2. In a letter H. M. Hyndman dated 28th April 1900, Shaw refers to “Nietzsche’s Tran[s]valuation of Moral Value & On t’other side of Good & Evil,” and links it to Blake’s Marriage of Heaven and Hell (*Letters*, II, 162).
3. In a letter to Siegfried Trebitsch (his German translator) dated 26th December 1902, he says “I want the Germans to know me as a philosopher, as an English (or Irish) Nietzsche (only ten times cleverer)...” (*Letters*, II, 298).

Except for the reference to Schopenhauer these letters do not show a great familiarity with the work of the non-British authors that we are considering. One question that might be asked about Shaw’s familiarity with Nietzsche is when he could have read him in either the original or in translation. David Thatcher has prepared a table that shows Nietzsche’s principal works, the dates of their German publication, and the dates of the earliest French and English translations.

A look at Table 1 shows that the earliest work of Nietzsche’s to be published was *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), and the latest *Ecce Homo* (1908). If Shaw knew German, he could have known most of Nietzsche’s work up to and including *The Genealogy of Morals*.<sup>173</sup> There were no French translations between *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*, the fourth of the *Untimely Meditations*, and 1892. Between 1892 and 1902, the year prior to *Man and Superman*, 12 of Nietzsche’s works were translated into French, 11 of these were translated in the period 1898–1902. The only major works that were not available in French by this time were *The Will to Power*, which, for reasons already stated, is not really a book, and *Ecce Homo*.

Table 2 shows the same works but sorted by date of first English translation. If Shaw was monolingual and could only read Nietzsche in English translation, he could have read the first seven works in the table prior to writing *Man and Superman*. He could have read none of these works prior to writing the *Quintessence*.

The question, then, is does any of Shaw’s writing show any familiarity with Nietzsche? Shaw, as already stated, reviewed Thomas Common’s translation of *The Case of Wagner* and recommended it to Janet Achurch. He also reviewed translations of *A Genealogy of Morals*, [sic] *Poems*, and *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. The review, entitled “Giving the Devil His Due,” appeared in *The Saturday Review* for 13 May 1899.

The review starts by tracing the fortunes of the publishing firm Henry & Co., a venture operated by John T. Grein, the founder of the Independent Theatre. Shaw, in the second paragraph, gives credit to Fisher Unwin for continuing with the publication of the translations originally undertaken by Henry & Co.

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<sup>173</sup> Shaw’s own statement on linguistic familiarity with German is from the preface to *Jitta’s Atonement*: I can neither claim knowledge of the German language nor plead ignorance of it. I am like most literary persons: I have spent several holidays in Germany (mostly in Bayreuth), and have just managed to ask my way, and get what I want in the shops and the railway stations, without the aid of an interpreter. The proverbial bits of Goethe and Wagner and Nietzsche are familiar to me.... When I opened the pages of Frau Gitta’s *Sühne*, I was driven to the dictionary.... Shaw also notes he had to spell the heroine’s name Jitta, “to avert having her name pronounced with a hard G.” (The hard G pronunciation is the correct pronunciation.) Shaw continues that “even a very bad translation may be a wonderful feat for a translator who does not know the language” (VI, 376–77). For a discussion of Shaw and his translators see Holroyd, *Power*, 48–9, 53–4, *et passim*. Shaw in a letter to Trebitsch dated September 15, 1920 says, “I do not know German.” George Bernard Shaw, *Collected Letters 1911–1925*, ed. Dan H. Laurence, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. 1985). Hereafter cited in the text “*Letters*, III.”

The heart of Shaw's review comes in the third paragraph. He says that "Nietzsche is a Devil's Advocate of the modern type."<sup>174</sup> Shaw then compares Nietzsche to Blake:

But nobody ever dreamt of openly defending the devil himself as a much misunderstood and fundamentally right-minded regenerator of the race until the nineteenth century, when William Blake boldly went over to the other side and started a devil's party.<sup>175</sup>

Shaw then goes on to expatiate about the fortunes of the Devil's party, Swinburne, Mark Twain, and the Parisian decadents. He identifies Ibsen as a dramatist in league with the Diabolonian party. So far none of this has been about Nietzsche, except for the first line.

Shaw then makes his most extended comment on Nietzsche:

After the dramatist came the philosopher. In England G. B. S.: in Germany, Nietzsche. Nietzsche had sat at the feet of Wagner, whose hero, Siegfried, was also a good Diabolonian. Unfortunately, after working himself up to the wildest enthusiasm about Wagner's music, Nietzsche went to Bayreuth and heard it: a frightful disillusion for a man barely capable of Carmen. He threw down his idol, and having thus tasted the joys of iconoclasm (perhaps the one pursuit that is as useful as it is amusing) became an epigrammatic Diabolonian; took his stand "on the other side of good and evil"; "transvalued" our moral valuations; and generally strove to rescue mankind from rulers who are utterly without conscience in their pursuit of righteousness.<sup>176</sup>

Work	German	French	English
<i>The Birth of Tragedy</i>	1872	1901	1909
<i>Thoughts out of Season</i>	1873	1907	1909
<i>Richard Wagner in Bayreuth</i>	1876	1877	1909
<i>Human, All Too Human</i>	1878	1899	1909
<i>Miscellaneous Opinions and Maxims</i>	1879	1902	1909
<i>The Wanderer and His Shadow</i>	1880	1902	1909
<i>The Dawn of Day</i>	1881	1901	1903
<i>The Gay Science</i>	1882	1901	1910
<i>Thus Spake Zarathustra</i>	1883-5	1898	1896
<i>Beyond Good and Evil</i>	1886	1898	1907
<i>The Genealogy of Morals</i>	1887	1900	1899
<i>The Case of Wagner</i>	1888	1892	1895
<i>The Twilight of the Idols</i>	1889	1899	1896

**Table 1: Translations of Nietzsche <sup>a</sup>**

<sup>174</sup> George Bernard Shaw, *Pen Portraits and Reviews*, (New York: Wm. H. Wise & Co., 1932) 230, vol. 29 of *Ayot St. Lawrence Edition The Collected Works of Bernard Shaw*.

<sup>175</sup> Shaw, *Pen*, 230.

Work	German	French	English
<i>Nietzsche Contra Wagner</i>	1895	1899	1896
<i>The Antichrist</i>	1895	1899	1896
<i>Poems</i>	1895	1909	1899
<i>The Will to Power</i>	1899–1902	1903	1909–10
<i>Ecce Homo</i>	1908	1909	1911

**Table 1: Translations of Nietzsche (Continued)<sup>a</sup>**

a. For Thatcher's table see David S. Thatcher, *Nietzsche in England 1890–1914 The Growth of a Reputation*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970) x.

Although this shows Shaw's appreciation of Wagner and his music, it does not show a very great understanding of why Nietzsche broke with Wagner. Further, it seems to denigrate Nietzsche's capacity as a judge of music, largely in order to boost Wagner. Shaw does not elaborate on what the Nietzschean transvaluation of values means, and makes no statement that shows that he understood that Nietzsche wrote something more than epigrams. The *Genealogy* is in fact three extended essays, and Shaw's review glosses over this fact.

Work	German	French	English
<i>The Case of Wagner</i>	1888	1892	1895
<i>Thus Spake Zarathustra</i>	1883–5	1898	1896
<i>The Twilight of the Idols</i>	1889	1899	1896
<i>Nietzsche Contra Wagner</i>	1895	1899	1896
<i>The Antichrist</i>	1895	1899	1896
<i>The Genealogy of Morals</i>	1887	1900	1899
<i>Poems</i>	1895	1909	1899 <sup>a</sup>
<i>The Dawn of Day</i>	1881	1901	1903
<i>Beyond Good and Evil</i>	1886	1898	1907
<i>Richard Wagner in Bayreuth</i>	1876	1877	1909 <sup>b</sup>
<i>Human, All Too Human</i>	1878	1899	1909
<i>The Birth of Tragedy</i>	1872	1901	1909
<i>Miscellaneous Opinions and Maxims</i>	1879	1902	1909
<i>The Wanderer and His Shadow</i>	1880	1902	1909
<i>Thoughts out of Season</i>	1873	1907	1909

**Table 2: English Translations of Nietzsche by Date**

<sup>176</sup> Shaw, *Pen*, 231.

<b>Work</b>	<b>German</b>	<b>French</b>	<b>English</b>
<i>The Will to Power</i>	1899-1902	1903	1909-10

**Table 2: English Translations of Nietzsche by Date (Continued)**

Work	German	French	English
<i>The Gay Science</i>	1882	1901	1910
<i>Ecce Homo</i>	1908	1909	1911

**Table 2: English Translations of Nietzsche by Date (Continued)**

- a. The works in this block are the earliest *English* translations of Nietzsche that Shaw could have known prior to writing *Man and Superman*. All were published subsequent to the publication of *The Quintessence of Ibsenism*.
- b. The work in this row is the earliest *French* translation that Shaw could have known and is the only one prior to the publication of *The Quintessence of Ibsenism*. Shaw could not have known *The Will to Power*, *Thoughts Out of Season*, or *Ecce Homo* prior to writing *Man and Superman* unless he read German. He could have known all of the other works in French translation. He could not have known *Ecce Homo* at all prior to writing *Man and Superman*.

Shaw's final paragraph in the review states the name of the volume and the translator. Shaw comments on *Zarathustra* in his final sentence: "Thus spake Zarathustra, a diffusion of Diabolonian wisdom in the guise of a concentration of it, has been reissued in a companion volume."<sup>177</sup> Shaw closes his review with this evaluation of *Zarathustra*. The review does not, in fact, indicate that Shaw even read the books in question prior to reviewing them.

Name	Date of Earliest Acquaintance	Source
Butler	2/28/87	Diaries
Darwin	1870's (?)	Preface to <i>Back to Methuselah</i>
Lamarck	7/29/91	Letters <sup>a</sup>
Nietzsche	1/30/1894	Diaries <sup>b</sup>
Schopenhauer	10/22/88	Diaries <sup>c</sup>

**Table 3: Dates of Shaw's Earliest Knowledge**

- a. Shaw's indirect knowledge of Lamarck must be roughly contemporaneous with his reading of *Luck, or Cunning*, since Lamarck is referred to in that work.
- b. The first English translation of Nietzsche was dated 1895; subsequent to Shaw's meeting with Miss Borchardt. All of the French translations, except for the essay on Wagner, come after his meeting with the mathematician.
- c. Helen Zimmern (1846-1934), who translated *Beyond Good and Evil* into English, published *Arthur Schopenhauer: His Life and His Philosophy* in 1876 as well as other materials. Nietzsche credited her with introducing Schopenhauer to the English (Nietzsche, *Basic*, 185, note 11).

Shaw's knowledge, as gleaned from his letters, diaries and from the review of Nietzsche may be tentatively classified as follows: he knew both Darwin and Butler; he knew Lamarck well enough for him to say that Lamarck regarded the cause of evolution as func-

<sup>177</sup> Shaw, *Pen*, 231.

tional adaptation, i. e., use and disuse, rather than will, as he does later; he knew Schopenhauer sufficiently for him to castigate Archer's lack of knowledge; he knew Nietzsche only superficially. He may have glanced at the books he was assigned to review, but the review we have cited does not show that he even read the books. This appears to be a fair assessment of the state of Shavian knowledge prior to the composition of *Man and Superman*.